Eclipse Manufacturing Co. v. U.S. Compliance Co., 381 Ill. App. 3d 127, 133 (2007). In Second New Haven Bank v. Kobrite, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 3d 832, 835 (1980), we held that an insurer and third-party citation respondent may litigate any proper defense to recovery under the policy. In Kobrite, the plaintiff secured a judgment against the defendant, Kobrite.

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1402(c)(6). It is well-settled that the rights of a citation respondent may be adjudicated in a supplementary citation proceeding, even if the respondent is not a party to the underlying litigation. Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Wholesale Life Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 915 N.E.2d 51, 58, 393 Ill. App. 3d 951, 333 Ill. Dec. 530 (2009); Eclipse Mfg. Co. v. United States Compliance Co., 886 N.E.2d 349, 351-52, 381 Ill. App. 3d 127, 319 Ill. Dec. 586 (2007); Second New Haven Bank v. Kobrite, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 369, 370, 86 Ill. App. 3d 832, 41 Ill. Dec. 947 (1980); see also Sobina v. Busby, 210 N.E.2d 769, 62 Ill. App. 2d 1 (1965). Therefore, Travelers can litigate any proper defense to recovery in Lake County circuit court, including the defense of no duty to defend or indemnify.

Under Illinois law, rights under an insurance policy may be adjudicated in citation proceedings, and "the citation defendant may litigate any proper defense to recovery under the policy." Second New Haven Bank v. Kobrite, Inc., 86 Ill.App.3d 832, 41 Ill.Dec. 947, 408 N.E.2d 369, 370 (1980). I previously rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Third Party Citation and Certified Answer are insufficient grounds on which to litigate the issue of Travelers' liability to plaintiffs as Kiefer's assignees.

See Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Wholesale Life Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 393 Ill.App.3d 951, 333 Ill.Dec. 530, 915 N.E.2d 51, 57 (2009) (citing Second New Haven Bank v. Kobrite, Inc., 86 Ill.App.3d 832, 41 Ill.Dec. 947, 408 N.E.2d 369, 371 (1980)). At all events, plaintiffs' supposed due process concerns are not supported by any authority and are directed specifically to Travelers' anticipated motion for summary judgment.

Furthermore, as a third-party citation respondent, National Union can litigate within the citation proceeding any defenses to recovery it may have. See Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Wholesale Life Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 915 N.E.2d 51, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (citing Second New Haven Bank v. Kobrite, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)). National Union also contends that the two actions are not "between the same parties" because it was not a party to the underlying state-court lawsuit. The Court is unpersuaded by this reliance on semantics.

See American National Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 215 So.2d 245, 250 (Miss. 1968); Second New Haven Bank v. Kobrite, Inc., 86 Ill. App.3d 832, 835, 41 Ill.Dec. 947, 949, 408 N.E.2d 369, 371 (1980); 18 M. Rhodes, Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law 2d § 74:87 (rev. 1983); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 982(2).a. (1946); 6 Am.Jur.2d Attachment And Garnishment § 167 (1963). Cf. Republic Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 413 F. Supp. 649, 653 (S.D.W. Va. 1976) (the identity of the person giving notice of the claim to the insurer is immaterial, if in fact notice is given).

¶ 53 Rights under an insurance policy may be adjudicated in citation proceedings, and the citation defendant may litigate any proper defense to recovery under the policy. See Second New Haven Bank v. Kobrite, 86 Ill.App.3d 832, 835, 408 N.E.2d 369, 370 (1980) ("[I]nsurance proceeds, although contingent, may be an asset of the debtor to the extent that rights under the policy may be adjudicated in the citation proceedings. [Citation.]

¶ 48 Our holding is just another way of reiterating the longstanding principle that, in a citation proceeding, a judgment creditor stands in the shoes of a judgment debtor and " ' "may not recover from a third-party citation [respondent] unless the judgment debtor could have recovered from the third-party [respondent]." ' " Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Wholesale Life Insurance Brokerage, Inc., 393 Ill. App. 3d 951, 958-59 (2009) (quoting Second New Haven Bank v. Kobrite, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 3d 832, 835 (1980), quoting Sobina v. Busby, 62 Ill. App. 2d 1, 13-14 (1965)). If the third party (Mago) does not owe a legally enforceable debt to the judgment debtor (Nahlawi), then the judgment debtor has no right to recover anything from the third party—and thus neither would the judgment creditor (Door Properties) stepping into the judgment debtor's shoes.

But as the circuit court correctly emphasized, that judgment creditor, in the shoes of the insured judgment debtor, is entitled to no more than that to which the judgment debtor itself would be entitled under the insurance policy. See Second New Haven Bank v. Kobrite, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 3d 832, 835 (1980).¶ 36 In other words, plaintiffs may collect from American only what Yellow Cab and Ezeagu, whom they are supplanting, could collect.

We note that the provision in an insurance policy requiring proof of loss is intended to give the insurer the opportunity to investigate the claim, with the view towards securing information as to any possible defense. ( Second New Haven Bank v. Kobrite, Inc. (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 832, 408 N.E.2d 369.) Nonetheless, where one has in good faith furnished proof sufficient to apprise the insurer of the character and extent of the claim, and no particular forms are required by the policy or by statute, such person shall not be barred because of the nature or manner in which the proof was submitted and the insurer had due notice thereof.