in judgment, but perversity of will, prejudice, passion, or moral delinquency (Grayson County v. Harrell (Tex.Civ.App.), 202 S.W. 160; Citizens St. R. Co. v. Heath, 29 Ind. App. 395, 62 N.E. 107; Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 P. 216, 22 L.R.A., N.S., 584), but it does not necessarily imply wrong-doing or a breach of trust, or import bad faith (Lyles v. Williams, 96 S.C. 290, 80 S.E. 470; Root v. Bingham, 26 S.D. 118, 128 N.W. 132); it conveys, rather, the idea of acting beyond the limit of discretion (Browning v. Dow, 60 Cal.App. 680, 213 P. 707; State Board v. Brown, 70 Colo. 116, 198 P. 274); the disregard of the evidence adduced (State v. District Court, 213 Iowa 822, 238 N.W. 290, 80 A.L.R. 339); the basing a decision upon incompetent or insufficient evidence (Katz v. Delohery Hat Co., 97 Conn. 665, 118 A. 88); an exercise of discretion to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence (Trimmer v. State, 142 Okla. 278, 287 P. 783; Seaba v. State, 144 Okla. 295, 290 P. 1098); a clear error in law in the circumstances (Tunstall v. Lerner Shops, 160 S.C. 557, 159 S.E. 386; Heaton v. Jackson, 34 Ohio App. 424, 171 N.E. 364). * * * "If the statute gives to the board the right to decide the question of affirming or reversing the county superintendent's order as it sees fit, the members are not vested with discretion, but with arbitrary power.

He testified that Gibson did call him about once a week from somewhere, and that Buster Lee Gibson's father kept in touch with him; but he did not testify that he told Buster Lee Gibson or the bondsmen that there had been a decision affirming the trial court in the Criminal Court of Appeals. Sec. 1108 [ 22-1108], Title 22, O.S. 1941, provides for the forfeiture of bail, and if at any time before final adjournment of court the defendant or his bail appear and satisfactorily excuse his neglect, the court may direct the forfeiture to be discharged upon such terms as may be just. The defendant, Buster Lee Gibson, at no time appeared in the trial court after the mandate had been returned, to in any way excuse his conduct in leaving the state and not being present at the time the mandate was spread of record. In Seaba et al. v. State, 144 Okla. 295, 290 P. 1098, a case where the facts are very similar to those in the case at bar, this court held that it was not the duty of the sheriff or county attorney to keep the plaintiff in error advised as to what action was taken in his case by the Criminal Court of Appeals, but that it was the duty of the plaintiff in error, Carl Seaba, and his attorney to keep advised concerning the proceedings in the Criminal Court of Appeals, and that had they made any inquiry of the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Appeals or of the district court of Kay county, they could, with the exercise of ordinary diligence, have discovered that the case had been affirmed and the mandate spread of record in the district court of Kay county. In that case the action of the Criminal Court of Appeals and the spreading of the mandate of record were done exactly as in this case, and the action of the trial court in that case in refusing to set aside the bond forfeiture was affirmed, as it did not clearly appear that the trial court

for the State. Refusal to suspend trial and submit to jury an inquisition as to defendant's insanity at time of trial under Code, Title 15, § 426, was matter that rested in discretion of trial judge and is not revisable on appeal. Granberry v. State, 184 Ala. 5, 63 So. 975; Rohn v. State, 186 Ala. 5, 65 So. 42; Whitfield v. State, 236 Ala. 312, 182 So. 42. Section 425, Title 15, Code, is not mandatory, and refusal to appoint commission, or Superintendent of Insane Hospital, thereunder was not error. Oliver v. State, 232 Ala. 5, 166 So. 615; Gast v. State, 232 Ala. 307, 167 So. 554; Benton v. State, 31 Ala. App. 338, 18 So.2d 423; Id., 245 Ala. 625, 18 So.2d 428; Burns v. State, ante, p. 135, 19 So.2d 450. Motions under Code, Title 15, §§ 425, 426 and 428, are not matters of right but are addressed to sound discretion of court. As to discretion of court and abuse thereof, see Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 175 N.E. 718, 79 A.L.R. 1380; Towle v. State ex rel. Fisher, 3 Fla. 202; Seaba v. State, 144 Okl. 295, 290 P. 1098. Under evidence in this case no abuse of discretion appears. Opinions of expert witnesses as to insanity are not conclusive upon jury, but are to be weighed like other evidence.

The following opinions, some of which involve the question of vacating judgments rendered at prior terms on bail bonds, sufficiently announce that principle as emanating from the statute itself, any needed changes in which must be made by the Legislature and not by the court; Burton v. Swanson, supra; Hall et al. v. Holloway et al., 62 Okla. 192, 162 P. 186; McAdams v. Latham, 21 Okla. 511, 96 P. 584; Foltz v. Deshon, 122 Okla. 42, 249 P. 358; Provins v. Lovi, 6 Okla. 94, 50 P. 81; Thompson et al. v. Caddo County Bank, 15 Okla. 615, 82 P. 927; Petros v. Fox-Vliet Drug Co., 138 Okla. 253, 280 P. 812; Tracy et al. v. State ex rel. Fancher, Co. Atty., 60 Okla. 109, 159 P. 496; Gavin v. Heath, 125 Okla. 118, 256 P. 745. In particular see Grammer v. State, 105 Okla. 72, 231 P. 505; Seaba et al. v. State, 144 Okla. 295, 290 P. 1098; Price v. State, 169 Okla. 343, 37 P.2d 254. In addition to the foregoing, it does not appear that there was any defense to the action in the first place. Even if the accused had appeared a few days after the bond forfeiture, and before the action on the bond had been filed, it would not have been a defense to the action on the bond, although it may have been sufficient to warrant the trial judge in exonerating the sureties within that term under the provisions of section 2820, supra.

udgment, but perversity of will, prejudice, passion, or moral delinquency ( Grayson County v. Harrell, (Tex.Civ.App.) 202 S.W. 160; Citizens St. R. Co. v. Heath, 29 Ind. App. 365, 62 N.E. 107; Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 P. 216, 22 L.R.A. (n.s.) 584), but it does not necessarily imply wrongdoing or a breach of trust, or import bad faith ( Lyles v. Williams, 96 S.C. 290, 80 S.E. 470; Root v. Bingham, 26 S.D. 118, 128 N.W. 132); it conveys, rather, the idea of acting beyond the limit of discretion ( Browning v. Dow, 60 Cal.App. 680, 213 P. 707; State Board v. Brown, 70 Colo. 116, 198 P. 274); the disregard of the evidence adduced ( State v. District Court, 213 Iowa, 822, 238 N.W. 290, 80 A.L.R. 339); the basing a decision upon incompetent or insufficient evidence ( Katz v. Delohery Hat Co., 97 Conn. 665, 118 A. 88); an exercise of discretion to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence ( Trimmer v. State, 142 Okla. 278, 287 P. 783; Seaba v. State, 144 Okla. 295, 290 P. 1098); a clear error in law in the circumstances ( Tunstall v. Lerner Shops, 160 S.C. 557, 159 S.E. 386; Heaton v. Jackson, 34 Ohio App. 424, 171 N.E. 364). The complaint sufficiently charges facts from which an "abuse of discretion" follows, under all of the foregoing definitions.

If the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable or unreasonable, if its action clearly amounts to a denial of justice, if clearly against justice or conscience, reason and evidence it has abused its discretion. Id. State v. Mooney, 10 Iowa 506, and other cases supra and post. Schiltz v. Lowell, Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 119 Atl. (Vt.) 513; Bringhurst v. Harkins, 2 W.W. Harr. (Del.) 324, 122 A. 783; Root v. Bingham, 128 N.W. 132, 26 S.D. 118; Seaba v. State, 290 Pac. (Okla.) 1098, 1100. Discretion does not mean the arbitrary will or merely individual or personal view of the judge.

Greenwood v. State, Okla. Cr. 381 P.2d 895 (1963). The respondent cites Seaba v. State, 144 Okla. 295, 290 P. 1098 (1930) as supporting the proposition that upon issuance of the mandate full jurisdiction is returned to the trial court, but in that case the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated: "When the Criminal Court of Appeals of this state affirms the judgment and sentence of a trial court in a criminal action and remands the same to the lower court with directions to carry out the mandate of the Criminal Court of Appeals, then the trial court has as full and complete jurisdiction of said cause, for all further proceedings consistent with the mandate, as though no appeal had ever been taken."