The fact that the defendant might have been known to the police as a prostitute was but one of the circumstances to be considered in deciding whether she should be arrested for violation of this law. Seattle v. Jones (1970), 3 Wn. App. 431, 438, 475 P.2d 790, 795. It is apparent that the guidelines are not meant to be exclusive. Other conduct or circumstances, not specifically outlined in the ordinance but observed or perceived by an arresting officer, could legitimately form the basis of an arrest if such conduct or circumstances manifested the proscribed intent.

Under Washington law, "[a] crime involves moral turpitude if it is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general." City of Seattle v. Jones, 3 Wash. App. 431, 437 (1970) (quotation and citation omitted). Some examples of crimes of moral turpitude include subornation of perjury, In re Bixby, 31 Wash.2d 620, 623 (1948), prostitution, Jones, 3 Wash. App. at 437, grand larceny, Hoagland v. Mount Vernon Sch. Dist. No. 320, Skagit Cnty., 95 Wash.2d 424, 434 (1981), and second degree assault involving a deadly weapon with injury to the victim, Matter of McGrath, 98 Wash.2d 337, 342 (1982).

ROSELLINI, J., concurs by separate opinion. Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, October 19, 1970, 3 Wn. App. 431. Affirmed.

See, e.g. Johnson, 569 F. Supp. at 980. But see City of Seattle v. Jones, 475 P.2d 790, 796 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) ("[T]he opportunity to explain afforded by the ordinance is a safeguard designed to discourage wholesale preventive arrests — a practice which is repugnant to the constitutional guarantees of individual freedom."), aff'd, 488 P.2d 750 (Wash. 1971).

This is true regardless of whether being a "known prostitute" is one of the circumstances listed under section C of the ordinance, and regardless of whether the arresting officer had knowledge of the prior conviction. Seattle v. Jones, 3 Wn. App. 431, 440, 475 P.2d 790 (1970), aff'd, 79 Wn.2d 626, 488 P.2d 750 (1971).

The provision giving the suspect an opportunity to explain his or her conduct does not require a different result. "[T]he opportunity to explain afforded by the ordinance is a safeguard designed to prevent wholesale preventive arrests — a practice which is repugnant to the constitutional guarantees of individual freedom." City of Seattle v. Jones, 3 Utah App. 431, 439 ( 475 P.2d 790, 796) (1970), affd. 79 Utah 2d 626 ( 488 P.2d 750) (1971). 2. Appellant also contends that the ordinance conflicts with "Georgia Constitution, Article I, Section IV, Paragraph I" and with "Article I, Section I, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Georgia Constitution."

Defendant's observed acts, superimposed on the arresting officer's knowledge of her previous arrest for prostitution, the general area known for its prostitution-related activities and the numerous arrests for prostitution at the spot where the operations took place, in combination furnished "`a reasonable ground for belief of guilt'" — the gist of probable cause (see Carroll v United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161). Actually, from a practical standpoint, very little more was needed to afford that reasonable ground other than defendant's departure with the third individual into the recesses and ways of 632 Eighth Avenue. It is noted that a number of States have upheld the constitutionality of loitering for the purpose of prostitution statutes similar to the one here (see, e.g., City of Seattle v Jones, 3 Wn. App. 431, affd 79 Wn.2d 626; State v Armstrong, 282 Minn. 39; State ex rel. Williams v City Ct. of Tucson, 21 Ariz. App. 489; contra, People v Gibson, 184 Col 444). In State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah v D. ( 27 Or. App. 861), the court rejected similar challenges to a City of Portland, Oregon, ordinance prohibiting loitering to solicit prostitution (Code of City of Portland, § 14.24.050), as are raised on this appeal. Significantly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in that case for want of a substantial Federal question(D. v Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County, 434 U.S. 914). Of course, while that summary disposition by the Supreme Court indicates the viability of section 240.37 under the Federal Constitution, it does not insulate the statute from attack under the New York Constitution (see Oregon v Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719).

1963); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 44-102 (1947); Matter of Application of Clark, 24 Cal.App. 389, 141 P. 831 (1914); Douglas v. Municipal Court, 151 Colo. 358, 377 P.2d 738 (1963); Hanjaras v. City of Atlanta, 6 Ga. App. 575, 65 S.E. 356 (1909); City of Des Moines v. Rosenberg, 243 Iowa 262, 51 N.W.2d 450 (1952); City of Paducah v. Ragsdale, 122 Ky. 425, 92 S.W. 13 (1906); State v. Goldberg, 131 Maine 1, 158 A. 364 (1932); White v. City of Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So.2d 493 (1944); Kansas City v. Howe, 416 S.W.2d 683 (Mo.App. 1967); Jersey City Land and Improvement Co. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 95 N.J.L. 34, 111 A. 275 (1920); City of Roswell v. Gallegos, 77 N. Mex. 170, 420 P.2d 438 (1966); City of Berea v. Petcher, 119 Ohio App. 165, 188 N.E.2d 605 (1963); Commonwealth v. Toth, 20 Cumb. L. J. 106 (Pa., Cumberland County, 1970); Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 39 Utah 260, 116 P. 442 (1911); Washington Old Dominion R. R. v. City of Alexandria, 191 Va. 184, 60 S.E.2d 40 (1950); City of Seattle v. Jones, 3 Wn. App.2d 431, 475 P.2d 790 (1970). Cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-423 (1956); Md. Ann. Code art. 38, § 1 (1957); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 66.7 (1967); City of Miles City v. Drum, 60 Mont. 451, 99 P. 719 (1921); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 189.080 (1971); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:21 (1970); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-4 (1969); City of Minot v. Whitfield, 71 N.W.2d 766 (N.D. 1955); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 3, and tit. 22, §§ 10 and 836 (1971); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.315 (1971); Bautsch v. City of Galveston, 27 Tex. Ct. App. R. 342, 11 S.W. 414 (1889); City of Charleston v. Beller, 45 W. Va. 44, 30 S.E. 152 (1898); State ex rel. Suchta v. District Court, 74 Wyo. 48, 283 P.2d 1023 (1955).

All that is constitutionally required to meet the tests of vagueness and uncertainty is that a person of ordinary understanding, after a careful and thoughtful reading of it, could be said to understand the statute and know what it prohibits or enjoins. RCW 74.08.331, we think, meets this standard of certainty. See Seattle v. Jones, 3 Wn. App. 431, 475 P.2d 790 (1970), review granted, 78 Wn.2d 992 (1971), this court affirming, 79 Wn.2d 626, 488 P.2d 750 (1971), where the court properly overruled the challenges of constitutionality to Seattle City Code § 12.49.010. [3, 4] Defendant assigns error to the overruling of her pretrial motion to have the information made more definite and certain — a motion she took no action whatever to have argued and determined before trial. Motions to make an information more definite and certain are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

" See also Morissette v. United States, supra; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628; City of Seattle v. Jones, 3 Wn. App. 431, 475 P.2d 790 (1970); State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 475 P.2d 926 (1970). All of the above cases strongly militate against this court's present gratuitous elimination of the element of intent from flag desecration cases.