The court's scheduling order in this case carried the same effect as would a party's interrogatory requesting disclosure. See Nelson v. Nelson, 2005 MT 263, ¶¶ 31-34, 329 Mont. 85, ¶¶ 31-34, 122 P.3d 1196, ¶¶ 31-34; Seal v. Woodrows Pharmacy, 1999 MT 247, ¶ 23, 296 Mont. 197, ¶ 23, 988 P.2d 1230, ¶ 23. ¶ 71 Texaco nevertheless maintains that the court's exclusion of its expert witnesses constituted too harsh of a remedy in light of the fact that Sunburst did not suffer any prejudice from Texaco's inadequate disclosures.

¶ 23 We review a district court's decision to award or deny sanctions for failure to comply with a Rule 16 Scheduling Order for an abuse of discretion. See Seal v. Woodrows Pharmacy, 1999 MT 247, ¶ 26, 296 Mont. 197, ¶ 26, 988 P.2d 1230, ¶ 26. We afford the district court discretion because it sits in the best position to evaluate whether one party has disregarded the rights of the opposing party and what sanctions for such conduct, if any, addresses most appropriately the sanctionable conduct.

¶ 24 The Tripps point us toward cases where we have upheld the exclusion of expert testimony on the grounds that the experts were not fully disclosed in advance of trial or that a party abused a discovery deadline. See, e.g., Seal v. Woodrows Pharmacy, 1999 MT 247, ¶ 25, 296 Mont. 197, ¶ 25, 988 P.2d 1230, ¶ 25; Rocky Mountain Enters., Inc. v. Pierce Flooring (1997), 286 Mont. 282, 299, 951 P.2d 1326, 1336-37. However, these cases do not necessarily help the Tripps' cause because in this case the District Court allowed the expert to testify.

¶ 10 Without Dr. Joseph's expert testimony, the court found Plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert witness to establish the elements of medical negligence, making summary judgment for the Defendants appropriate as a matter of law. See Seal v. Woodrows Pharm., 1999 MT 247, ¶ 35, 296 Mont. 197, 988 P.2d 1230. ¶ 11 This appeal followed, and we held oral argument on August 1, 2012.

Id. at ¶ 32; First Citizens Bank v. Sullivan, 2008 MT 428, ¶ 29, 347 Mont. 452, 200 P.3d 39. This Court views "with favor" sanctions for failure to comply with the rules of discovery. Seal v. Woodrows Pharmacy, 1999 MT 247, ¶ 22, 296 Mont. 197, 988 P.2d 1230. ¶ 28 Absent a showing that the district court abused its discretion, this Court will not overturn a district court's decision on the admissibility of evidence, including expert testimony.

McKenzie v. Scheeler, 285 Mont. 500, 506, 949 P.2d 1168, 1172 (1997). See also Seal v. Woodrows Pharmacy, 1999 MT 247, ¶ 26, 296 Mont. 197, 988 P.2d 1230; Smith v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 276 Mont. 329, 332, 916 P.2d 91, 93 (1996). ¶ 35 In Smith, the district court dismissed Smith's complaint with prejudice for Smith's failure to comply with pretrial orders compelling discovery. Smith, 276 Mont. at 330, 916 P.2d at 91-92.

STANDARD OF REVIEW¶ 23 We review a district court's decision to impose or deny sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Seal v. Woodrows Pharmacy, 1999 MT 247, ¶ 26, 296 Mont. 197, 988 P.2d 1230; Big Spring v. Jore, 2005 MT 64, ¶ 37, 326 Mont. 256, 109 P.3d 219. A district court's decision to refuse a proposed jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion as well. Howard v. St. James Community Hosp., 2006 MT 23, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 60, 129 P.3d 126. An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court, in the exercise of its discretion, acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason in view of all the circumstances. Howard, ¶ 16.

¶ 32 This Court has, on a number of occasions, affirmed the authority of a district court to exclude expert testimony. In Seal v. Woodrows Pharmacy, 1999 MT 247, 296 Mont. 197, 988 P.2d 1230, the District Court concluded that, contrary to the District Court's scheduling order and Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P., Seal's disclosure of expert witnesses did not state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert would testify or a summary of the grounds for the expert's opinion. Consequently, Seal was prohibited from introducing the expert's testimony into evidence.

¶ 61 Having reviewed the court's ruling in the context of the three Maloney criteria, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in not allowing Dr. Price to testify. The facts here are distinguishable from Seal v. Woodrows Pharmacy, 1999 MT 247, 296 Mont. 197, 988 P.2d 1230. In that case, we upheld a trial court's prohibition of a doctor's testimony because of continual and blatant discovery abuses when Seal refused to provide the required Rule 26 information even after being afforded numerous opportunities to do so.

Denial of a motion in limine filed in disregard of a scheduling order is not an abuse of discretion. See Seal v. Woodrows Pharmacy, 1999 MT 247, 296 Mont. 197, 988 P.2d 1230. ¶ 67 Applying the same rationale to the District Court's denial of Weldele's untimely motion to suppress, we affirm the court's denial of that motion as well.