Second, the defense of unclean hands must be immediately related to the subject-matter of the suit, and affect the equitable relations between the parties to the litigation. Seaton v. Dye, 37 Tenn. App. 323, 263 S.W.2d 544, 551 (1953). Consequently, in the case at bar, the Court concludes that AmeriGas's alleged wrongful behavior vis-a-vis UCG is not germane and Defendant cannot maintain the defense of unclean hands.
1963), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 341 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965), and United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Easement Right-of-Way Over Certain Land, 271 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.Tenn. 1966); Seaton v. Dye, 37 Tenn. App. 323, 263 S.W.2d 544 (1954). The rule apparently is that when the parties agree to an oral condition to one party's performance, and thus to the other party's performance, the condition is provable.
We fully recognize that to establish a trust the proof must be "clear, cogent, convincing, and irrefragable." Seaton v. Dye, 37 Tenn. App. 323, 263 S.W.2d 544 (1953); Greene v. Greene, 38 Tenn. App. 238, 272 S.W.2d 483 (1954). The proof presented in this case, standing alone, did not measure up to that standard, but it does not stand alone.
The case also holds where the note provides for a reasonable attorney's fee, before allowance of such, proof will have to be taken as to the proper amount. Appellee, D.R. Wade, Jr., also cites Daly v. Drug Co., 127 Tenn. 412, 155 S.W. 167 (1912); Franklin v. The Duncan, et al, 133 Tenn. 472, 182 S.W. 230 (1915); Merrimon v. Parkey, 136 Tenn. 645, 191 S.W. 327 (1916); and Seaton v. Dye, 37 Tenn. App. 323, 263 S.W.2d 544 (1953). We are of the opinion these cases are not in point, because the issue of the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fee is not raised in any of them.
Rumpf v. Home Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Upper East Tenn., 667 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Vick v. Vick, 398 S.W.2d 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964); Seaton v. Dye, 37263 S.W.2d 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953)); see also G.T. Issa Constr., LLC v. Blalock, No. E2020-000853-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 5496593, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2021)
They assert that the doctrine is not applicable when the misconduct complained of is not connected with the subject matter of the suit. See Nolen v. Witherspoon, 187 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tenn. 1945); Seaton v. Dye, 263 S.W.2d 544, 550-51 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1953). Nothing in this record indicates any misconduct on the part of the plaintiffs with regard to the handwritten document giving them the opportunity to select a place for their home or in the making of improvements to the premises with the active assistance and acquiescence of Father.
Hence, the judgment was not a lien on the Beaman Lake Property in Knox County. The injunction operated against the judgment debtors personally, but did not fix a lien on the property involved.Seaton v. Dye, 263 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1953). In the brief period between May 17, 2000 and the effective date of Chapter 170 of the Acts of 2001 on May 3, 2001, during which the word "executed" was a part of the statute, Plaintiffs took no action to execute on their purported revived judgment.
Browder, 602 S.W.2d at 493 (citing Cook v. Cook, 521 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1975); Seaton v. Dye, 37 Tenn. App. 323, 263 S.W.2d 544 (1953)); see also Linder v. Little, 490 S.W.2d 717 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1972). In the case herein, we find that a number of the prerequisites for a constructive trust do not exist. BCA has not engaged in the type of conduct required; Conister was not entitled to the "property" at issue; and Conister received the benefits its was entitled to, in that it could assert its debtor's rights to restitution.
Parol proof of "inducing representations" or "collateral agreements" to the written contract must be limited to subject matter which does not contradict or vary terms which are plainly expressed in the writing. Searcy v. Brandon, 167 Tenn. 218, 68 S.W.2d 112 (1934); Litterer v. Wright, 151 Tenn. 210, 268 S.W. 624 (1925); Dupont Rayon Company v. Roberson, 12 Tenn. App. 261 (1930); Seaton v. Dye, 37 Tenn. App. 323, 263 S.W.2d 544 (1954). In light of the foregoing, we are presented with the question of whether the alleged oral agreement contradicts or varies the terms of the written contract.
See Heylandt Sales Co. v. Welding Gas Products Co., 180 Tenn. 437, 175 S.W.2d 557 (1943). New River Lumber Co. v. Tenn. Ry Co. 145 Tenn. 266, 238 S.W. 867 (1922); Seaton v. Dye, 37 Tenn. App. 323, 263 S.W.2d 544 (1953). The Chancellor approached the issue from a different viewpoint: the amount of contribution of Mr. and Mrs. O'Brien to the construction and improvement of the house compared to the benefits received.