Opinion
2022-CA-1475-ME 2022-CA-1476-ME
10-13-2023
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: RICHARD L. DECKER LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BULLITT COUNTY ATTORNEY: TAMMY R. BAKER SHELLY L. ALVEY SHEPHERDSVILLE, KENTUCKY
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM BULLITT FAMILY COURT HONORABLE MONICA K. MEREDITH, JUDGE ACTION NOS. 21-J-00243-001, 21-J-00244-001
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: RICHARD L. DECKER LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BULLITT COUNTY ATTORNEY: TAMMY R. BAKER SHELLY L. ALVEY SHEPHERDSVILLE, KENTUCKY
BEFORE: COMBS, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
OPINION AND ORDER
MCNEILL, JUDGE
This case involves allegations of dependency, neglect, or abuse (DNA). Two DNA petitions were filed on behalf of T.W. and G.W. (the Children). Both alleged that the Children were physically abused by their aunt and custodian, the Appellant (S.D.). The Commonwealth presented its case on April 28, 2022. S.D. presented her case on October 13, 2022. The Bullitt Family Court found that the Children were “Neglected or Abused as defined in KRS 600.020(1).”
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
S.D. appeals both cases to this Court as a matter of right. She raises two arguments: 1) her due process rights were violated; and 2) the court failed to amend its findings to conform to the evidence presented. For the following reasons, we affirm.
On June 23, 2023, we issued an order for S.D. to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to appeal from the proper final orders. S.D. filed a timely response. Having considered the issue, we hold that S.D. has substantially complied with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, its predecessor rules. See F.E. v. E.B., 641 S.W.3d 700, 704 n.4 (Ky. App. 2022). Therefore, the pending motion to amend the notice of appeal is moot.
A family court's findings of fact in a DNA action shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence sufficient to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person. If the family court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, and it applied the correct law, its decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the family court's decision is unreasonable or unfair. Thus, in reviewing the decision of the family court, the test is not whether the appellate court would have decided it differently, but whether the findings of the family court are clearly erroneous, whether it applied the correct law, or whether it abused its discretion.M.C. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 614 S.W.3d 915, 921 (Ky. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). With this standard in mind, we now address the record and arguments presented.
For her first argument, S.D. broadly asserts that "the trial court arbitrarily, without proper notice, placed restrictions and limitations on Appellant while presenting her case-in-defense." Her primary contention appears to be that the family court erroneously limited her time to call witnesses in her defense. The Kentucky Supreme Court has addressed a similar issue as follows:
The trial court is vested with a large discretion in the conduct of the trial of causes and an appellate court will not interpose to control the exercise of such discretion by a court of original jurisdiction, unless there
has been an abuse or a most unwise exercise thereof. In exercising that discretion, a trial court clearly has the power to impose reasonable time limits on the trial of both civil and criminal cases. . . . As long as these trial time limits are not arbitrary or unreasonable we will not disturb the court's decision on review. The trial court also has discretion to . . . control . . . the amount of evidence produced on a particular point.Addison v. Addison, 463 S.W.3d 755, 762 (Ky. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the present case, there is no indication that S.D.'s ability to present a defense was violated or that the family court acted arbitrarily. There was no abuse of discretion here. See id. at 763.
Without citation to the record, S.D. also asserts that she requested additional findings pursuant to CR 52.02. See Dennis v. Fulkerson, 343 S.W.3d 633, 637 (Ky. App. 2011) (citation omitted) ("[i]t is not the job of the appellate courts to scour the record in support of an appellant or cross-appellant's argument."). The Court in Dennis further elaborated as follows:
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
[Cross-appellant] makes no citation to the record in violation of CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). (Argument section of brief shall contain "ample supportive references to the record and citations of authority pertinent to each issue of law[.]").Id. See also RAP 32(A)(4). The remainder of her second argument also lacks specificity. In consideration of the record, the law, and the arguments presented, there is no indication that the family court abused its discretion. Therefore, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.