Opinion
Case No. A04-0076 CV (RRB).
January 25, 2005
ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS
Before the Court are several motions. The first is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Sears Life Insurance Company (Sears) at Docket 15. Sears seeks a judgment interpreting the terms of the life insurance policy here in question, Policy No. 64497113, Certificate No. 2222299335809, issued to Andrew G. Matson, Sr., which policy became effective September 7, 1999. Sears further requests that the Court enter judgment declaring that Sears has satisfied all of its obligations to Defendants (hereinafter Matsons).
The Matsons simultaneously filed their own Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Amount of Coverage at Docket 14. Matsons ask the Court to declare that Sears has not fulfilled its entire obligation under the insurance policy and to declare that additional monies are owing.
An additional motion before the Court and filed by Matsons is a Motion to Strike Or, In The Alternative, For Extension Of Time Pursuant To Rule 56 To Conduct Discovery And Provide Supplemental Briefing at Docket 17. Matsons ask the Court to strike from Plaintiff's pleadings any reference to a promotional letter sent out by Sears regarding the aforesaid policy.
The Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary on any of the above-mentioned motions.
After a thorough review of the pleadings and after detailed consideration of the insurance policy in question, the Court concludes that a reasonable reading of the insurance policy, on its face, favors the interpretation given to it by Sears. No reference need be made to the disputed promotional materials in order for the Court to resolve the coverage issue before it. Therefore, the Matsons' Motion to Strike at Docket 17 is hereby GRANTED.
For the reasons set forth below and more fully set forth in Sears' Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 15 and Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 16, Sears' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
I. FACTS
Lena Irene Matson, wife and mother of the Defendants, was tragically killed in an airplane accident that occurred in Dillingham, Alaska, on October 10, 2001. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Andrew G. Matson, Sr., made a claim for benefits under the Sears Life insurance policy in question.
The first page of the Certificate identified "ANDREW G. MATSON, SR." as the "Primary Insured." On page 3, the Certificate defined "Primary Insured" as "You, the individual named on the Certificate." On page 4, the "Coverage" portion of the Certificate provided various schedules of benefits for certain types of accidents. The first section on page 4, entitled " Benefits for Common Carrier Accidents," provides:
If an Insured Person dies while Occupying, as a passenger, a public conveyance licensed as a common carrier and operated for regular passenger service — such as a plane, train, ship, school bus — the following benefit will be paid:
Primary Insured Spouse Each Child $1,000,000 $100,000 $20,000
On page 3, the Certificate defines "Insured Person" as:
You, and if covered, your spouse and all your unmarried, dependent children from birth through age 19 or through age 22 if a full time student. This includes your stepchildren and adopted children.
On page 7, the Certificate includes additional terms that identified how benefits would be paid. Sears Life agreed that benefits would be payable as follows:Payment of benefits
Benefits payable under the Policy will be paid when we receive the necessary proof of loss.
Unless you tell us otherwise, the standard beneficiary designation shown below is in effect. Accidental death benefits will be paid in the following order:
1. At your death, to your spouse, if living; otherwise equally to your living children, including step-children and adopted children, if any; otherwise equally to your living parents; otherwise to your estate.
2. At the death of any other Insured Person, to you, if living; otherwise as though it were an amount payable under 1 above.
On or about February 8, 2002, pursuant to the terms of the Policy and Certificate, Sears Life paid defendant Andrew G. Matson, Sr. $100,000. That is the amount of the benefit specified for the death of a spouse in the section entitled Benefits for Common Carrier Accidents on page 4 of the Certificate.
Sears Life contends that, as a result of the payment of $100,000 to defendant Andrew G. Matson, Sr., Sears Life has paid all the benefits that it is obligated to pay under the Policy and Certificate.
Notwithstanding the payment of $100,000 by Sears Life, defendants Andrew G. Matson, Marilyn Fortune, Teddy Matson, Andrew Matson, Jr., Matt Matson, Laura Christensen, Dennis Matson, Emil Matson, and the estate of Lena Irene Matson, continue to make claim for additional benefits. In particular, these defendants claims $1,140,000 in additional benefits. . . .
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket 15 at 2-3.
II. DISCUSSION
Under Alaska law, the obligations of an insurance company are determined by the terms of the insurance policy. West v. Umialik Ins. Co., 8 P.3d 1135, 1138 (Alaska 2000). Insurance policies are to be construed or interpreted in accordance with the "reasonable expectations" of the parties. Id. The reasonable expectation of the parties is to be determined by looking at: (1) the language of the disputed policy provision; (2) the language of other provisions in the same policy; (3) extrinsic evidence; and (4) case law interpreting similar provisions. Id.
In the instant case, the disputed policy provisions are clear and unambiguous and susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation.
The Benefits for Common Carrier Accidents on page 4 provides that
If an Insured Person dies . . . the following benefit will be paid:
Primary Insured Spouse Each Child $1,000,000 $100,000 $20,000
(emphasis added). This section describes the amount of the singular benefit payable upon the death of each category of Insured Person, depending on whether the death is of the Primary Insured, his spouse, or child. Thus, if the Primary Insured dies, the single benefit payable is $1,000,000; if a spouse dies, the single benefit payable is $100,000; and if a child dies, the single benefit is $20,000.
[Contrary to Defendants' suggestion] [t]his section does not describe to whom the single benefit is payable. That is accomplished in the " Payment of benefits" section on page 7:
Unless you tell us otherwise, the standard beneficiary designation shown below is in effect. Accidental death benefits will be paid in the following order:
1. At your death, to your spouse, if living; otherwise equally to your living children, including step-children and adopted children, if any; otherwise equally to your living parents; otherwise to your estate.
2. At the death of any other Insured Person, to you, if living; otherwise as though it were an amount payable under 1 above.
(emphasis added). In the case of the death of any Insured Person other than the Primary Insured (i.e. spouse or child), this section directs that the benefit be payable to the Primary Insured.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket 15 at 4.
The plain meaning of the aforesaid policy clearly provides for payments to a single person upon the occurrence of an insured event in an amount that would vary according to who the deceased may have been. Again, if the primary insured were to have died, then payment of $1,000,000 would be made to his spouse, if living. Otherwise payment would be made pursuant to the "Payment of Benefit" section of the policy. If the primary insured's spouse were to die, as occurred here, payment would be made to the primary insured in the amount of $100,000. If a child of the primary insured were to die, payment would be made to the primary insured in the amount of $20,000. This was clearly the intent of the insurance policy as manifested by the unambiguous language of the policy itself.
Therefore, it is the conclusion of the Court that upon the death of Lena Irene Matson, Sears was obligated to pay to Andrew G. Matson, Sr., $100,000 pursuant to the terms of the aforesaid life insurance policy. Sears has satisfied this obligation. Sears has no further obligations under this policy. Sears Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. The Matsons' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
Judgment shall enter consistent herewith dismissing this matter in its entirety.