Opinion
A23A0141
08-18-2022
LATOYA CHARLISSE SEARD v. THE STATE.
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
A jury found LaToya Charlisse Seard guilty of obstruction, reckless driving, attempting to elude, and speeding. Following the trial court's entry of sentence, Seard filed a pro se notice of appeal. We lack jurisdiction.
"A criminal defendant in Georgia does not have the right to represent himself and also be represented by an attorney, and pro se filings by represented parties are therefore unauthorized and without effect." Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357, 363 (3) (767 S.E.2d 24) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the record shows that Seard was represented by counsel when the trial court entered sentence, and nothing in the record indicates that counsel either withdrew or was relieved from representing Seard. See White v. State, 302 Ga. 315, 318 (2) (806 S.E.2d 489) (2017) (rejecting defendant's argument that representation terminates upon entry of judgment and recognizing that defense counsel's duties toward a client extend for at least the 30 days after the entry of judgment when a notice of appeal may be filed).
Under these circumstances, Seard's pro se notice of appeal is a legal nullity, and this appeal is therefore DISMISSED. See Soberanis v. State, 345 Ga.App. 403, 405 (812 S.E.2d 800) (2018).