The traditional standard for trial court review has been modified by Prunty v. YMCA of Lockport, Inc., 616 N.Y.S.2d 117, 206 A.D.2d 911(N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept. 1994) which said "At least two of the Departments of the Appellate Division have ruled that a trial court may overturn a jury's award of damages in a negligence action where it "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" (CPLR 5501[c]; see, Cochetti v. Gralow, 192 A.D.2d 974, 975, 597 N.Y.S.2d 234 [3d Dept.]; Wendell v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 189 A.D.2d 1063, 592 N.Y.S.2d 895 [3d Dept.]; Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658 [2d Dept.]; see also, Siegel, Supp. Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C5501:10, 1994 Pocket Part, at 4-5), and we now adopt the same rule."
Although phrased as a direction to New York's intermediate appellate courts, § 5501(c)'s "deviates materially" standard, as construed by New York's courts, instructs state trial judges as well. See, e.g., Inya v. Ide Hyundai, Inc., 209 A.D.2d 1015, 619 N.Y.S.2d 440, (4th Dept. 1994) (error for trial court to apply "shock the conscience" test to motion to set aside damages; proper standard is whether award "materially deviates from what would be reasonable compensation"); Cochetti v. Gralow, 192 A.D.2d 974, 975, 597 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (3d Dept. 1993) ("settled law" that trial courts conduct "materially deviates" inquiry); Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805, 806, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (2d Dept. 1992) (approving trial court's application of "materially deviates" standard); see also Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 901 F. Supp. 166, 169 (SDNY 1995) (CPLR 5501(c)'s "materially deviates" standard "is pretty well established as applicable to [state] trial and appellate courts."). Application of § 5501(c) at the trial level is key to this case.
Decisions of New York State courts show that the two standards are different. See Harvey v. Mazal Amer. Partners, 581 N.Y.S.2d 639, 643 (1992) (remanding to Appellate Division for reconsideration of remittitur using proper "deviates materially" standard, where Appellate Division had referred to both standards); Shurgan v. Tedesco, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (App. Div. 199 2) (affirming trial court's additur where court set aside jury award as materially deviating from what would be reasonable compensation). Because this statute makes explicit mention only of the Appellate Division, courts have expressed some confusion as to whether its standard applies also at the trial level.
However, the exercise of the discretion of a trial court over damage awards should be exercised sparingly. Shurgan v. Tedesco, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658 (2d Dept. 1992) citing James v. Shanley, 423 N.Y.S.2d 312 (3rd Dept. 1979).
The exercise of the discretion of a trial court over damage awards should be exercised sparingly. Shurgan v. Tedesco, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658 (2d Dept. 1992) citing James v. Shanley, 423 N.Y.S.2d 312 (3rd Dept. 1979). "In the absence of indications that substantial justice had not been done, a successful litigant is entitled to the benefit of a favorable jury verdict", and a court may not employ its discretion merely because it disagrees with a verdict (McDermott v. Coffee Beanery,777 N.Y.S.2d 103(1st Dept. 2004)
The court is obliged to award an amount in compensatory damages that does not materially deviate from what would be considered "reasonable compensation" under the circumstances given the plaintiff's injuries (CPLR 5501 (c); Shurgan by Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179A.D.2d 805, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658 [2d Dept. 1992]). Although the plaintiff assented to conduct the inquest "on papers", the court has not been provided with any comparable awards or verdicts for similar injuries of comparable duration to assist the court's determination of what can be considered reasonable compensation for the decedent's pain and suffering.
The exercise of the discretion of a trial Court over damage awards should be exercised sparingly. Shurean v. Tedesco, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658 (2d Dept. 1992) citing James v. Shanley, 423 N.Y.S.2d 312 (3rd Dept. 1979). Not all awards lend themselves to review and approval by comparison with previously approved verdicts.
Although CPLR 5501(c) dictates to the Appellate Division to overturn a verdict when it materially deviates from what is considered reasonable compensation, this standard has been held to apply to a trial court. See Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805, 806, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658 (2nd Dept 1992). In determining whether an award deviates from what is reasonable compensation, courts look to comparable cases “bearing in mind that personal injury awards, especially those for pain and suffering, are subjective opinions which are formulated without the availability, or guidance, of precise mathematical quantification.”
Under the circumstances presented, the awards of $180,000 for past pain and suffering and $30,000 for future pain and suffering do not materially deviate from what would be reasonable compensation ( seeCPLR 5501[c]; Wilson v. Livingston, 305 A.D.2d 585, 585–586, 762 N.Y.S.2d 408;Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805, 806, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658).
Although phrased as a direction to the Appellate Courts, it is well settled that the standard applies to the Trial Courts as well. See, Weigl v Quincy Specialties Company, 190 Misc 2d 1, 735 NYS2d 729 (Supreme New York Co. 2001); Morisseau v State of New York, 265 AD2d 647, 696 NYS2d 545 (3rd Dept. 1999); cf., Cochetti v Gralow, 192 AD2d 974, 597 NYS2d 234 (3rd Dept 1993); Shurgan v Tedesco 179 AD2d 805, 578 NYS2d 658 (2nd Dept. 1992). The evaluation mandated by CPLR § 5501 (c) as to whether an award deviated materially from reasonable compensation is inherently subjective and cannot produce results with mathematical procession.