Opinion
Argued November 7, 2001
This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
This case is hereby resubmitted effective December 10, 2001.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 36-3)
A defendant subjected to a permanent injunction in connection with a fraudulent investment scheme appealed grant by the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Alicemarie H. Stotler, J., of summary judgment for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Court of Appeals held that defendant could not raise issues for the first time on appeal.
Affirmed.
Page 776.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Alicemarie H. Stotler, District Judge, Presiding.
Before PREGERSON, REINHARDT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Job Kjell Hovik appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Because the facts are known to the parties, we will not recite them in detail except as necessary. We affirm the district court's decision.
Hovik argues that the amount of the district court's disgorgement is not supported by the record. The uncontradicted declarations of Toshie Honda Connick and Lorraine Pearson support the court's disgorgement calculation of $397,265.50 before interest. Hovik failed to contest those declarations in any way. He may not do so now for the first time. See, e.g., Palmer v. Internal Revenue Serv., 116 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (9th Cir.1997).
Hovik next contends that the asset freeze to which he consented at the time of the permanent injunction is invalid because it extends to assets that have not been proven traceable to the fraudulent investment scheme. Hovik did not raise this argument before the district court and thus it is waived on appeal. See id.
Hovik's final argument is that he was deprived of his due process rights by having been improperly induced to consent to the permanent injunction. Having failed to move for relief from the judgment in the district court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3), he is not permitted to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. See id. If Hovik felt the SEC made misrepresentations to him, he should have sought recourse from the district court.
AFFIRMED.