Opinion
1:23-CV-00092-SPB-RAL
08-04-2023
JHEN SCUTELLA, Plaintiff v. ERIE COUNTY PRISON, MIKEY HOLMAN, D.W.; DEPUTY BRYANT, COUNSELOR MARTIN, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
ECF NO. 6
RICHARD A. LANZILLO Chief United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Jhen Scutella's Motion for Injunctive Relief/Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 6) be DENIED in part and DEFERRED in part. Specifically, Scutella's request for a temporary restraining order should be DENIED, and his request for a preliminary injunction should be deferred pending service of his Complaint and motion for injunctive relief upon the Defendants and, if determined to be necessary, a hearing on the motion.
II. Report
a. Plaintiff's Motion and Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Jhen Scutella, a pre-trial detainee at the Erie County Prison (“ECP”), initiated this pro se civil rights action against the ECP, Deputy Warden Holman, Deputy Warden Bryant, and Counselor Martin. See ECF No. 8. The Complaint alleges that the ECP's quarantine and lockdown procedures violate Scutella's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and that the ECP's grievance screening process violates his First Amendment free speech rights. Scutella also asserts a retaliation claim under the First Amendment and a Pennsylvania state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Scutella seeks declaratory and monetary relief, as well as an injunction directing the ECP to stop “violating the rights of [Scutella] and any other inmates [sic] by subjecting them to not being able to exercise, shower, or contact their families and at least afford inmates an hour out of the cell a day.” Id., 21.
Scutella's pending motion for “injunctive relief/temporary restraining order” asks the Court to enjoin the ECP from violating inmates' constitutional and state rights. ECF No. 6. Scutella alleges that inmates leave their cell “a fraction of the supposed time” allowed by the ECP's “training mode” because of “med line, commissary, shift change, and the numerous codes being called almost daily.” Id., ¶ 3. He adds that inmates are “[s]ometimes not even being allowed to shower, make phone calls, or use the kiosk to contact personnel,” and that he has been prevented from showering and exercising for days at a time. Id., ¶ 4. He also contends that he was “initially quarantined 2 times for a ten day period both times with only being allowed out of his cell for 20 minutes per day.” Id., ¶ 2. He then avers that the ECP's policies violate 61 Pa. C.S. § 5901 by failing to “provide the inmate[s] with at least two hours of daily physical exercise” outside of their cell. 61 Pa. C.S. § 5901(a)(1). Additionally, Scutella alleges that a recent influx of detainees “are not locked down and are able to move freely” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Id., ¶ 9. He seeks the same declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief stated in his Complaint.
b. Standard of Review
A temporary restraining order is assessed under the same standards as a preliminary injunction. See Alves v. Main, 747 Fed.Appx. 111, 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018)). As a threshold procedural matter, however,
[t]he court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
As a matter of substance, the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Scutella bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, he must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to him if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because they are “in court” . . .'”. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
c. Discussion
As a threshold procedural matter, Scutella's request for a temporary restraining order must be denied based on his failure to state “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show[ing] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition” and identifying “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1). Substantively, Scutella's allegations fail to demonstrate “the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). As noted above, the burden on a party seeking injunctive relief is “particularly heavy” where the party is seeking to alter (rather than preserve) the status quo. Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582. See also Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.”). Thus, a request for mandatory proactive injunctive relief, such as Scutella's demands, must be viewed with exacting scrutiny and extreme caution. Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *6.
Scutella has not met this heavy burden for several reasons. Scutella asserts that ECP's policies have caused him body soreness, “back pain, diminished mental compacity, increased anxiety, cramping of joints, and other ailments” Id., ¶ 6. These alleged harms do not constitute an imminent risk of irreparable harm. See Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 9192 (3d Cir. 1992) (“requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable, not merely serious or substantial.”); Synthes, Inc. v. Gregoris, 228 F.Supp.3d 421, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“Any irreparable harm must be imminent.”); Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (declining to grant preliminary relief in the absence of evidence “that there is an imminent risk of irreparable injury”) (emphasis in original). The allegations of limitations on his inability to shower, exercise, or use the phone for consecutive days at a time likewise do not amount an imminent irreparable harm, and Scutella, a pro se Plaintiff, may not invoke the harms allegedly suffered by other inmates because he may not “represent another party pro se.” Itiowe v. Trentonian, 620 Fed.Appx. 65, 68 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir.1991)). To the extent Scutella asserts claims that, if proven, may be compensated through money damages or equitable relief, these claims are also inappropriate for injunctive relief. See e.g., Alston v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 2015 WL 136334, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2015). Indeed, Scutella's requests for monetary damages in the Complaint and motion suggest that such damages “may be adequate redress.” Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (noting that, where an inmate-plaintiff is alleging that damages may be an adequate remedy, a preliminary injunction is often not appropriate”).
Scutella's allegations are also insufficient to meet his heavy burden of demonstrating that he will likely succeed on the merits of his underlying claims. While Scutella “need not prove his case with airtight certainty, the moving party nevertheless bears a heavy burden on a motion for a preliminary injunction of establishing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.” Burton v. Wetzel, 2017 WL 4284345, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 27, 2017) (internal citations, quotations, and additions omitted). As stated, Scutella's allegations do not support a violation of Scutella's constitutional or state rates upon which relief can be granted. Although the Complaint names several individual Defendants, the motion identifies only ECP as the source of his alleged injury. A prison “is not a ‘person' and therefore, cannot be held liable for constitutional violations through § 1983.” Scutella v. Erie Cnty. Prison, 2020 WL 4904587, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2020). Barnes v. Erie Cty. Prison Admin., 2020 WL 4450297, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2020) (citing Lenhart v. Pennsylvania, 528 Fed.Appx. 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2013)) (concluding that district court properly dismissed claims against county prison because even though “[a] local governmental agency may be a ‘person' for purposes of § 1983 liability[, the county prison] is not a person capable of being sued within the meaning of § 1983”) (internal citations omitted). Scutella's IIED claim against ECP also fails because “a prison cannot form the necessary intent to engage in” an intentional violation of Scutella's state rights. Jones v. Erie Cnty. Prison, 2022 WL 3236939, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 11, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3228113 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2022) (“[Plaintiff's] state law claim is subject to dismissal because a prison cannot form the necessary intent to engage in a battery.”). With respect to the alleged violation of his equal protection rights and 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901, “[a] preliminary injunction is not an appropriate vehicle for trying to obtain relief that is not sought in the underlying action.” Martin v. PA Dep't of Corr., 2009 WL 983006, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2009) (citing Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Even if Scutella had identified a proper Defendant, the allegations do not demonstrate that these facially neutral policies caused an ECP employee to violate Scutella's constitutional or state rights. See Young v. Medden, 241 Fed.Appx. 45, 47 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding the denial of a temporary restraining order where prisoner provided no evidence, outside of his allegations, to support his claim of wrongdoing); Hammonds v. Alleghany County Bureau of Corrections, 2019 WL 3843085, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2019) (citing Young). Moreover, the crux of the motion is ECP's allegedly harmful policies and procedures, but, as noted, the Court is loath to interject itself into matters of routine prison administration. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 527; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
III. CONLCUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Jhen Scutella's request for a temporary restraining order be DENIED, and his request for a preliminary injunction be deferred pending service of his complaint and motion for injunctive relief upon the Defendants. ECF No. 6.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
DATED this 4th day of August, 2023.