Opinion
CV166065294S
05-08-2017
Richard Seeley v. Quinnipiac University
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (#109)
Robin L. Wilson, J.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, Richard Seeley commenced this wrongful termination action by service of writ, summons and complaint against the defendant, Quinnipiac University. The return date is October 25, 2016, and the complaint was returned to court on October 5, 2016. On October 11, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint dated October 11, 2016, which is the operative complaint and alleges the following facts. The defendant hired the plaintiff as the Women's Ice Hockey Head Coach in 2008. In January 2015, as has been the case in previous years, the defendant renewed the plaintiff's employment contract and offered him a five-year employment contract with a definite term for the period from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2019. In April 2015, the defendant wrongfully terminated the plaintiff, on the basis of allegations by student athletes of verbal and physical misconduct, which allegations the plaintiff denies. The amended complaint is in three counts and alleges in counts one, two and three respectively, breach of the employment contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and negligence.
On March 15, 2017, the plaintiff renoticed the deposition of the defendant, identifying various topics on which the defendant should provide a knowledgeable witness whose testimony is binding on the defendant. The topics on which the plaintiff seeks to inquire are, 5) facts regarding any complaints of student mistreatment or other similar inappropriate conduct on the part of any Quinnipiac coach, professor or administrator during the period beginning January 1, 2008 and extending through the present; 6) facts regarding the resolution and punishments, if any issued for inappropriate conduct on the part of any Quinnipiac coach, professor or administrator during the period beginning January 1, 2008 and extending through the present; 10) the facts and circumstances of any other coach, professor or administrator's claim that Quinnipiac breached his/her employment contract. The defendant filed a protective order seeking to prohibit the plaintiff from questioning the defendant about these topics on grounds that said matters are of a highly confidential nature and of no relevance to the issues at stake in this litigation. Oral argument on the motion was heard at short calendar on May 1, 2017.
DISCUSSION
Practice Book § 13-2 provides in relevant part: " In any civil action . . . where the judicial authority finds it reasonably probable that evidence outside the record will be required, a party may obtain in accordance with the provisions of this chapter discovery of information or disclosure, production and inspection of papers, books, documents and electronically stored information material to the subject matter involved in the pending action, which are not privileged, whether the discovery or disclosure relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, and which are within the knowledge, possession or power of the party or person to whom the discovery is addressed. Discovery shall be permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action and if it can be provided by the disclosing party or person with substantially greater facility than it could otherwise be obtained by the party seeking disclosure. It shall not be ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence . . ."
Practice Book § 1-8 provides: " The design of these rules being to facilitate business and advance justice, they will be interpreted liberally in any case where it shall be manifest that a strict adherence to them will work surprise or injustice."
Practice Book § 13-5 states in relevant part: " Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specific terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into or that the scope of discovery be limited to certain matters . . . (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way."
Under Practice Book § 13-5, the party seeking the protective order is required to show good cause. The courts have defined good cause as " a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action." Welch v. Welch, 48 Conn.Supp. 19, 828 A.2d 707 (2003) . " Good cause must be based upon a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements." Id., 20. " Whether or not 'good cause' exists for entry of a protective order must depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case." Carrier Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 88352383 S (February 11, 1992, Schaller, J.) [6 Conn.L.Rptr. 3, ]. " To determine whether good cause exists, courts balance 'the need for information against the injury that might result if uncontrolled disclosure is compelled.'" Zyprexa Litig., 474 F.Supp.2d 385, 413-16 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3dCir. 1994)).
The plaintiff seeks to inquire of the defendant into the three following topics:
5. Facts regarding any complaints of student mistreatment or other similar inappropriate conduct on the part of any Quinnipiac coach, professor or administrator during the period beginning January 1, 2008, and extending through the date hereof.
6. Facts regarding the resolution and punishments, if any, issued for inappropriate conduct on the part of any Quinnipiac coach, professor or administrator during the period beginning January 1, 2008 and extending through the date hereof.
10. The facts and circumstances of any other coach, professor or administrator's claim that Quinnipiac breached his/her employment contract.
The plaintiff argues that the defendant's motion for protective order should be denied because the deposition topics at issue are discoverable in that they may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence relevant to the issue of just cause. The plaintiff alleges that his employment agreement with the defendant was for a defined term and terminable only for just cause. The plaintiff argues that topics five and six seek information from the defendant related to similar complaints made by students against Quinnipiac employees of student mistreatment and information related to the outcome of those complaints. Topic ten seeks information related to any claims by Quinnipiac employees that Quinnipiac breached their employment agreements. The plaintiff further argues that the three deposition topics that are the subject of the defendant's motion for protective order relate to the plaintiff's interest in obtaining comparative information relevant to the issue of " just cause" in this case.
First, the defendant denies that the plaintiff's contract was for a definite five-year term or that he was employed on other than an at-will basis, therefore the issue of just cause is not relevant. While the defendant's claim is that the plaintiff was employed on an at-will basis, the plaintiff, however, has alleged that the contract was for a definite period and terminable only for just cause. It is not this court's job to determine the merits of the plaintiff's claims on a motion for protective order relating to discovery which may be relevant to prosecute the plaintiff's claims. Rather, the court must determine whether the defendant has met its burden in demonstrating that good cause exists to grant a protective order. In order to determine whether good cause exists, the court, in the first instance, must determine whether the information sought by the plaintiff is discoverable pursuant to § 13-2. Second, and more importantly, the court must balance " the need for information against the injury that might result if uncontrolled disclosure is compelled." Zyprexa Litig., 474 F.Supp.2d 385, 413-16 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (quoting Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994)).
The defendant argues that the areas of inquiry go well beyond the scope of discovery and raise legitimate confidentiality concerns. The defendant argues that " good cause" or " just cause" turns on the assessment of the reasons it proffers for the plaintiff's dismissal. The defendant argues that it either had good cause to terminate the plaintiff's employment or did not, and that determination must necessarily focus on the specific complaints directed against the plaintiff, the defendant's investigation of those complaints, and whether that investigation gave rise to a good faith belief on the defendant's part that the plaintiff engaged in conduct justifying dismissal. The defendant argues that for this critical inquiry, it is irrelevant how the defendant dealt with other complaints of student mistreatment or the like. Equally irrelevant, the defendant argues, are claims asserted by other Quinnipiac University personnel alleging breach of their individual contracts. The defendant argues that whether it breached some other employment contract says absolutely nothing about whether its firing of the plaintiff transgressed the terms of his appointment letter.
" In Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will employment relationship in the absence of a contract to the contrary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 267 Conn. 210, 225, 837 A.2d 759 (2004). " Employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., supra, 267 Conn. 225. " An employment contract for a definite or determinable term, however, may be terminated by either party only for good or just cause." Slifkin v. Condec Corp., 13 Conn.App. 538, 549, 538 A.2d 231 (1988). The question of whether an employer has terminated an employee for just cause is an issue to be determined by the trier of fact. Coelho v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 208 Conn. 106, 122-23, 544 A.2d 170 (1988).
" [G]ood cause is defined as 'a substantial reason amounting in law to a legal excuse for failing to perform an act required by law [and] [l]egally sufficient ground or reason.' Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) . . ." Roberto v. Honeywell, Inc., 33 Conn.App. 619, 626, 637 A.2d 405, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 909, 642 A.2d 1205 (1994); see also Slifkin v. Condec Corp., supra, 13 Conn.App. 549 ('Good cause, as distinguished from the subjective standard of unsatisfactory service, is defined as [s]ubstantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse . . . [or a] legally sufficient ground or reason.' [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]). " Good cause or [j]ust cause substantially limits employer discretion to terminate, by requiring the employer, in all instances, to proffer a proper reason for dismissal, and by forbidding the employer to act arbitrarily or capriciously . . . In any contract of employment for a fixed period, an employee prematurely discharged without good or just cause may recover damages." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Slifkin v. Condec Corp., supra, 549.
The principles set forth by the court in Slifkin concerning the just cause requirement in express employment contracts for definite or determinable terms have been applied by numerous trial courts in Connecticut. See, e.g., Puglia v. Westbrook, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 065000446 (July 9, 2008, Jones, J.) (46 Conn.L.Rptr. 105, 107, ); Espinal v. Child & Family Agency of Southeastern Connecticut, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 568897 (March 14, 2005, Devine, J.) (38 Conn.L.Rptr. 859, 860, ); Mast v. Harmon, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 92 0291675, (October 5, 1993, Spear, J.); Berger v. Balmar Marine of Canton, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. CV 90 0441360, (February 28, 1992, Hammer, J.).
In Berger v. Balmar Marine of Canton, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 90 0441360, (February 28, 1992, Hammer, J.), the trial court cited the principles espoused by the Appellate Court in Slifkin and, relying on the well-established principles of other jurisdictions, further defined the meaning of " just cause" in the employment contract context. The court stated: " Not every act of insubordination or misconduct justifies an employer in firing an employee, because if that were the case, if an employee's conduct and performance were less than perfect he could be discharged for 'just cause.' . . . In the case of a managerial employee, in particular, whose position gives him some latitude and discretion in working out the details of his service, a failure immediately and literally to comply with the master's orders may not constitute disobedience, and it is a question of fact for the jury in each case whether the limits of that latitude and discretion have been exceeded . . . There may also, of course, be derelictions of duty by an employee that are so trivial or inconsequential that the law will not take note of them . . . Slight or occasional omissions do not constitute conduct justifying dismissal, the proper test being whether the conduct is so inconsistent with the employer-employee relationship that it prejudices a valid business interest of the employer, which is ordinarily a question of fact, with the burden on the employer to justify the discharge . . . If an employer retains an employee after he has knowledge of misconduct warranting his discharge, such retention is prima facie a waiver, and condonation is presumed, unless circumstances are shown that tend to establish a reasonable and proper reason for the delay . . . Where the employer makes no complaint about the employee's conduct when he was aware of it, and waits until the matter is in litigation to assert it as a defense, such delay tends to show that there was nothing in the employee's conduct to justify his discharge and that the assertion of such claims was purely an afterthought prompted by considerations of trial strategy . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotations omitted.) Berger v. Balmar Marine of Canton, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 90 0441360S, .
General Statutes § 31-128f concerns the disclosure of information in an employee's personnel file and provides in relevant part: " No individually identifiable information contained in the personnel file or medical records of any employee shall be disclosed by an employer to any person or entity not employed by or affiliated with the employer without the written authorization of such employee except where the information is limited to the verification of dates of employment and the employee's title or position and wage or salary or where the disclosure is made . . . pursuant to a lawfully issued . . . judicial order . . ." Personnel file is defined in General Statutes § 31-128a(5) as " papers, documents and reports, including electronic mail and facsimiles, pertaining to a particular employee that are used or have been used by an employer to determine such employee's eligibility for employment, promotion, additional compensation, transfer, termination, disciplinary or other adverse personnel action including employee evaluations or reports relating to such employee's character, credit and work habits. Personnel file does not mean . . . medical records . . . [or] documents which are being developed or prepared for use in civil, criminal or grievance procedures . . ."
The legal precedent is clear that " the contents of personnel files, though not immune from discovery, must only be disclosed in response to requests that directly relate to legitimate issues in the case material that is clearly material and relevant." Piveronas v. Franciscan Friars Assumption B.V.M. Province, Inc., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford, Docket No. X08CV075009962, (August 31, 2009, Jennings, J.T.R.). " 'The disclosure of such information [contained in a personnel file] must be carefully tailored to a legitimate and demonstrated need for such information in any given case. Where disclosure of the personnel file would place in the hands of a [party] irrelevant or personal and sensitive information concerning . . . [another], the entire file should not be disclosed. No [party] has the right to conduct a general fishing expedition into the personnel records of [another] . . . Because discovery of matters contained in a . . . personnel file involves careful discrimination between material that relates to the issues involved and that which is irrelevant to those issues, the judicial authority should exercise its discretion in determining what matters should be disclosed . . . Because the law furnishes no precise or universal test of relevancy, the question must be determined on a case by case basis according to the teachings of reason and judicial experience . . . (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, supra, Docket No. CV 93 0300272S, . 'The trial court should make available to the [party] only information it concludes is clearly relevant and material to the issue involved.' Id. " Dotson v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-106012742S, (February 17, 2011, Woods, J.).
The defendant is correct that any complaint of student mistreatment on the part of any Quinnipiac coach, professor or administrator during the relevant time period is not relevant on the issue of just cause. Thus, to allow the plaintiff to inquire into any complaints would be in violation of § 31-128f. The court therefore finds, based upon the legal authority defining " just cause" that, what is relevant on the issue of just cause, however, is whether, during the period from January 1, 2008 to the present, any coach, professor or administrator, engaged in similar or the same conduct allegedly engaged in by the plaintiff, which conduct was grounds for the dismissal. Thus, the plaintiff may inquire into areas enumerated in 5, 6 and 10, limited to conduct that includes the " use of profanity, " " aggressive physical touching" and " unwarranted aggression" and, if there were such complaints made against any coach, professor or administrator, what discipline was implemented, and whether a breach of contract claim was initiated by said coach, professor or administrator as a result of such discipline. The court finds good cause relating to any other line of inquiry into the personnel record of any coach, professor or administrator, except that which the court has specified above, privileged pursuant to § 31-128f, and the plaintiff shall not inquire into same. It is so ordered.