Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-112-BC
April 9, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Nikita Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 10, 2002. Having reviewed the pertinent pleadings and the evidence submitted therewith, the motion is DENIED for the reasons that follow.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff Kinnon E. Searcy ("Searcy"), appearing pro se herein, brings this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Searcy alleges that while he was in administrative custody at the Dallas County Jail, Defendant Nikita Cooper ("Officer Cooper"), a Dallas County Sheriffs Department detention officer, used excessive force against him in violation of his constitutional rights.
Searcy's excessive force claim against Officer Cooper is the only remaining claim in this case. On May 15, 2001, the District Court dismissed Searcy's other claims as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
On August 30, 2000, Searcy escaped from the Dallas County Jail. (Def.'s App. at 23.) He was apprehended on September 4, 2000, hooked into the Dallas County Jail and charged with escape, failure to identify himself as a fugitive, failure to stop and render aid, and parole violations for robbery and assault. (Id.) Searcy was housed in administrative custody pending those charges because he was classified as a security risk. (Id. at 31-33.)
According to Searcy, on October 20, 2000, at approximately 8:00 p.m., he was in his cell when he asked Officer Cooper, who was working in the jail control center, what time it was. (Pl.'s Compl. at 4.) Officer Cooper allegedly responded in a "negative manner" and Searcy told her that she should not speak to him like that. (Attachment to Pl.'s Compl. ("Pl.'s Attach.").) According to Searcy, he and Officer Cooper then "had words." (Id.) Sometime thereafter, when Officer Cooper was relieved from her duty at the control center, she allegedly approached Searcy's cell and said, "You were the one talking all that shit." (Id.) Searcy claims that at the time Officer Cooper approached his cell, he was talking on a pay telephone. (Pl.'s Compl. at 4.) Officer Cooper allegedly disconnected Searcy's call and pulled the telephone handset through the feeder port of his cell door. (Id.) Searcy claims that Officer Cooper injured his hands by stabbing him with her jail keys and slamming his hands in the feeder port. (Id.)
Inmates in administrative custody are provided with a pay telephone on a cart. To use the telephone, the inmate must reach through a feeder port in the cell door to dial the number on the base unit and then pull the handset into the cell.
Officer Cooper's version of the facts is quite different. According to Officer Cooper, while she was making her rounds at the jail, she noticed that the pay telephone handset was hanging inside Searcy's cell and was not in use. (Def.'s App. at 68.) Officer Cooper allegedly ordered Searcy to replace the handset so other inmates could use the telephone. (Id.) Searcy allegedly refused to comply with Officer Cooper's order and began speaking profanely. (Id.) Officer Cooper then reached for the handset and Searcy allegedly attempted to thwart her efforts by thrusting his arms through the feeder port. (Id.) Officer Cooper, however, removed the handset from Searcy's cell and replaced it on the base unit. (Id.) at 68-69.) Officer Cooper denies stabbing Searcy's hands with her keys. (Id. at 69.)
Officer Cooper now moves for summary judgment on Searcy's excessive force claim. The issues have been briefed by the parties and this matter is ripe for determination.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that, as a matter of law, the movant is entitled to judgment. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) . "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) . Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Id .
In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the movant to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Latimer v. Smithkline French Lab., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990) . If the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the summary judgment movant need not support its motion with evidence negating the non-movant's case. Rather, the movant may satisfy its burden by pointing to the absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. Id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 .
Once the movant meets its burden, the non-movant must show that summary judgement is not appropiiate. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)) . "This burden is not satisfied with `some metaphysical doubt as to material facts,' . . . by `conclusory allegations,' . . . by `unsubstantiated assertions,' or by only a "scintilla' of evidence." Id . (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)) . The non-moving party must "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). To determine whether a genuine issue exists for trial, the court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and the evidence must be sufficient such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 .
III. Searcy's Summary Judgment Evidence
Searcy filed an opposition to Officer Cooper's summary judgment motion on March 5, 2002. Instead of submitting an affidavit or other evidence to support his opposition, Searcy merely declares under penalty of perjury that all of the statements contained in his opposition are true and correct. (See Pl.'s Opposition at 8.) Officer Cooper objects that Searcy is improperly attempting to use his opposition as evidence. Noting the general rule that pleadings are not summary judgment evidence, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986), Officer Cooper argues that summary judgment is proper because Searcy has failed to conic forward with competent, admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The Court, however, need not decide whether Searcy's opposition may be considered as summary judgment evidence because his complaint may so he considered.
28 U.S.C. § 1746 provides for verification of an unsworn complaint when a plaintiff declares under penalty of perjury that the factual allegations contained therein are true and correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746 . When a plaintiff so verifies his complaint, he ostensibly faces criminal prosecution for perjury if it is shown that he willfully or knowingly made material misrepresentations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621, 1623 . In turn, the factual allegations of the complaint are endowed with the evidentiary force of an affidavit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746 . "In other words, when a pro se plaintiff properly executes such a form complaint, which calls for a declaration in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, the plaintiffs statement of claim is transformed from `mere allegations' of a pleading into `specific facts' as in an evidentiary affidavit." McNeal v. Macht , 763 F. Supp. 1458, 1461 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (citing Murrell v. Bennett, 615 F.2d 306, 310 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1980)); Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir. 1992) . "Therefore, the plaintiffs failure to proffer evidentiary materials directly in opposition to the defendant['s] motion . . ., without more, does not mandate the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant." McNeal, 763 F. Supp. at 1462 .
28 U.S.C. § 1746 provides as follows
Wherever, . . . under any rule . . . made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the . . . affidavit, in writing of the person making the same, such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, . . . in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury.
In the case at bar, Searcy made the following declaration in his form complaint: "I declare under penalty of perjury all facts presented in this complaint and the attachments thereto are true and correct." (Pl.'s Compl. at 5.) Thus, Searcy's complaint was verified within the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and the Court will consider it to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.
IV. Analysis
Searcy brings this action against Officer Cooper under § 1983, alleging that Officer Cooper used excessive force against him while he was in administrative custody at the Dallas County Jail, in violation of his constitutional rights. Officer Cooper moves for summary judgment on the basis that the force used against Searcy was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline and not maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Alternatively, Officer Copper argues that Searcy's excessive force claim is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The Court will address each issue in turn.
Under § 1983, "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A. Excessive Force Claim — Due Process Violation
A claim that a county detention officer used excessive force against a pretrial detainee is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Valencia v. Wiggins , 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993) (Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process standard applied to pretrial detainee's excessive force claim against county jail official); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979) (constitutional rights of pretrial detainees flow from the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the protections of the Eighth Amendment). The appropriate inquiry under the due process clause is "whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering" and "`whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.'" Id. at 1446 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)) . This inquiry focuses on the subjective intent of the detention officer. While there is often no evidence of subjective intent, the following objective factors may be suggestive of intent: (1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need for the application of force; (3) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible official; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. Id . (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 962 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1992)).
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that, approximately two hours after the alleged incident, Searcy was treated for "minimal swelling" of his left hand and two "small laceration[s]" on each hand. (Def.'s App. at 2.) The jail nurse cleaned the lacerations with saline and applied a triple antibiotic. (Id.) The nurse also applied a buddy splint to Searcy's left hand and ordered an x-ray to ensure that it was not broken. (Id.) Officer Cooper argues that this evidence shows that Searcy's injuries were only minor and, therefore, do not support a finding that Searcy suffered more than a de minimis injury, which is required for an excessive force claim. While Officer Cooper is correct that a detainee must have suffered more than a de minimis injury to prevail on an excessive force claim, "there is no categorical requirement that the physical injury be significant, serious, or more than minor." Gomez v. Chandler , 163 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1999); see Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (noting that "[t]he absence of a serious injury is . . . relevant to the [excessive force] inquiry, but does not end it.") . Thus, even a minor injury may support a due process violation if the degree of force employed was excessive to the apparent need for it. See id. at 923 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) . The court must view the injury in context.
Officer Cooper points to Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997), which held that a bruised ear lasting for three days was de minimis for purposes of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Officer Cooper argues that the injuries suffered in this case are similar to those in Siglar . The Court, however, finds that "recitation in appellate opinions of such subjective determinations as the relative severity of an injury do not lend themselves to useful or instructive comparison" due to the highly fact-specific nature of the excessive force inquiry. Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1448 . In Siglar , the inmate did not seek or receive medical treatment for any injury resulting from the correctional officers use of force. See Siglar , 112 F.3d at 193. In this case, Searcy sought and received medical attention for his injuries, which included the application of a buddy splint to his left hand and an x-ray of his hand to ensure that it was not broken. Thus, the Court finds Siglar distinguishable.
Here, the parties dispute what occurred when Officer Cooper approached Searcy's cell on the evening of October 20, 2000. According to Searcy, he was using the pay telephone when, without warning, Officer Cooper disconnected his call and pulled the handset through the feeder port. Searcy alleges that Officer Cooper slammed his hands in the feeder port and stabbed him with her jail keys. According to Officer Cooper, Searcy was not using the pay telephone, so she ordered him to replace the handset. Officer Cooper alleges that when Searcy became belligerent and refused to replace the handset, she began to pull the handset through the feeder port. Searcy allegedly attempted to thwart her efforts by thrusting his arms through the feeder port. Although Officer Cooper retrieved the handset from Searcy, she denies that she stabbed him with her jail keys.
Due to this discrepancy between the parties' versions of the events, the Court finds there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, and the threat reasonably perceived by Officer Cooper. As explained above, these factors will be largely dispositive of whether Officer Cooper's force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Accordingly, summary judgment on this basis is denied.
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability "unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) . A detention officer attempting to maintain to restore order in a correctional facility, such as Officer Cooper, is acting within her discretionary authority as a law enforcement official, and thus is shielded from liability by the defense of qualified immunity. See Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1448 (qualified immunity defense available to detention officers) . Searcy, as the plaintiff bears the burden of negating Officer Cooper's defense of qualified immunity. Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1994).
In Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991), the United States Supreme Court set forth the analytical framework for determining whether a plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to overcome a defendant's defense of qualified immunity. As a threshold matter, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Seigert, 500 U.S. at 231-232 . If the plaintiff is successful, the court must then determine whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the "clearly established" law at the time of the alleged violation. Spann v. Rainey , 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
Searcy has alleged a violation of his substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the Court must examine whether Officer Cooper's use of force was objectively reasonable. However, as material questions of fact exist regarding whether Officer Cooper's use of force was excessive to the apparent need for it, the Court cannot resolve this issue on summary judgment. The objective reasonableness of Officer Cooper's use of force must be viewed in the context in which it was applied. Because the circumstances surrounding Officer Cooper's use of force are disputed, summary judgment on this basis is denied.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Nikita Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.