Opinion
23A-CR-3127
06-06-2024
Dennis Todd Seabolt, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Victoria Bailey Casanova Casanova Legal Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Nicole D. Wiggins Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Dearborn Circuit Court The Honorable F. Aaron Negangard, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 15C01-2301-F6-49
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Victoria Bailey Casanova Casanova Legal Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Nicole D. Wiggins Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
RILEY, JUDGE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[¶1] Appellant-Defendant, Dennis Todd Seabolt (Seabolt), appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation and imposition of the entirety of his previously suspended sentence.
[¶2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[¶3] Seabolt presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence at the Department of Correction after finding that Seabolt had violated his probation.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶4] On January 30, 2023, the State filed an Information, charging Seabolt with neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony, maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony, possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. On March 16, 2023, the State amended the charges by adding a charge of dealing smokable hemp, a Class A misdemeanor. On May 1, 2023, Seabolt entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to neglect of a dependent and maintaining a common nuisance, Level 6 felonies, in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges. After accepting the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Seabolt to concurrent sentences of 910 days, with 724 days suspended to probation. Immediately after being sentenced in the current cause, Seabolt was extradited to Illinois where he remained in custody on a parole violation until June 8, 2023.
[¶5] On June 12, 2023, Seabolt began serving his probationary sentence in this cause. A month later, on July 17, 2023, Seabolt submitted a diluted urine sample for his first drug screen. He also submitted diluted urine samples on September 28, 2023, and October 4, 2012. On October 11, 2023, the State filed a petition to revoke Seabolt's probation. On November 6, 2023, the trial court conducted a revocation hearing. During the proceedings, Seabolt's probation officer testified that Seabolt had been informed that submitting a diluted urine sample would equate to a positive screen and would be considered a violation of his probation. Seabolt testified that, for medical reasons, he was taking Flomax to help him urinate. He admitted a letter from Dr. Thom Bunnell (Dr. Bunnell), dated November 13, 2023, which informed the court that Seabolt "should have his drug screening done through blood tests instead of through urine." (Defendant's Exh. B). The court noted the vagueness of the statement and unsuccessfully attempted to contact Dr. Bunnell during the revocation hearing. The parties agreed to allow the court to speak with Dr. Bunnell ex parte and that they would reconvene for a continued hearing the following day. The next day, the trial court informed the parties that the court had spoken with Dr. Bunnell, who conveyed that he had written the letter for Sebolt because "he was under the impression that [Seabolt] was having trouble urinating, not that it would create a sample that would be diluted." (Transcript p. 80). Dr. Bunnell clarified that Flomax would not cause a diluted urine sample and that "the only drug that would cause [dilution] would be a diuretic," which had not been prescribed to Seabolt. (Tr. p. 80). Concluding that the State had established the probation violation, the trial court also found that Seabolt had violated his probation within barely one month of his release from custody and had "provided an excuse that was not truthful" about the dilution of his screenings. (Tr. p. 85). The trial court considered that Seabolt was fifty years old, had an extensive criminal history, and had never been able to successfully complete probation. The trial court ordered his probation revoked and mandated him to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence in the Department of Correction (DOC).
[¶6] Seabolt now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[¶7] Not contesting the trial court's conclusion of a probation violation, Seabolt challenges the sanction the trial court imposed upon finding he violated his probation and contends that the 724-day sanction for three diluted drug screens-considering the two negative screens and no other violations-is excessive and inappropriate.
[¶8] "Probation is a matter of grace left to the trial court's discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled." Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (explaining that "[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed. If this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.") A probation hearing is civil in nature, and the State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Brown v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1179, 1182 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if these conditions are violated. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. As such, the trial court may order the execution of all or part of the original suspended sentence upon finding a violation of probation. Id; I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in determining the appropriate sanction for a probation violation, and we review only for an abuse of that discretion. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188.
[¶9] In imposing Seabolt's entire previously suspended sentence, the trial court considered that "he was just released from prison in June of 2023, and it is only November of 2023 and we have had five drug screens." (Tr. p. 84). Although Seabolt was aware that diluted drug screens would be considered positive screens and a violation of his probation, three out of the five screens returned as having been diluted. Only after the State filed a petition to revoke his probation on October 11, 2023, did Seabolt submit a vague letter from Dr. Bunnell in an attempt to use his medication as a reason for the diluted screens. The trial court considered this as "not truthful." (Tr. p. 86). In addition, the trial court explicitly found "his criminal history [to be] extensive and the [c]ourt is specifically making that finding in this case." (Tr. p. 85). Seabolt had two prior misdemeanor convictions and six prior felony convictions. He had five drug convictions, including three felony convictions that resulted in DOC sentences. He has violated his probation on at least six prior occasions and his probation has been revoked three times. In the current case, Seabolt violated his probation only one month after his release from the Illinois DOC by failing his first drug screen.
[¶10] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the remainder of Seabolt's suspended sentence. Seabolt's numerous probation violations reflect that he is unwilling to avail himself of rehabilitative efforts. See Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188 (the trial court acted well within its discretion by ordering defendant to serve two years of his previously suspended sentence given his multiple probation violations, past criminal history, and unwillingness or inability to complete the halfway house program). The fact that Seabolt tested negative twice does not minimize his violations, as he suggests, especially since he only submitted five drug screens. In sum, Seabolt rapidly violated his probation upon his release, the nature of his violations demonstrated that he continued to struggle with substance abuse, and his attempt to excuse his violation was "untruthful." (Tr. p. 86).
CONCLUSION
[¶11] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the entirety of Seabolt's previously suspended sentence following his probation violation.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Felix, J. and Kenworthy, J. concur.