Opinion
Nos. 05-10-00206-CR, 05-10-00207-CR
Opinion issued July 30, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F09-39142-T, F09-39303-T.
Before Justices BRIDGES, FITZGERALD, and FILLMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jammorison Andre Seaton, Jr. appeals his convictions for possession of cocaine and aggravated robbery. In two issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to imprisonment in each case. We affirm the trial court's judgments. The background of these cases and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. In each case, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine in an amount of one gram or more, but less than four grams, and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, a firearm. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment for the possession conviction and thirty years' imprisonment for the aggravated robbery conviction. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to prison because the sentences are not necessary to prevent the recurrence of his criminal behavior. Appellant asserts he was only seventeen years of age when he committed the offenses in order to buy drugs for his addition. Appellant argues that because he expressed remorse and took responsibility for his actions, the trial court should have considered rehabilitation in assessing punishment, such as probation and drug treatment or, because of his age, the state boot camp program. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaints for appellate review and, alternatively, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the sentences are within the statutory range for the offenses. Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in motions for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion). After sentencing, appellant did not object to the sentences, and he did not file a motion for new trial in either case. Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for our review. Even if appellant had preserved error, however, his argument still fails. As a general rule, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for the offense is not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). In this case, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offenses. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 12.34, 29.03(b); Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(c). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the ten-and thirty-year sentences. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We resolve appellant's two issues against him. In each case, we affirm the trial court's judgment.