Under the Act, "[t]he Labor Secretary, acting through MSHA, sets regulatory standards for mine safety, conducts regular mine inspections and issues citations and orders in response to violations." Sec'y of Labor v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC, 991 F.3d 1297, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see generally 30 U.S.C. §§ 811, 813-15, 820. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC or Commission) is an independent adjudicatory body that reviews citation, penalty, and order decisions by MSHA.
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The standard for reviewing factual findings-substantial evidence-is likewise “highly deferential to the agency fact-finder, requiring only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sec'y of Lab. v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC, 991 F.3d 1297, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The test requires more than a scintilla, but can be satisfied by something less than a preponderance of the evidence.”
Accordingly, we decline to address the Commission's definition of the phrase "reasonably could have been expected to cause death or serious bodily injury" because we lack jurisdiction. See Sec'y of Lab. v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC , 991 F.3d 1297, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (rejecting the Secretary's argument—raised for the first time before that court—for lack of jurisdiction). 3. Deletion of the Flagrant Designation
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (cleaned up); see also Sec'y of Labor v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC, 991 F.3d 1297, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ("substantial evidence" turns on whether a "reasonable factfinder" could have reached the agency's conclusion) (cleaned up). Because the parties both take the position that CMS was required to use the "best available data" when calculating Pomona's Medicare fraction, we assume without deciding that CMS was so obligated.
Borushevskyi, 2023 WL 2663006, at *9 (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)) (cleaned up). This review “is highly deferential to the agency fact-finder,” Sec'y of Lab. v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC, 991 F.3d 1297, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Rossello ex rel. Rossello v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2008)), such that a court “may not reject reasonable findings and conclusions, even if [it] would have weighed the evidence differently,” Id. (quoting Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 717 F.3d 1020, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). Instead, a court “must affirm the decision if ‘a theoretical reasonable factfinder could have reached the conclusions actually reached by the [agency].'
The D.C. Circuit has explained that "[s]ubstantial-evidence review is highly deferential to the agency fact-finder." Sec'y of Lab. v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC, 991 F.3d 1297, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Rossello ex rel. Rossello v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). This Court "may not reject reasonable findings and conclusions, even if [it] would have weighed the evidence differently," id. (quoting Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 717 F.3d 1020, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2013)); and must affirm the decision if "a theoretical 'reasonable factfinder' could have reached the conclusions actually reached by the [agency]," id. (quoting Sec'y of Lab. v. Keystone Coal Mining Corp., 151 F.3d 1096, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).