Opinion
1101N
December 31, 2002.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Stephen Crane, J.), entered March 22, 2001, which, on motions by both sides to confirm in part and reject in part a report of J.H.O. Martin Evans, awarded plaintiffs counsel fees of $453,902.44 plus interest and $58,138.13 in expenses, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Judith L. Spanier, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Pro Se, for Defendants.
Before: WILLIAMS, P.J., TOM, ELLERIN, MARLOW, JJ.
In light of our finding that the nominal defendant corporation benefitted from plaintiffs' litigation (see Seinfeld v Robinson, 246 A.D.2d 291), the motion court properly declined to make no award or only a nominal award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel. Contrary to the arguments on the main appeal, the motion court properly exercised its broad power to accept or reject the report of the Judicial Hearing Officer (see Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose LLP, 288 A.D.2d 14, 15,lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 608, cert denied 536 U.S. 924, 122 S.Ct. 2590; Interlink Metals v. Kazdan, 222 A.D.2d 55, 59). The conclusion of the motion court that the overall benefit obtained on the corporation's behalf was relatively slight is supported by the record and consistent with this Court's prior decisions in this action (see Seinfeld, supra, 246 A.D.2d at 300; Seinfeld v. Robinson, 277 A.D.2d 24) and other legal authority (see e.g. United Operating Company v. Karnes, 482 F. Supp. 1029, 1031-32). Moreover, the record supports the motion court's conclusion as to the reasonable value of services based on the benefit (see also id. at 1032 [benefit to corporation is limiting factor upon the appropriateness of fee]).
Since the right to cross-examine is fundamental (see State of New York v. Metz, 241 A.D.2d 192, 199), affidavits should not have been received by the Judicial Hearing Officer from witnesses who were not available for cross-examination in court (see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 182 Misc.2d 676, 678), and such affidavits were properly disregarded by the motion court in calculating attorneys' fees. In addition, the motion court properly exercised its discretion by deducting excessive investigation and travel costs. Moreover, the motion court properly denied recovery for efforts spent litigating the fee award (see Sage Realty, supra, 288 A.D.2d at 15; Savoie v. Merchant's Bank, 166 F.3d 456, 461; Mautner v. Hirsch , 32 F.3d 37, 39).
We have considered the parties' remaining arguments for affirmative relief and find them unavailing.
Motion seeking leave to compel objector-appellant to pay his share of costs for joint record on appeal granted.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.