Seaton v. Scott County

13 Citing cases

  1. Sila v. Sears, Roebuck Co.

    Civil No. 02-1070 (JRT/FLN) (D. Minn. Sep. 3, 2003)

    Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Mutual Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 279 (Minn. 1985); Seaton v. County of Scott, 404 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987). See also In re Trusteeship of Williams, 591 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999) ("Generally, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care and breach of that standard, unless the conduct can be evaluated by a jury in the absence of expert testimony.") "Whether an expert opinion is necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining whether the standard has been met is at the discretion of the trial court."

  2. Lien v. Casper Constr., Inc.

    No. A17-1994 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2019)

    The district court has broad discretion in determining whether an expert opinion is necessary to establish the standard of care to assist the jury. Seaton v. Scott County, 404 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn. App. 1987). The supreme court has stated that expert testimony is not needed, "[w]here the acts or omissions complained of are within the general knowledge and experience of lay persons . . . even in cases of alleged medical malpractice."

  3. Peterson v. City of Isle

    A16-1576 (Minn. Ct. App. May. 15, 2017)

    It has been stated numerous times in Minnesota caselaw that a city's liability is limited to those instances where the city has actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. See e.g., Hansen v. City of St. Paul, 298 Minn. 205, 207-08, 214 N.W.2d 346, 348 (1974) (citing Cleveland v. City of St. Paul, 18 Minn. 279 (1872)); Seaton v. County of Scott, 404 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. June 25, 1987); Johnson v. County of Nicollet, 387 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn. App. 1986).

  4. Flint Hills Resources LP v. Lovegreen Turbine Services, Inc.

    Civil No. 04-4699 (JRT/FLN) (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2006)   Cited 5 times
    In Flint Hills Resources LP v. Lovegreen Turbine Services, Inc., No. 04-4699 (JRT/FLN), 2006 WL 2472819 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2006), the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused when one of defendant's employees left a cloth rag in plaintiff's gas compressor.

    Further, "whether an expert opinion is necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining whether the standard has been met is at the discretion of the trial court." Seaton v. County of Scott, 404 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987). The Court concludes that under Minnesota law, Lovegreen had a duty, as a contractor, to perform work in a workmanlike manner.

  5. Teska v. Potlach Corporation

    184 F. Supp. 2d 913 (D. Minn. 2002)   Cited 12 times

    Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 279 (Minn. 1985); see also,Mozes v. Medtronic, Inc., 14 F. Supp.2d 1124, 1128 (D. Minn. 1998);Seaton v. County of Scott, 404 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn.App. 1987), rev, denied (Minn., June 25, 1987). If, however, "the acts or omissions complained of are within the general knowledge and experience of lay persons, expert testimony is not necessary to establish a standard of care, even in cases of alleged medical malpractice."

  6. Helton v. Knox County

    922 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. 1996)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that, while the standard of care imposed on governments in building and maintaining roads and bridges is one of reasonableness, it is not its duty to maintain guardrails of sufficient strength to prevent all accidents

    Here, there are no prior recorded instances of anyone driving over the edge of Coward Mill Bridge. The fact that repeated accidents occur at a particular location may lead to the ultimate conclusion that the conditions at that location are inherently dangerous. See, e.g., Goodermote, 856 S.W.2d at 715; Sweeney, 768 S.W.2d at 253; Seaton v. County of Scott, 404 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). However, the fact of, or absence of, prior accidents is only one element in the equation.

  7. Kariniemi v. City of Rockford

    863 N.W.2d 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times
    Finding that a contractor retained by a city to function as a city engineer enjoyed official immunity for discretionary acts as a city engineer

    Design involves the application of expertise and discretion, balancing the often-competing considerations of cost, quality, and aesthetics; construction executes the requirements of the resulting design.Compare Seaton v. Scott Cnty., 404 N.W.2d 396, 398–99 (Minn.App.1987) (holding that county had official immunity for discretionary act of designing a bridge without guardrails unless county had prior notice that it would produce a dangerous condition), review denied (Minn. Jun. 25, 1987), with Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn.

  8. Eischens v. Scott County

    No. C6-97-786 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 1997)

    The Eischens failed to offer any evidence that the existence of a creek bed below a curve on Highway 68 created a hazard requiring a guardrail. See Seaton v. Scott County, 404 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.App. 1987) (holding county immune where no evidence of knowledge that lack of guardrail is dangerous condition), review denied (Minn. June 25, 1987). Under these circumstances, there is no disputed fact on the question of the county's lack of notice.

  9. Nguyen v. Nguyen

    565 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that decision to delay safety improvements to roads, based on fiscal considerations, was entitled to statutory immunity

    Appellant relies on a series of decisions of this court suggesting that discretionary immunity does not apply to decisions that involve warning the public of known hazards. Ostendorf v. Kenyon, 347 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Minn.App. 1984) (en banc) ("The State's placement of warning signs on the highway was not a discretionary act after the State had knowledge of a dangerous situation where warning could be provided by additional or better signs."); see Gutbrod v. County of Hennepin, 529 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn.App. 1995) ("Since there was no evidence that the crack [in the road] was dangerous or presented a dangerous condition, the presence or absence of warning signs was in the range of discretionary acts."); Seaton v. Scott County, 404 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.App. 1987) (stating that the failure to post warning signs or the failure to place guardrails on a bridge are discretionary acts "unless the County had notice of a dangerous condition"), review denied (Minn. June 25, 1987); Gonzales v. Hollins, 386 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Minn.App. 1986) (stating that a city's decision to replace a semaphore with a stop sign was a discretionary act absent proof that the city had knowledge of a dangerous condition existing at the time of the accident).

  10. Kolosky v. Underground Con. of Perham

    No. C8-96-813 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 1997)   Cited 2 times
    Disclaiming the need for expertise, since the "jury was familiar with road construction crews digging trenches and using backhoes and jackhammers."

    We defer to the trial court's discretion in deciding whether expert opinion was necessary to assist the jury in determining if Underground Contractors had met the standard of care; we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Seaton v. County ofScott, 404 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.App. 1987), review denied (Minn. June 25, 1987).