48 billed in another, constituted a breach of the insurers' duty to defend sufficient to extinguish their right to compel arbitration under section 2860. Seagate Tech. LLC v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 737 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1017 (N.D.Cal.2010). In another, an insurer's improper refusal to accept tender of the insured's defense precluded arbitration under section 2860.
In one case, the failure to pay at all in two actions, and payment of $130,579.40 out of $2,253,433.48 billed in another, constituted a breach of the insurers' duty to defend sufficient to extinguish their right to compel arbitration under section 2860. Seagate Tech. LLC v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2010). In another, an insurer's improper refusal to accept tender of the insured's defense precluded arbitration under section 2860.
To defend immediately, it must defend entirely." Seagate Technology LLC v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh. PA, 737 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
Where, as here, an insurer “accept[s] only a share of the defense burden, ” the insurer's act is “equivalent to breach of the duty to defend.” Seagate Tech. LLC v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 737 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Haskel v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.4th 963, 976 n.9 (1995) (finding an insurer's “acceptance of a 13 percent share of the defense burden . . . equivalent [to] a defense denial” because when an insurer “owes any defense burden it must be fully borne with allocations of that burden among other responsible parties to be determined later.”)). The parties have not provided, and this Court has not found, Nevada caselaw addressing the precise issue presented here. Because “Nevada's duty to defend appears to be identical to California's, and Nevada courts often look to California for guidance, ” the Court considers California law.
The case was superseded by statute, so the duty is now governed by Cal. Civil Code § 2860, commonly referred to as the Cumis statute.Wallis v. Centennial Ins. Co. , 982 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1121–22 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Seagate Tech. LLC v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. , 737 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ; Concept Enters., Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co. , No. CV007267NM(JWJX), 2001 WL 34050685, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2001) ; Atmel Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine , 426 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ; Janopaul + Block Cos. v. Superior Court , 200 Cal.App.4th 1239, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380 (2011) ).Janopaul + Block Cos , 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 387–88.
That agreement is also consistent with California law which requires insurers in a mixed action to defend the entire suit. Seagate Technology LLC v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 737 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1016-1017 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Buss v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.4th 35, 58 (1997)); Gonzales v. Fire Ins. Ex., 234 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted). Therefore, this Court holds, when the SIR is met as to a single claim to which the policy applies, an obligation arises for NAC to defend the entirety of the suit containing the covered claim.