Under the plain language of the statute, a defendant is automatically discharged if there is no adjudication of guilt prior to the completion of the probationary term. OCGA § 42-8-60 (g); Seibert v. Alexander , 351 Ga. App. 446, 451 (3), 829 S.E.2d 473 (2019) ; Ailara v. State , 311 Ga. App. 862, 864, 717 S.E.2d 498 (2011) (where trial court never revoked first offender status, or adjudicated defendant guilty, discharge was automatic once defendant completed his term of probation). Nevertheless, a trial court may revoke a first offender's status and adjudicate him guilty even if the term had expired as long as the State initiated revocation proceedings prior to the expiration of his term of probation.

See Brantley v. Jones , 363 Ga. App. 466, 467 n. 1, 871 S.E.2d 87 (2022) (sheriff's office is "not [a] separate legal entit[y] capable of being sued"); Seibert v. Alexander , 351 Ga. App. 446, 448 (1), 829 S.E.2d 473 (2019) (adopting persuasive federal authority that, in Georgia, a sheriff's office is not a legal entity that can be sued). Lundy has filed two related appeals challenging the trial court's rulings.

Brantley also asserted negligence claims against the City of Hiram Police Department and the Paulding County Sheriff's Office, but those are not separate legal entities capable of being sued. See McClain v. City of Carrollton Police Dept. , 361 Ga. App. 496, 498 (1), 863 S.E.2d 172 (2021) (holding that a city police department is not a legal entity that can be sued); cf. Seibert v. Alexander , 351 Ga. App. 446, 448 (1), 829 S.E.2d 473 (2019) (adopting persuasive federal authority that, in Georgia, a sheriff's office is not a legal entity that can be sued). In these related appeals, Brantley challenges the trial court's orders granting summary judgment to the City of Hiram and Darr (Case No. A21A1252) and granting summary judgment to the five detention officers (Case No. A21A1251).

Oglesby v. Deal , 311 Ga. App. 622, 626 (1), 716 S.E.2d 749 (2011). See Seibert v. Alexander , 351 Ga. App. 446, 449 (2), 829 S.E.2d 473 (2019) ("[i]t is the fact of service which confers jurisdiction, and not the return, and the latter may be amended to speak the truth"). See id.

Although the position of district attorney is provided for in the Georgia Constitution, neither the Georgia Code nor the Georgia Constitution establishes the office of district attorney as a separate legal entity capable of suing or being sued. Cf. Seibert v. Alexander , 351 Ga. App. 446, 448 (1), 829 S.E.2d 473 (2019) (holding that although the Georgia Constitution designated the county clerk of Superior Court as an officer of the county, nothing established the clerk's office as a separate legal entity, subject to direct suit). See also Dean , 951 F.2d at 1214-1215 (II) (B) ; Tyner , 2017 WL 579954, at *2 (II) ; Ward , 2007 WL 1822014, at *2 (III).

Importantly, under Georgia law, "there is no legal provision that designates a trial court clerk's office as either a person or corporation capable of being sued." Seibert v. Alexander, 829 S.E.2d 473, 477 (Ga.App. 2019). Accordingly, the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that a clerk's office "has no legal status" and "cannot be a legal party to litigation." Id.