Accordingly, the well established rule in Texas may be stated as follows: if a transfer of collateral is consented to by a party holding a secured claim in the collateral, the secured party waives his security interest, the transferee takes free and clear of such interest, and the secured party may neither foreclose nor bring an action for conversion. Sechrist-Hall Co. v. Harlingen National Bank, 368 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cartwright v. Flatt, 244 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1951, no writ); Oats v. Dublin National Bank, 127 Tex. 2, 90 S.W.2d 824, 827 (1936); Lumberman's National Bank v. Bush Witherspoon Co., 247 S.W. 295, 299 (Tex.Civ.App. — Galveston 1922, writ ref'd); Rusk County Lumber Co. v. Meyer, 126 S.W. 317, 319 (Tex.Civ.App. 1910, writ dism'd); see, Tex.Bus. Com. Code Ann. § 9.306(b) (Vernon 1991).

In support of its position, Associates cites the general rule that a mortgagee may waive his mortgage lien and be stopped to enforce it by conduct inconsistent with its existence. Appellant relies primarily on Sechrist-Hall Company v. Harlingen National Bank (Tex.Civ.App.), 368 S.W.2d 155 (Ref. N.Y.E.) . That case dealt with chattel mortgages on central air conditioning units.