Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-3585, Section "K" (3).
June 6, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant's (sic) 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14) filed on behalf of defendants Donald Battiste ("Battiste") and the City of New Orleans. Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda and the relevant law, the Court finds that plaintiff's federal unlawful arrest claim, state false arrest claim, and state malicious prosecution claim must be dismissed; however, there are material questions of fact preventing the entry of judgment on plaintiff's federal excessive force claim, state battery claim, and respondeat superior claim.
Background
On December 29, 2002, the plaintiff, Jonathon Sebald, came to the City of New Orleans to attend a Saints football game. Mr. Sebald reserved a room at the Radisson Hotel on Canal Street. After the football game, at approximately 1:00 a.m., the plaintiff was returning to his hotel room, when he stopped to urinate in a darkened alleyway near an abandoned building. Plaintiff's Complaint ¶ 3-4, (Rec. Doc. No. 1).
At approximately the same time, Officers Donald Battiste and Vaughn Gonsoulin were in the area on a routine patrol. The officers contend that they observed two white males inside the alcove of an abandoned business. Additionally, they noted that a large glass window inside the alcove had been shattered. Curious as to whether the two individuals had broken the glass or whether they were attempting to enter the building, the officers chose to investigate further. As the officers approached on foot, they witnessed both individuals urinating inside the alcove.
In the Complaint, plaintiff claims "Without warning, one of the officers, believed to be Officer Batiste [a defendant], shoved plaintiff from behind, causing plaintiff to fall forward into a broken glass window, causing plaintiff serious, painful, and debilitating injuries to plaintiff's dominant left hand." Complaint ¶ 5, (Rec. Doc. No. 1); see also Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6 (citing Mr. Sebald's Deposition at 20-21) attached to (Rec. Doc. No. 18).
Defendants, in contrast, contend that Officer Battiste acted reasonably under the circumstances and suggests that Officer Battiste attempted to apprehend Mr. Sebald by grabbing the collar of his jacket. Defendants maintain that:
[At this point,] the subject began flinging both his arms in an attempt to break the officer's grasp. . . . [After removing the suspect from the alleyway,] Officer Battiste noticed that the subject had received a laceration to the left hand which he had apparently cut on the broken pane of glass as he flung his arms away from the officer.Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 7 and Incident Report at 5-6, attached to (Rec. Doc. No. 14).
Following the arrest, plaintiff received treatment for his injuries at the Medical Center of Louisiana. With regard to the legal resolution of the arrest, the charges against the plaintiff were dismissed by the City of New Orleans because of Officer Battiste's failure to appear in court. Defendants maintain that Battiste never received a subpoena to testify which is unrefuted. Nonetheless, the charges were dismissed.
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint which asserts a federal claim against the police officers, including Officer Battiste, and state claims against both the officers and the City of New Orleans. With respect to the federal claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988, plaintiff claims that he was unlawfully arrested and subjected to excessive force. The state claims, brought pursuant to La.Civ.C. art. 2315, allege plaintiff was subjected to a false arrest, malicious prosecution, and battery. The Complaint contends that the Officers are directly liable for these state law violations and that the City of New Orleans is liable under a respondeat superior theory under state law only.
Battiste and the City of New Orleans seek the dismissal of and/or the granting of summary judgment. They claim that Officer Battiste is entitled to qualified immunity and that the City is not liable as plaintiff has failed to allege any specific policy or custom, failure to train or deliberate indifference to subject the City to liability. As to this latter request, as there are no federal claims brought against the City, hence there is no need to enter judgment in that regard. Judgment is sought against the City of New Orleans solely pursuant to state law.
Legal Standard
In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), the Court must take the allegations in the complaint as true and resolve any ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). "[A] claim may not be dismissed [pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] unless it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief." Home Capital Collateral, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 96 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 1996).
Defendants have moved alternatively pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 for summary judgment. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2005). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis added); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, when the record taken as whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Analysis A. Federal Unlawful Arrest Claim, Louisiana Malicious Prosecution Claim and False Arrest Claim
Defendant Battiste seeks summary judgment based on a qualified immunity defense with respect to the federal unlawful arrest claim. "Personal-capacity suits which seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law are recognized under § 1983." Craft v. City of New Orleans, 2004 WL 193134, *3 (E.D.La. Jan. 30, 2004), citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 211 S. Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). This Court continued:
A state official can be sued in his individual capacity and be held personally liable under § 1983 if it can be shown that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. Hafer, 502 at 25-31. However, such persons are entitled to assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law or, qualified immunity.Id. Thus, it is clear that the qualified immunity analysis entails a two-step process:
First, a court must determine whether plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, the court must decide if the conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time the challenged conduct occurred.Glen v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). In order to survive a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must articulate specific conduct and action giving rise to a constitutional violation. Mahrous v. O'Brien, 1998 WL 166189, *1-2 (E.D.La. April 8, 1998), citing Shultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995).
Likewise, based on the failure to assert a justiciable constitutional violation, Battiste and the City of New Orleans seek judgement dismissing the two state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution claim
These three claims involve a single dispositive issue — whether Officer Battiste had probable cause at the time he apprehended Mr. Sebald. If Officer Battiste possessed probable cause on December 29, 2002, the federal unlawful arrest claim, the state malicious prosecution claim, and the state false arrest claim must fail as there would be no violation of a constitutional right.
1. Federal Unlawful Arrest Claim
In the Complaint, the plaintiff asserts a federal, unlawful arrest claim against Officer Battiste. Although asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988, the claim is based on an alleged deprivation of Mr. Sebald's constitutional rights, particularly rights conferred via the 4th and 14th Amendments. Complaint ¶ 1, (Rec. Doc. No. 1). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, "there is no cause of action for `false arrest' [or unlawful arrest] under section 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause." Fields v. City of South Houston, Tex., 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1974)). Thus, to withstand the defendant's motion in this matter, the plaintiff must create a genuine factual issue as to whether Officer Battiste possessed probable cause to arrest on December 29, 2002.
2. Malicious Prosecution Claim under Louisiana law
The malicious prosecution claim, made under Louisiana law, proves no different. The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained:
Chief among the elements [of a malicious prosecution claim] is the requirement that the plaintiff must sustain . . . that the criminal proceeding was initiated or continued without "probable cause."Miller v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Dept., 511 So. 2d 446, 452 (La. 1987) (citations omitted). Therefore, for Mr. Sebald to succeed on either the excessive force claim (under federal law) and the malicious prosecution claim (under Louisiana law), he must establish that Officer Battiste lacked probable cause to arrest.
3. False Arrest Claim under Louisiana law
Probable cause also proves to be an essential element of a false arrest claim. Under Louisiana law, false arrest has two essential elements: (1) the detention of a person, and (2) the unlawfulness of such a detention. Ross v. Sheriff of LaFourche Parish, 479 So. 2d 506, 510 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985). Further elaborating on the second prong, the Ross court continued, "Unlawful detention is restraint without color of legal authority." Id. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 213 enunciates the instances in which an Officer has the legal authority to make an arrest absent a warrant. Pertinent to this matter, Article 213 provides, "A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when: . . . (3) The peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense . . ." LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 213 (2005). Although subsection (3) uses the phrase "reasonable cause," Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that this concept is indistinguishable from "probable cause" in a federal context. Louisiana v. Powell, 598 So. 2d 454, 460 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1992). Therefore, as with the two claims already discussed, Mr. Sebald's false arrest claim cannot succeed unless he establishes that Officer Battiste lacked probable cause. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 213(3).
The Court also notes that Louisiana Criminal Procedure article may not even require reasonable cause if the Mr. Sebald relieved himself in Officer Battiste's presence. LSA-C.Cr.P. 213(1). However, because reasonable cause would be the most stringent standard, the Court need only scrutinize Officer Battiste's conduct under this standard.
Ultimately, therefore, each of these three claims must fail if Officer Battiste possessed probable cause to arrest Mr. Sebald on December 29, 2002. Probable cause for an arrest exists when the "facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer and of which he has reasonable and trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [person to be arrested] has committed or is committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). The Court finds that the NOPD incident report describes facts sufficient to provide Officer Battiste with probable cause to arrest Mr. Sebald. The report explains:
Prior to mak[ing a vehicle stop], the officers [Battiste and Gonsoulin] observed males enter a (sic) entrance way Canal (sic), an abandoned building with the windows smashed out. The officers neared the subjects and could hear the sound of glass breaking. The officers believed that the subjects were either committing criminal damage or possibly trying to enter the building.
As the officers neared the building, one of the subjects exited the area while zipping his fly of his pants. The subjects name was Bradley Pope. The other subject identified as Jonathan Sebald was still in the entrance way urinating in a corner, standing on piles of glass near a window with shards still in the frame.NOPD Incident Report at 5, attached to (Rec Doc. No. 14). Plaintiff provides nothing to contradict this account. In fact, the Complaint corroborates this account insofar as it admits that plaintiff "stopped to relieve himself in a darkened alleyway near a closed and abandoned building." Complaint ¶ 4, (Rec. Doc. No. 1). Even assuming for purposes of argument that viewing Mr. Sebald enter an abandoned building coupled with the sound of breaking glass was insufficient to establish probable cause, the Officers next observed Mr. Sebald urinating in public — indisputably in violation of Municipal Code of the City of New Orleans § 54-254 (Lewd Conduct). Ultimately, therefore, plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Officers possessed probable cause to arrest Mr. Sebald. Accordingly, for the reasons already discussed, the defendants' are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the federal unlawful arrest claim, the Louisiana false arrest claim, and the Louisiana malicious prosecution claim.
B. Reasonableness of the Force used to Apprehend Mr. Sebald
The remaining claims (the federal excessive force claim, the Louisiana battery claim, and the respondeat superior claim against the City) are dependent upon single issue. Namely, were Officer Battiste's actions "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him on December 29, 2002. See Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1996) (All [federal] claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest, . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard. . . . As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, . . . the `reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force claim is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them) (citation omitted); See Bostick v. Lee, 1996 WL 483151 at *4 (E.D. La. 1996) (The elements of a Louisiana battery claim against a police officer due to the use of excessive force are essentially the same as those required by federal law. Thus, liability depends on the reasonableness of the force used, and "reasonable[ness] depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances in each case."); See Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 321-22 (La. 11/30/94) (deciding that two police officers had acted reasonably in attempting to disarm a suspect, thus the City of New Orleans was not liable under a respondeat superior theory).
To resolve whether Officer Battiste acted reasonably, this Court would be required to make factual findings concerning the exact nature of the encounter between Officer Battiste and Mr. Sebald. However, the nature of this encounter remains in dispute as evidenced by the conflicting accounts contained in the pleadings. Compare Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 7 (Rec. Doc. No. 14), with Deposition p. 20, attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6 (Rec. Doc. No. 18). At this stage of the proceedings, the only conclusion that can be drawn from these conflicting accounts is that a genuine issue of material fact remains. Thus, it would be inappropriate for this Court to dispose of the excessive force claim, the battery claim, or the respondeat superior claim on a summary judgment motion.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14) with respect to the federal unlawful arrest claim, the state false arrest claim, and the state malicious prosecution claim is GRANTED and the Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the federal excessive force claim, the state battery claim, and the respondeat superior claim is DENIED.