Opinion
CV185041470S
10-01-2018
SEA GREENS HOLDINGS, LLC v. Andrea A. ANGERA, Jr. et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OZALIS, J.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 11, 2018, the plaintiff, Sea Greens Holdings, LLC (Sea Greens) filed an eleven-count complaint against the defendants, Andrea A. Angera, Jr. (Angora), Tikal Consulting Company, LLC (Tikal), Maine Seaweed Exchange, LLC (MSE), and Springtide Seaweed, LLC (Springtide) (collectively, the defendants). The action stems from the defendants’ allegedly unfair and deceitful actions concerning Sea Greens’ commercial seaweed and kelp aquaculture farming and distribution business, and the complaint alleges the following facts. Sea Greens is licensed to do business in Connecticut with a principal place of business in New Haven, Connecticut. Angera was and remains a resident of Litchfield, Connecticut, and Tikal was and remains a Connecticut limited liability company with a principal place of business in Connecticut. Angera and Tikal held themselves out as experts in the seafood processing industry and were hired to provide consulting services to Sea Greens. Specifically, Angera and Tikal were hired to manage the build out and operation of Sea Greens’ seaweed processing facility in New Haven. By virtue of various misrepresentations, deceptions, and breaches of duties and obligations to help build and strengthen Sea Greens’s business, Angera, Tikal, and the other defendants have operated directly, illegally, unfairly, and improperly against the interests of Sea Greens’, all to its detriment, damage, and immediate and irreparable harm. The eleven counts sound in breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud/intentional misrepresentation, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with business relationships/expectancies, unjust enrichment, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act, General Statutes § 42-110b(a) et seq. (CUTPA), and a request for temporary/permanent injunction. Default judgments were entered against Tikal, MSE, and Springtide for failure to appear. Tikal subsequently filed an appearance on July 23, 2018.
By way of background, Sea Greens had initially applied for ex parte orders for prejudgment remedies (PJR) and an injunction against the defendants on January 25, 2018. The court, Abrams, J., declined to enter ex parte orders, but the clerk ordered service of the applications and related papers upon the defendants on or before February 1, 2018, and set an initial hearing date of February 5, 2018. The marshal’s return of service was filed on January 31, 2018, and states that service was made upon all four defendants on January 29, 2018. This court conducted a hearing regarding the PJR and injunction applications on February 5, 2018, and granted the PJR application on May 3, 2018. Subsequently, on May 7, 2018, Sea Greens served the defendants with a signed writ of attachment, summons, complaint, amount in controversy and copies of the court’s PJR and injunction orders, as stated in the marshal’s return of service filed on May 11, 2018.
Presently before the court is the defendant Angera’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. On May 4, 2018, Angera filed his first motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum of law [Entry No. 121] arguing (1) that he was not a resident of the state of Connecticut and was not properly served with a copy of the process instituting this action in this state; (2) that service upon him was defective and a nullity; (3) that the court lacks jurisdiction over the defendants except Tikal, which was dissolved with the Connecticut Secretary of State; and (4) that the court should decline hearing this matter based on the principle of forum non conveniens. It is Angera’s position that Connecticut is an improper forum, and that the case belongs in Maine.
Angera thereafter filed a second motion to dismiss on May 29, 2018, along with a supporting memorandum of law and exhibits [Entry No. 135]. Angera argues in this second motion that he had and has no legal duty to or obligation to Sea Greens, and that Sea Greens’ allegations that "Angera was the principal, manager and agent of [Tikal], which he operated under his sole domination and such that there was a complete unity of interest and ownership, whereby [Tikal] and Angera are and were merely alter egos and should be jointly and severally liable" is false.
On June 4, 2018, Sea Greens filed an objection to both motions to dismiss, along with a supporting memorandum of law and exhibits. Sea Greens argues that the first motion to dismiss was premature, as it was filed before the complaint was served on May 7, 2018, and that the second motion to dismiss does not raise jurisdictional issues. Sea Greens argues that Angera was properly served at his domicile at 156 West Street, Litchfield, Connecticut, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-57, and that alternate service was made at Angera’s Massachusetts and Maine addresses pursuant to Connecticut’s longarm statute, General Statutes § 52-59b. Further, Sea Greens argues that the principle of forum non conveniens does not warrant dismissal of the case, as Connecticut is the proper forum.
This court ordered oral argument and an evidentiary hearing as to the issues raised in the two motions to dismiss, as well as Angera’s motion to vacate, filed on May 7, 2017, and Sea Greens’ motion for contempt, filed on July 2, 2018. The evidentiary hearing took place on July 23, 2018, and August 29, 2018 (collectively, the evidentiary hearing). At the evidentiary hearing, Angera’s counsel conceded that the arguments set forth in the May 29, 2018 motion to dismiss (that Angera did not owe a duty to Sea Greens and that certain allegations in Sea Greens’ complaint were false) were not appropriate grounds for a motion to dismiss. Angera’s counsel asked that the motion be withdrawn without prejudice to re-file as a motion for summary judgment as necessary.
On August 28, 2018, Angera filed a "Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Vacate Orders." This court issued an order that the "supplemental memorandum" is in actuality a new motion to vacate that raises new claims and arguments. The order indicated that the court would not consider the arguments raised in this motion at the evidentiary hearing.
At the close of the evidentiary hearing on August 29, 2018, it was agreed upon that the motion for contempt would be decided after the court issued a decision on the motion to dismiss.
The evidentiary hearing was initially ordered for June 18, 2018. Angera, who was previously self-represented, retained counsel just prior to the hearing date. Counsel filed an appearance on June 15, 2018, and filed a motion for continuance on the same day, asking for time to review the pleadings and confer with his client. Sea Greens objected to the motion for continuance. Angera’s counsel appeared at the hearing on June 18, 2018, but Angera was not present. The hearing was continued until July 23, 2018.
As for the May 4, 2018 motion to dismiss, Angera’s counsel stated at the evidentiary hearing that he was not pressing the issue of improper service. Angera’s counsel conceded that alternate service pursuant to the longarm statute either was or could have been made. Accordingly, the issue of personal jurisdiction was conceded, and the only remaining issue before the court is whether the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Personal Jurisdiction
"[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). "A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
"[A]n action commenced by ... improper service must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Matthews v. SBA, Inc., 149 Conn.App. 513, 530, 89 A.3d 938, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 917, 94 A.3d 642 (2014). Generally, "[a] defect in process ... such as an improperly executed writ, implicates personal jurisdiction, rather than subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 400, 21 A.3d 451 (2011). Further, "[f]ailure to comply with the statutory requirements of service renders a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction ... Facts showing the service of process in time, form, and manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of mandatory statutes in that regard are essential to jurisdiction over the person." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 401. "Because a lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived by the defendant, the rules of practice require the defendant to challenge that jurisdiction by a motion to dismiss." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Golodner v. Women’s Center of Southeastern Connecticut, Inc., 281 Conn. 819, 825, 917 A.2d 959 (2007).
"When issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court’s jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross examine adverse witnesses." Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503 (1983). "[W]here a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts ... Likewise, if the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits of the case, a court cannot resolve the jurisdictional question without a hearing to evaluate those merits ... An evidentiary hearing is necessary because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties." (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 652-54, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
In the present case, this court ordered oral arguments and an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues raised in Angera’s motions to dismiss and motion to vacate. In support of his arguments, Angera offered three full exhibits, his own testimony, and the testimony of Sarah Redmond, who is the principal of Springtide. Sea Greens did not offer any testimony but submitted over 30 full exhibits. References to specific exhibits and additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
B. Forum Non Conveniens
Angera argues that the court should dismiss Sea Greens’ case on the ground that Connecticut is an inconvenient forum, and that the case instead belongs in Maine. He argues that Sea Greens brought this case in Connecticut for the sole purpose of harassing and causing inconvenience to the defendants. In its objection, Sea Greens argues that Connecticut is the appropriate forum for this action on the basis that Sea Greens maintains a facility in New Haven, and that the misconduct alleged in the complaint occurred in Connecticut.
"A court that decides to dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens has jurisdiction but elects to dismiss the case and defer to another forum." Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 258 Conn. 454, 480, 782 A.2d 103 (2001). "The common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens is an exception to the general rule that a court must hear and decide cases over which it has jurisdiction by statute or constitution, and recognizes the discretion of a court, in some few instances, where jurisdiction and venue are proper ... to dismiss a suit because the court has determined that another forum is better suited to decide the issues involved." (Citation omitted.) Sabino v. Ruffolo, 19 Conn.App. 402, 405-06, 562 A.2d 1134 (1989). "[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens vests discretion in the trial court to decide where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 463-64. "The burden of proof to demonstrate that the forum is not convenient is on [the] defendant seeking dismissal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 482.
"[T]he central principle of the forum non conveniens doctrine [is] that unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant[s], the [plaintiffs’] choice of forum should rarely be disturbed ... Although it would be inappropriate to invoke [a] rigid rule to govern discretion ... it bears emphasis that invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a drastic remedy ... which the trial court must approach with caution and restraint. The trial court does not have unchecked discretion to dismiss cases from a [the plaintiffs’] chosen forum simply because another forum, in the court’s view, may be superior to that chosen by the plaintiff[s] ... Although a trial court applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens must walk a delicate line to avoid implicitly sanctioning forum-shopping by either litigant at the expense of the other ... it cannot exercise its discretion in order to level the playing field between the parties. The [plaintiffs’] choice of forum, which may well have been chosen precisely because it provides the plaintiffs] with certain procedural or substantive advantages, should be respected unless equity weighs strongly in favor of the defendant[s]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 464-65.
"[T]he overriding inquiry in a forum non conveniens motion is not whether some other forum might be a good one, or even a better one than the [plaintiffs’] chosen forum. The question to be answered is whether [the plaintiffs’] chosen forum is itself inappropriate or unfair because of the various private and public interest considerations involved ... Accordingly, the trial court, in exercising its structured discretion, should place its thumb firmly on the [plaintiffs’] side of the scale, as a representation of the strong presumption in favor of the [plaintiffs’] chosen forum, before attempting to balance the private and public interest factors relevant to a forum non conveniens motion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 465.
A forum non conveniens analysis requires this court to apply a four-part process that "our Supreme Court has termed a useful frame of reference for the law of Connecticut in analyzing claims of forum non conveniens." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Temlock v. Temlock, 95 Conn.App. 505, 515, 898 A.2d 209, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 910, 902 A.2d 1070 (2006). "First, the court should determine whether an adequate alternative forum exists that possesses jurisdiction over the whole case ... Second, the court should consider all relevant private interest factors with a strong presumption in favor of ... the plaintiffs’ initial choice of forum ... Third, if the balance of private interest factors is equal, the court should consider whether any public interest factors tip the balance in favor of trying the case in the foreign forum ... Finally, if the public interest factors tip the balance in favor of trying the case in the foreign forum, the court must ... ensure that [the] plaintiffs can reinstate their [action] in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 466.
As to the first part of the framework adopted in Durkin, "[o]rdinarily, the alternative forum prerequisite will be satisfied simply if the defendants are amenable to service in another jurisdiction ... The United States Supreme Court, however, has identified at least some instances in which mechanical inquiry into the amenability of process in the other forum must surrender to a more meaningful assessment of the suitability of the alternative forum ... [T]he United States Supreme Court noted that, in rare circumstances, where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, such as where the alternative forum does not permit any litigation of the subject matter of the legal controversy, the other forum may not meet the threshold requirement of an adequate alternative." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., 215 Conn. 490, 504 n.13, 576 A.2d 518 (1990).
As to the second part of the forum non conveniens framework, "the relevant private interest factors are: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling witnesses, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; (3) the possibility of viewing the accident scene if such viewing is appropriate to the action; (4) the enforceability of a judgment; (5) the relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; and (6) all other practical problems that make the trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive ... We examine each of these factors in turn, keeping in mind that, consistent with the flexibility necessary in a forum non conveniens analysis, no single factor should be given undue weight." (Citation omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 467. The third part, the public interest factors, include "(1) administrative difficulties for the courts, i.e., court congestion and the court’s familiarity with the applicable law; (2) imposing the burden of jury duty on [the] people of a community with no relation to the litigation; (3) holding trial in the view of interested persons; and (4) having matters decided in their local forum." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 462. Finally, regarding the fourth part of the framework, courts will consider, inter alia, whether the statute of limitations would prevent the plaintiff from reinstating their claim in the alternative forum.
In the present case, Angera first argues that Maine is an adequate alternative forum. Specifically, Angera argues that Sea Greens has its primary operating facility in Maine, Sea Greens’ general manager resides in Maine, and all of the active defendants are either citizens or residents of Maine. Angera next argues that the private interest factors weigh in favor of dismissing Sea Greens’ case. Without citing to any particular factor, Angera argues that none of the "Maine defendants" do business in Connecticut or are otherwise subject to jurisdiction in Connecticut under the longarm statute, and that Sea Greens will have a more complete remedy by bringing this action in Maine. Angera argues that Sea Greens’ choice of forum was designed solely to make it expensive and inconvenient to litigate this matter for the defendants by bringing this action in Connecticut. As for the public interest factors, Angera argues that Sea Greens’ claims are grounded factually and legally in Maine, and that it is a vital public interest that claims so intertwined with Maine be heard there. Finally, Angera argues that it would not be prejudicial for Sea Greens to bring this matter in Maine.
In its objection, Sea Greens argues that Connecticut is the appropriate forum for this case. As to the first factor, Sea Greens holds Angera to his proof as to the suitability of Maine as an adequate alternate forum, and argues that even if Maine might have jurisdiction over some of the conduct at issue, no such showing has been made. Sea Greens similarly argues that Angera has made no showing concerning the relevant private or public interest factors. Instead, Sea Greens argues that the defendants’ alleged misconduct originated in Connecticut in February 2017, and involved Sea Greens’ New Haven facility, where Angera and Tikal were working during the relevant time frame. Although Sea Greens does maintain a facility in Maine, Sea Greens argues that this is not dispositive of the issue. Finally, Sea Greens notes that Angera filed an action against Sea Greens and other parties in the District Court of Connecticut.
Inasmuch as Sea Greens has stated in its objection that it maintains a facility in Maine, it is likely that Sea Greens is amenable to jurisdiction there. Nevertheless, the mere existence of an adequate alternative forum does not warrant dismissal of the case. Instead, the applicable private interest factors support maintaining the case in Connecticut.
I. Private Interest Factors
The first two private interest factors, "[t]he assessment of the relative ease of access to sources of proof and the availability of witnesses for trial generally requires that the trial court become entangled in the merits of the underlying dispute ... [T]o examine such factors, the court must scrutinize the substance of the dispute between the parties to evaluate what proof is required, and determine whether the pieces of evidence cited by the parties are critical, or even relevant, to the [plaintiffs’] cause of action and to any potential defenses to the action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 467-68. The burden of persuasion is on the defendant to show "that the chosen forum is inconvenient to potential witnesses for the defense ... When a dismissal is premised on the convenience of witnesses, more than a mere allegation to that effect is required ... Rather, the defendant[s] must establish, with specificity, inconvenience to witnesses that is sufficiently prejudicial to justify dismissal ... A party seeking to transfer a case ... for the convenience of witnesses must identify the key witnesses to be called and must make a general statement of what their testimony will cover ... The burden is upon it to give the names and locations of potential witnesses and the substance of their testimony ... Sufficient information must be included ... to establish that the named witnesses are key witnesses who need to be called and that their testimony is material ... The mere assertion that such evidence is irretrievably located in [the alternative forum] is, therefore, not adequate to tip the scales in the defendants’ favor on a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., supra, 215 Conn. 509-10.
In the present case, Angera testified that. Maine seaweed farmers and other persons involved in the grant writing and award process were potential witnesses, located in Maine, whose testimony would be relevant to the underlying case. He then named other witnesses who would provide relevant testimony, none of whom are located in Maine, and one who is located in Connecticut. To the extent that Sarah Redmond would be a necessary witness, she was able to travel and testify at the evidentiary hearing; accordingly, Angera has not established an inconvenience to her that is sufficiently prejudicial to justify dismissal. Moreover, "the advent of the videotaped deposition greatly transformed the meaning of ‘compulsory process’ in a forum non conveniens calculus. [V]ideotaped depositions frequently make corporeal transportation of foreign witnesses unnecessary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., supra, 215 Conn. 511. To the extent that any of Angera’s Maine witnesses might be unable to travel to Connecticut to testify, video deposition is available.
The third factor, the possibility of viewing the accident scene, is seemingly inapplicable in the present matter. Angera has not offered any testimony or exhibits suggesting that the parties would require access to any property or facility in Maine. See Mathis v. Marriott International, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-14-6044292-S (September 12, 2014, Fischer, J.) ("[t]he defendant has not claimed, however, that it will be necessary for any party or expert to inspect the premises"). This factor, to the extent that it is even applicable, does not weigh in favor of dismissing the case.
As for the fourth factor, Angera has not shown how any judgment rendered by this court would not be enforceable. The court in Durkin dealt with the issue of whether a judgment rendered in Australia could be enforced in the United States; Durkin v. Intevac, supra, 258 Conn. 477; a situation plainly not at issue in the present case. Some Superior Courts have relied on the full faith and credit clause to hold that any decision rendered in Connecticut would be enforceable in another jurisdiction. See Everett v. Everett, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-10-6004013-S (December 16, 2010, Adams, J.) ("[a]s full faith and credit would be given to any decision rendered by the Connecticut court in the present case, the enforceability of a judgment is not a private interest factor that weighs in favor of dismissal for forum non conveniens"). In the present case, the testimony and exhibits show that Angera has assets in Connecticut, including his Litchfield property. Although he disputes whether the 156 West Street, Litchfield property is his primary residence, the testimony and exhibits plainly show that he is the co-owner of this property; Pl.’s Exs. 18, 14; that he has rented this property; Def.’s Ex. A; and that he maintains an office space on the third floor. Accordingly, the fourth factor supports maintaining this case in Connecticut.
"As to the fifth and sixth factors, the court must look at obstacles and practical problems that would result from having the case remain in Connecticut." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mathis v. Marriott International, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-14-6044292-S. The fifth factor "encompasses the defendants’ ability to implead third parties"; Durkin v. Intevac, supra, 258 Conn. 477; an issue that Angera has neither raised nor argued. The sixth factor "includes all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Id., 478. Angera has not sustained his burden in showing that this factor favors a Maine forum. Rather, the consulting agreements between Sea Greens and Tikal show that Angera, as the principal of Tikal, was tasked with managing the build out of Sea Greens’ seaweed processing facility at 315 Front Street, New Haven, Connecticut, and with assisting in the design and build out of Sea Greens’ new seaweed processing facility at a yet to be determined location based in New Haven. Pl.’s Exs 1, 2. Angera’s alleged failure to abide by these consulting agreements forms the very basis of this dispute. See Pl.’s Compl. Moreover, the testimony and exhibits show that Angera has since traveled back to Connecticut to attend and present at an aquaculture seminar on behalf of MSE. Pl.’s Ex. 31. To the extent that MSE and Springtide are Maine-based entities, Angera testified extensively to the fact that MSE does not do any business in any state, and Sarah Redmond, the principal of Springtide, has already made herself available to testify in Connecticut. Finally, any argument by Angera that Sea Greens chose this forum solely to make it expensive and inconvenient for the defendants to litigate this matter is patently contradicted by the fact that Angera filed an action against Sea Greens and others in the District Court of Connecticut. See Pl.’s Exs. 4, 7, 37. Angera has not sustained his burden of showing that Connecticut is not the proper forum to hear this case, and the private interest factors weigh in favor of maintaining the case in Connecticut.
2. Public Interest Factors
Having concluded that the private interest factors weigh in favor of keeping the present case in Connecticut, the court need not review the public interest factors. Nevertheless, for completeness, the court similarly concludes that the public interest factors warrant maintaining the case in Connecticut.
"If the balance of private interest factors is equal, the court must then consider public interest factors ... Those public interest factors ... include the following considerations: [A]dministrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Temlock v. Temlock, supra, 95 Conn.App. 515.
Although Angera argues that Sea Greens’ claims are grounded factually and legally in Maine, Sea Greens’ allegations involve breaches and tortious acts committed while Angera was working with Sea Greens in Connecticut, at Sea Greens’ Connecticut facility. Sea Greens expressly alleges that it entered into a consulting agreement with Tikal and Angera to manage the build out and operation of its New Haven, Connecticut facility, and that Angera breached his obligations and duties under said agreement, directly impacting Sea Greens’s business. The controversy originated in Connecticut, and there is a local interest in having the case decided here.
III.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this court concludes that both the private and public interest factors weigh in favor of maintaining the present case in Connecticut. Having determined that Connecticut is the appropriate forum, this court denies Angera’s motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens.