The Court of Appeals granted the CRB and the CAJ leave to appeal. By a decision dated March 27, 1990, and reported at 75 N.Y.2d 460 (1990), the Court of Appeals upheld in part and annulled in part the decisions of the lower courts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the determination that the duties and responsibilities of the trial level and appellate level court clerks were so similar that different classes were not justified.
Appeals of the rulings of the Chief Administrator went to a Classification Review Board (Review Board). (See, Matter of Association of Secretaries to Justices of Supreme Surrogate's Cts. v Office of Ct. Admin., 75 N.Y.2d 460.)
Appeals of the rulings of the Chief Administrator went to a Classification Review Board (Review Board). (See, Matter of Association of Secretaries to Justices v Office of Ct. Admin., 75 N.Y.2d 460.)
Any claim by the NYCTA that section 115 fails to require equal pay for equal work would be frivolous. In Matter of Association of Secretaries to Justices of Supreme & Surrogate's Cts. in City of N.Y. v. Office of Ct. Admin. of State of N.Y., 75 N.Y.2d 460, 554 N.Y.S.2d 431, 553 N.E.2d 979 (1990), we reviewed a dispute over the Classification Review Board's decision to reduce the pay grade of appellate clerks to that of trial clerks doing the same work. In approving the action, we held that section 115 “require[d] that the salary grades” be equivalent ( id. at 476, 554 N.Y.S.2d 431, 553 N.E.2d 979).
gistrates had their salaries increased to $116,689 and, following subsequent raises of the entire salary schedule, many support magistrates now receive higher salaries than Family Court judges. The Chief Administrative Judge has exclusive authority to "adopt classifications" for nonjudicial employees of the Unified Court System "and revise them when appropriate" ( 22 NYCRR 80.1 [b] [16]), and "to classify and reclassify, and to allocate and reallocate to an appropriate salary grade, all positions in the classified service" of the Unified Court System ( 22 NYCRR 25.5 [a]). Indeed, "[o]nly the [Chief Administrative Judge] possesses the expertise required to determine how new classifications and salary grades will impact on the budget and structure of the Unified Court System and his [or her] discretionary authority in these matters may not be usurped" ( Matter of Association of Secretaries to Justices of Supreme Surrogate's Cts. in City of N.Y. v Office of Ct. Admin, of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d 460, 476; see Matter of Bellacosa v Classification Review Bd. of Unified Ct. Sys. of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d 383, 391). Thus, classification determinations "are . . . subject to only limited judicial review, and will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing that they are wholly arbitrary or without any rational basis" ( Cove v Sise, 71 NY2d 910, 912; see Matter of Association of Secretaries to Justices of Supreme Surrogate's Cts. in City of N.Y. v Office of Ct. Admin, of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d at 476; Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v State of N.Y. Unified Ct. Sys., 35 AD3d 1008, 1009; Matter of Botti v Lippman, 290 AD2d 923, 924).
Respondents' argument that prior title specifications for Court Officer were court specific is one that has been rejected with regard to Court Clerk titles ( seeAssociation ofSecretaries to Justices of the Supreme and Surrogate's Cts. in theCity of New York v Office of Ct. Admin., 75 NY2d 460, 554 NYS2d 431 [ 1990]) and Secretary to Judge and Senior Secretary to Judge titles based upon the size of the county-level court in which they worked ( seeMatter ofBellacosa v Classification Review Bd. of the United Ct. Sys. of theState of N. Y., 72 NY2d 383, 391, 534 NYS2d 119 [". . .the duties and responsibilities set forth in the two job titles under consideration were virtually identical"]). Similarly, arguments that concerning the difference in the origin of authority to entertain issues did not contradict respondents' conclusion that the duties and responsibilities of two titles (support magistrate and court attorney-referee) were similar ( seeMatter of CivilServ. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Stateof N. Y. Unified Ct. Sys., 55 AD3d 1070, 865 NYS2d 753 [3d Dept 2008]).
Respondent's argument that prior title specifications for Court Officer were court specific is one that has been rejected with regard to Court Clerk titles ( see Matter of Association of Secretaries to Justices of Supreme Surrogate's Cts. in City of N.Y. v Office of Ct. Admin, of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d 460) and Secretary to Judge and Senior Secretary to Judge titles based upon the size of the county-level court in which they worked ( see Matter of Bellacosa v Classification Review Bd. of Unified Ct. Sys. of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d 383, 390 ["the duties and responsibilities set forth in the two job titles under consideration were virtually identical"]). Similarly, arguments concerning the difference in the origin of authority to entertain issues did not contradict respondent's conclusion that the duties and responsibilities of two titles (Support Magistrate and Court Attorney-Referee) were similar ( see Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v State of N.Y. Unified Ct. Sys., 55 AD3d 1070 [3d Dept 2008]).
The extensive analysis that the Division of Classification and Compensation of the State Department of Civil Service conducted provided a rational basis to revise the classification standards at issue to include the duty of conducting inmate disciplinary hearings. ( Matter of Benson v Cuevas, 272 AD2d 764, 95 NY2d 760; Matter of Association of Secretaries to Justices of Supreme Surrogate's Cts. in City of N.Y. v Office of Ct. Admin, of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d 460; Cove v Sise, 71 NY2d 910; Matter of Woodward v Governor's Off. of Empl. Relations, 279 AD2d 725; Matter of Carolan v Schechter, 7 NY2d 980; Matter of Niebling v Wagner, 12 NY2d 314; Matter of Gavigan v McCoy, 37 NY2d 548; Matter of Kuppinger v Governor's Off of Empl. Relations, 203 AD2d 664; Matter of Collins v Governor's Off. of Empl. Relations, 211 AD2d 1001; Matter of Loehr v Governor's Off. of Empl. Relations, 3 AD3d 653.) OPINION OF THE COURT
Moreover, we find petitioners' claim that the Department's determinations were arbitrary because they departed from its own prior precedent to be unavailing. In reversing its prior approval of Kulzer's outside activities request—and subsequently denying Brown's—the Department adequately explained its reasons for the disapprovals in sufficiently detailed and reasoned determinations (see Matter of Association of Secretaries to Justices of Supreme & Surrogate's Cts. in City of N.Y. v. Office of Ct. Admin. of State of N.Y., 75 N.Y.2d 460, 471–472, 554 N.Y.S.2d 431, 553 N.E.2d 979 [1990] ; Matter of O'Brien v. Albany County Sheriff's Dept., 126 A.D.3d 1064, 1065, 4 N.Y.S.3d 695 [2015], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 909, 2015 WL 3555556 [2015] ). Petitioners' remaining arguments, to the extent not specifically addressed, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the amended petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits. When a classification decision is made, “[t]he courts have the power to reverse or modify a particular classification ... [only] if it is ‘wholly arbitrary or without any rational basis' ” ( Matter of Association of Secretaries to Justices of Supreme & Surrogate's Cts. in City of N.Y. v. Office of Ct. Admin. of State of N.Y., 75 N.Y.2d 460, 476, 554 N.Y.S.2d 431, 553 N.E.2d 979, quoting Cove v. Sise, 71 N.Y.2d 910, 912, 528 N.Y.S.2d 528, 523 N.E.2d 815;see Matter of New York State Ct. Clerks Assn. v. Crosson, 269 A.D.2d 335, 335, 703 N.Y.S.2d 469). So long as the classification determination has a rational basis, a court may not disturb it even if there are legitimate grounds for a difference of opinion ( see Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL–CIO v. State of N.Y. Unified Ct. Sys., 55 A.D.3d 1070, 865 N.Y.S.2d 753;Matter of McGreevy v. Classification Review Bd. of Unified Ct. Sys. of State of N.Y., 154 A.D.2d 678, 678, 546 N.Y.S.2d 882;Donegan v. Nadell, 113 A.D.2d 676, 680–681, 497 N.Y.S.2d 692). Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the record established a rational basis for the distinction between the positions of New York State Court Officer Major I (Judicial Grade [hereinafter JG]–26) (hereinafter Major I) and New York State Court Officer Major II (JG–28) (hereinafter Major II) ( see Matter of Civil Serv. Empls