Opinion
CV-24-01171-PHX-DGC
10-15-2024
Shai Segui, Plaintiff, v. Stephanie Stromfors; Diana Vigil; Randy Rand; Julie Verner; Yvonne Parnell; Donna Moniz; and Building Family Bridges, Defendants.
ORDER
David G. Campbell Senior United States District Judge
On October 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the Clerk of Court enter Defendant Randy Rand's default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Doc. 62 at 1. Plaintiff also requests that ten days from the filing of the motion, the Court enter default judgment against Defendant Rand. Id. at 2. This request is denied.
Default judgment under Rule 55 “is a two-step process: an entry of default judgment must be preceded by an entry of default.” Brooke v. Sai Ashish Inc., No. 1:21C-cv-00967-AWI-SAB, 2021 WL 4804220, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2021) (citing Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986)). The entry of default by the clerk “does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The district court's decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.”). The rule in this Circuit is “that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored. Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472.
What is more, while the Court may generally take as true the factual allegations of the complaint, it may not simply accept the amount of damages the plaintiff requests. See Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). “There must be an evidentiary basis for the damages sought by plaintiff.” Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Metro Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see also Rubicon Glob. Ventures, Inc. v. Chongqing Zongshen Grp. Imp./Exp. Corp., 226 F.Supp.3d 1141, 1149 (D. Or. 2016) (noting that “district courts within the Ninth Circuit have required plaintiffs to prove . . . compensatory damages with ‘reasonable certainty' even in situations of default.”) (citations omitted); Wu v. Ip, No. C-93-4467-FMS, 1996 WL 428342, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (while injury may be admitted upon default, plaintiffs “still must prove that the compensation sought relates to the damages that naturally flow from the injuries pled.”) (citation omitted).
The Clerk has now entered Defendant Rand's default. Doc. 64. Plaintiff shall promptly file a motion for default judgment under Rule 55(b) that addresses the Eitel factors and presents sufficient evidence to support any requested damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.