' Ocean Accident c. Corp. v. Bates, 104 Ga. App. 621, 622 ( 122 S.E.2d 305); General Motors Corp. v. Pruitt, 83 Ga. App. 620, 628 ( 64 S.E.2d 339). The above provision of the 1963 amendment did not change the law respecting the evidence necessary to prove that an accident arising out of and in the course of employment caused the disability or death." Sears Roebuck Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 527, 528 ( 145 S.E.2d 615); Brown Transport Corp. v. Blanchard, 126 Ga. App. 333 ( 190 S.E.2d 625). 2. "The distinction between proximate and remote causes is not to be too rigorously pressed in the application of the workmen's compensation act. [Cits.
In the case before us it is not clear that the 1963 Act rendered presumptions unavailable to the trier of fact in heart attack comp cases and there is no irreconcilable conflict. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals in the case sub judice and adopt the reasoning underlying the following cases: Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 527 (2) ( 145 S.E.2d 615) (1965), which was the first appellate decision construing the 1963 amendment; Burson v. Howell, 112 Ga. App. 675 ( 145 S.E.2d 718) (1965); Fulton Industries v. Knight, 127 Ga. App. 604 (1) ( 194 S.E.2d 346) (1972); City Council of Augusta v. Williams, 137 Ga. App. 177 (1) ( 223 S.E.2d 227) (1976); Carter v. Kansas City Fire c. Ins. Co., supra. Of course, the fact that an employee suffered a heart attack while working for his employer does not, by itself, require a finding that the injury was caused or precipitated by his work activities.
In City Council of Augusta v. Williams, 137 Ga. App. 177, 178 ( 223 S.E.2d 227), this court stated: "The physician's testimony that claimant's work-connected emotional stress might or could have contributed to his injury is sufficient to support the board's finding that claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 527 [, 529 (145 S.E.2d 615)]; Burson v. Howell, 112 Ga. App. 675 [, 677] (145 S.E.2d 718); J. D. Jewell, Inc. v. Peck, 116 Ga. App. 405 ( 157 S.E.2d 806)." See also Union Carbide Corp. v. Coffman, 158 Ga. App. 360, 361 ( 280 S.E.2d 140); American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 144 Ga. App. 845 (1) ( 242 S.E.2d 748). Appellee contends on the basis of the above statement that the record in this case contains sufficient evidence to support an award.
(b) There is sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the award. Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 527, 528 (2) ( 145 S.E.2d 615); Burson v. Howell, 112 Ga. App. 675 ( 145 S.E.2d 718); Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Williams, 117 Ga. App. 713 ( 161 S.E.2d 396). 2.
Claimant's argument that the board applied an incorrect theory of law, namely, that this claim would not be compensable unless there was a showing of unusual exertion, is founded upon a mere misconstruction of the thrust of the board's award. Neither Cox v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. App. 659 ( 178 S.E.2d 287), nor Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 527 ( 145 S.E.2d 615), is authority for reversal, as both cases involved on-the-job heart attacks shown by medical evidence to have been actually or possibly precipitated by or contributed to by the work then being done. Judgment affirmed. Clark, J., concurs. Evans, J., concurs specially.
The opinion evidence in this case was sufficient to support a finding that the claimant's employment contributed to causing his coronary occlusion and death and authorized the award for the claimant. Thomas v. United States Cas. Co., 218 Ga. 493 ( 128 S.E.2d 749); Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 649, 651 ( 21 S.E.2d 478); Carter v. Ga. Power Co., 107 Ga. App. 380 ( 130 S.E.2d 156); Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 527 ( 145 S.E.2d 615); Burson v. Howell, 112 Ga. App. 675 ( 145 S.E.2d 718), cert. denied 112 Ga. App. 896. Just as in the cases cited, medical opinion that some specific incident of exertion at work before an attack precipitated it and contributed to death was held sufficient to authorize a finding that the work contributed to cause death; medical opinion that exertion in working for abnormally long hours over a long period contributed to the attack and death authorizes a finding in this case that the work was a contributing cause of death.
This specially crafted "heart attack" evidentiary-related provision was adopted by the legislature in amendments to the Workers Compensation code. SeeSears, Roebuck & Co. v. Poole , 112 Ga.App. 527, 528, 145 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1965) (explaining that the legislature amended the code in 1963 "to provide that the terms ‘injury’ and ‘personal injury’ shall not include ‘heart disease, heart attack, the failure or occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels, or thrombosis, unless it is shown by preponderance of competent and creditable evidence that it was attributable to the performance of the usual work of employment"); O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1996); see also Georgia State University Law Review, LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSWorkers' Compensation: Refine the Definitions of Injury and Independent Contractor; Require the Use of Medical Evidence; Provide Exemptions for Limited Liability Corporations; Require Probate Courts to Appoint Guardians; Specify the Use of Guidelines in the Determination of Impairment , 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 233, 234-35 (1996). (detailing HB 1291, the 1996 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. and noting the change to include "stroke" to the list of compensable injuries).
This case squarely presents the issue whether under the law as amended the evidence stated above is sufficient to support a finding that exertion in the employment contributed to the death. In Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 557, this court held that the 1963 amendment to Code Ann. § 114-102 "did not change the law respecting the evidence necessary to prove that an accident arising out of and in the course of employment caused the disability or death." Before that amendment the law was that in workmen's compensation cases, as in other cases, the weight and credit to be given to the testimony of witnesses and the question as to where the preponderance of the evidence lay were matters resting with the trior of the facts; and the board's determinations upon these matters were final if supported by any evidence. Ocean Accident c. Corp. v. Bates, 104 Ga. App. 621, 622 ( 122 S.E.2d 305); Hansard v. Georgia Power Co., 105 Ga. App. 486 ( 124 S.E.2d 926).