Summary
finding jury considered total entitlement for injuries where jury "had before it the entire list of injuries suffered by appellant and not a mere portion allocable to [one party] alone"
Summary of this case from Ginn v. Stonecreek Dental CareOpinion
No. 87-1194
Submitted May 18, 1988 —
Decided August 3, 1988.
Judgments — Damages determined by jury — Satisfaction of judgment leaves no enforceable claims against other parties, when.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-850897.
Ten-year-old Lisa A. Seifert complained of abdominal pains, nausea and vomiting to the family's pediatrician, Lee Burroughs, M.D. Dr. Burroughs diagnosed the condition as one of acute gastritis and, over an approximate two-day period, prescribed various medications. When the condition did not respond to this treatment, the doctor referred her to the Test Referral Center at Children's Hospital Medical Center where she was admitted on August 23, 1980. Thereafter, she was diagnosed as suffering from acute appendicitis and immediately underwent surgery. During this surgery, it was discovered that the appendix had burst and that the fluids released therefrom had inflamed the abdominal tissues (diffuse peritonitis). Various drainage devices were placed in her body to control the accumulation of fluids.
Over the next two days Lisa's condition did not improve and, in fact, became worse. On August 25, hospital physicians discovered that fluids were accumulating in Lisa's pleural cavity. It was determined that insertion of a chest tube was required in order to provide drainage of this area. Dr. Mohammed S. Singapuri, who was a third-year surgical resident, performed the insertion on the morning of August 26. Shortly thereafter, the fluid being drained displayed a partial blood content, which suggested internal bleeding. It was thereafter determined that the drainage tube had been misplaced and had cut into the diaphragm, resulting in internal bleeding.
On August 27, a second surgery was performed, during which the laceration to the diaphragm was apparently repaired. Nevertheless, Lisa's condition continued to deteriorate until August 30, 1980, when she died. At the parents' request, no autopsy was performed.
On August 7, 1981, Lisa's father filed a complaint, later amended, both individually and as the administrator of Lisa's estate (hereinafter "appellant"), alleging wrongful death and various survivorship claims. The defendants included Dr. Burroughs and appellees herein, Dr. Singapuri and the Children's Hospital Medical Center. There followed an arbitration proceeding in which all defendants prevailed but which appellant appealed. The matter then proceeded to trial which lasted almost three weeks. By the close of the trial, the court had granted all defendants' motions for directed verdicts dismissing all punitive damage claims against them, as well as the negligence claims against both Dr. Singapuri and the hospital. The jury was presented with the claims of negligence against Dr. Burroughs and the informed-consent claims against the hospital and Dr. Singapuri.
By its general verdict the jury determined that Dr. Burroughs was negligent but that appellees had not violated the informed-consent requirements. The jury verdict against Dr. Burroughs stated as follows:
"We, the Jury, being duly impaneled and sworn find in favor of the Plaintiff, against the Defendant, Dr. Lee Burroughs, and assess the amount due to the Plaintiff from the said Defendant at the sum of * * * ($1,187,000.00)."
Following the verdict, and entry of judgment by the trial court, appellant filed his notice of appeal from the trial court's decision directing verdicts in favor of appellees. Dr. Burroughs also appealed the jury's verdict against him. Thereafter, appellant and Dr. Burroughs entered into an agreement resulting in an "Entry of Satisfaction with Reservation of Rights," journalized by the trial court, which recited the following:
"The judgment heretofore entered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Lee Burroughs, M.D., having been fully satisfied, said satisfaction is herewith entered of record and the within action, as to Lee Burroughs, M.D. only, is herewith dismissed. * * *
"With this Entry, Plaintiffs respectfully reserve their right to proceed against Mohammed S. Singapuri, M.D. and Children's Hospital Medical Center."
After appellant dismissed his appeal against Dr. Burroughs, both appellees moved the court of appeals to dismiss the remainder of the appeal as to them because appellant had received a full satisfaction of his judgment. The court of appeals overruled the motions. Following a hearing, the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the judgment had been satisfied, which rendered the appeal moot.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Keating, Ritchie, Lyon Norwine, Michael F. Lyon and Kevin L. Swick, for appellants.
Bloom Greene Co., L.P.A., Gordon C. Greene and Stephen K. Show, for appellee Mohammed Singapuri, M.D.
Dinsmore Shohl, Frank C. Woodside III, John E. Schlosser and John E. Jevicky, for appellee Children's Hospital Medical Center.
The law of Ohio is well-settled that an injured party is entitled to only one satisfaction for his injuries, "and that receipt of full compensation from one of several persons whose concurrent acts of negligence are the basis of a suit for damages for personal injuries releases all." (Emphasis added.) Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker (1930), 122 Ohio St. 582, 589, 173 N.E. 194, 196; see, also, id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
More particularly, we have held that "in an action to recover damages * * * claimed to have been caused by * * * two defendants [where] the amount of damages sustained is determined by the jury * * *, the payment of such amount and receipt thereof by the plaintiff, releases both defendants." (Emphasis added.) Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Nickel (1929), 120 Ohio St. 133, 165 N.E. 719, at paragraph two of the syllabus. The same rule applies to the tender and acceptance of a compromise amount, which is followed by the trial court's journal entry that the judgment is satisfied. Gholson v. Savin (1941), 137 Ohio St. 551, 19 O.O. 309, 31 N.E.2d 858, 139 A.L.R. 75.
The foregoing is well-explained by the Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982) 40, Section 50, Comment d, at 43, which states:
"* * * The adjudication of the amount of the loss also has the effect of establishing the limit of the injured party's entitlement to redress, whoever the obligor may be. This is because the determination of the amount of the loss resulting from actual litigation of the issue of damages results in the injured person's being precluded from relitigating the damages question. * * * Therefore, when a judgment is based on actual litigation of the measure of a loss, and the judgment is thereafter paid in full, the injured party has no enforceable claim against any other obligor who is responsible for the same loss." (Emphasis added.)
The question then becomes whether the judgment in the instant case represented an award of damages for all of appellant's injuries or for only a mere allocable part of them. If for all injuries then the entry of satisfaction of judgment will have completely compensated him. On the other hand, if the judgment was for only a part of his injuries, then he was not fully compensated and is entitled to pursue his appeal.
Turning now to appellant's second amended complaint filed in the trial court, it is clear that he alleged all his asserted damages against each defendant. The damages were based entirely upon the death of Lisa Seifert and the pain and suffering she endured. Moreover, in the first cause of action, which was against Dr. Burroughs, appellant asserted at paragraph thirteen:
"The aforementioned negligence of the said Defendants in failing to properly diagnose and properly treat the illness and conditions from which Lisa A. Seifert was suffering, was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by Lisa and her subsequent death."
The damages which Dr. Burroughs was alleged to have proximately caused were set forth in the next two paragraphs. In the first, it was asserted that "Lisa A. Seifert was caused extreme physical and mental pain and suffering through August 30, 1980, the date of her death, all to which the plaintiffs have been injured in the amount of $2,000,000.00 * * * compensatory damages." (Emphasis added.) Next it was alleged that "the next of kin * * * were caused to suffer loss of support, comfort and care, medical expenses and funeral expenses, all to which the Plaintiffs have been injured in the amount of $750,000.00 * * * compensatory damages." (Emphasis added.) In the causes of action which followed, appellant set forth exactly the same injuries and damages claims against both appellees. Also, appellant asserted against each appellee individually that such appellee's negligence "was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by Lisa and her subsequent death."
A review of appellant's closing argument, wherein counsel interpreted the evidence and summarized appellant's claims, reveals that the negligence of Dr. Burroughs was asserted to be the proximate cause of all injuries complained of. Particularly illustrative, counsel asserted the following: "And I submit to you that Lisa got to the hospital and she was a dying girl, and she died because of Dr. Burroughs." Similarly, counsel set forth with particularity all the injuries asserted in their entirety.
It becomes apparent that the jury had before it the entire list of injuries suffered by appellant and not a mere portion allocable to Dr. Burroughs alone. The jury also considered all the allegations of Dr. Burroughs' negligence and the degree to which he may have proximately caused the various injuries. Consequently, the general jury award must be considered as a factual determination of appellant's total entitlement for those injuries. That being so, a full settlement of the amount adjudicated, which is entered of record, operates to satisfy the injuries complained of. All injuries having been compensated, the issues of joint or alternative causation become moot.
Accordingly, we find no error in the proceedings below and thus affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., LOCHER, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only.
SWEENEY, J., dissents.