Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1852.
September 7, 2004
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated below, it is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint as Against Various Defendants and to Strike Plaintiff's Demand for Punitive Damages (Doc. 8) and the Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 18) be denied.
II. REPORT
BACKGROUND 1. Procedural History
On December 3, 2003, J. Patrick Scully ("the Plaintiff") commenced this civil action against Allegheny Ludlum Corporation ("Ludlum") and Allegheny Technologies Incorporated ("ATI") based on an alleged discriminatory termination of employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 621, et seq., and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 1001, et. seq. See generally Compl. (Doc. 1).
On January 26, 2004, the Plaintiff amended the Complaint to include as additional defendants two supervisors at Ludlum — John L. Scarfutti ("Scarfutti") and David Murphy ("Murphy") — and to add claims against all four Defendants based on purported violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("the PHRA"), 43 P.S. Section 951, et seq. See generally First Am. Compl. (Doc. 4).
On February 17, 2004, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and to strike punitive damages ("the Defendants' Motion"). See generally Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss First Am. Compl. as Against Various Defs. and to Strike Pl.'s Demand for Punitive Damages (Doc. 8; hereinafter cited as "Defs.' Mot."). The bases of the Defendants' Motion — stated broadly — were: (1) that claims under the ADEA, ERISA, and the PHRA, can only be brought against a plaintiff's employer, thus, these claims could not be asserted against ATI; (2) that the First Amended Complaint failed to sufficiently allege that Scarfutti and Murphy "aided, abetted, incited, compelled, or coerced any unlawful act under the PHRA"; and (3) that punitive damages were not recoverable under the PHRA. See generally Defs.' Mot. at 1-2; see also generally Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss First Am. Compl. as Against Various Defs. and to Strike Pl.'s Demand for Punitive Damages (Doc. 9).
The court also notes that the Defendant had previously filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint as Against Allegheny Technologies Incorporated (Doc. 5) on February 2, 2004. This motion is moot, however, in light of the Plaintiff's subsequent amendments to the original Complaint — that is, ATI has been dismissed as a Defendant from this action. See discussion infra.
In order to remedy the these alleged deficiencies, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint on March 16, 2004. See Pl.'s Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Compl. (Doc. 11; hereinafter cited as "Mot. for Leave"). As characterized by the Plaintiff, the Second Amended Complaint contains three amendments: "First, . . . [it] drops [ATI] as a Defendant[;] [s]econd, [it] leaves out any punitive damages in [the] Plaintiff's PHRA claim[;] [and third], [it] specifically pleads that Defendants Scarfutti and Murphy `aided, abetted, incited, compelled, or coerced an unlawful act under the PHRA'. . . ." See id. at 2; see also generally Second Am. Compl. (attached as Ex. to Mot. for Leave).
On April 5, 2004, the court issued an Order granting the Plaintiff's motion for leave. See Order (Doc. 17). Recognizing that the Second Amended Complaint resolved in significant part the issues presented by the Defendants' Motion, the court granted the Defendants the right to amend it. See id.
On April 16, 2004, the Defendants' filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 18; referred to collectively with its prior motion as "the Defendants' Motions"), which is currently before the court. The briefing has come to a close, and the matter is now ripe for adjudication. See, e.g., Defs.' Am. Mem. in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 19; hereinafter cited as "Defs.' Br."); Pl.'s Br. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 20).
ANALYSIS
The sole basis for dismissal identified in the Defendants' Motions is that the Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege facts that would give rise to individual liability claims against Scarfutti and Murphy under the PHRA. See generally Defs.' Am. Br. at 1-12. Accordingly, these claims should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). See id. Having reviewed the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and relevant case law, the court concludes that the Defendants' Motions lack merit and are otherwise premature within the context of a motion to dismiss.
Under the PHRA, an individual supervisory employee can be held liable for "aiding, abetting, inciting or compelling a discriminatory act." See, e.g., Sherif v. AstraZeneca, L.P., 2002 WL 123352, *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2002) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann § 955(e)). Moreover, a supervisor's liability can be predicated upon either "direct acts of discrimination or the failure to prevent discrimination by others." See, e.g., id. (citation omitted); Davis v. Levy, Angstreich, Finney, Baldante, Rubenstein Coren, P.C., 20 F.Supp.2d 885, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (stating same); see also generally Carlton v. City of Philadephia, 2004 WL 633279, *8 (E.D. Pa. March 30, 2004) (stating that allegations that a supervisor "knew of discriminatory behavior and refused to take prompt action to end it" could sustain an aiding and abetting claim under the PHRA) (citing Dici v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Here, the Second Amended Complaint generally alleges that "Scarfutti and Murphy are supervisors for the purposes of PHRA liability" and that they "aided, abetted, incited, compelled and coerced unlawful and intentional discrimination against the Plaintiff because of the Plaintiff's age." See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 91 92. With regard to the specific actions taken by Scarfutti and Murphy, the Plaintiff alleges that:
"Scarfutti instructed [the Plaintiff's immediate supervisor] to alter [the Plaintiff]'s peer analysis form so that [the Plaintiff] would be terminated instead of [a younger employee] and the [immediate supervisor] did in fact alter [the Plaintiff]'s form." See id. ¶ 34. The" peer analysis" was then used as part of "a pretext to cover up the unlawful termination decision." See id. ¶ 39;
Murphy either "manipulated the peer analysis and/or knew of its manipulation and failed to take action to prevent the Plaintiff's discriminatory termination." See id. ¶ 40;
"Scarfutti and/or Murphy and/or with Murphy's knowledge and consent" made "the subjective employment decision to terminate the Plaintiff. . . ." See id. 53; and
Scarfutti and Murphy "entered [the] Plaintiff's office and told him that his position was eliminated, in effect that he was being terminated." See id. ¶ 16. They "offered no reason for [the] Plaintiff's termination . . . [but] t[old] [the] Plaintiff that he had just three hours to vacate his office." See id. ¶ 19.
These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for individual aiding and abetting liability under the PHRA. See generally cases cited supra; see also, e.g., Sherif v. AstraZeneca, L.P., 2001 WL 359958, *3 (E.D. Pa. April 3, 2001) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that allegations that two supervisors "actively participated" in the plaintiff's termination and a third supervisor "was made aware and did not prevent [the plaintiff's] discrimatory demotion and termination" was sufficient to state an individual liability claim under the PHRA); Wien v. Sun Co., Inc., 1997 WL 772810, *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1997) (finding that allegations that a defendant supervisor "participated in the meetings in which it was decided [that the plaintiff] should be discharged, and drafted the termination letter" was sufficient to state an aiding and abetting claim under the PHRA).
Moreover, the liberal pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil procedure are not intended to be arduous; rather, a complaint is sufficient so long as it puts the defendant(s) on notice of the "essential elements" of the plaintiff's cause of action. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 564 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[A] complaint [at the 12(b)(6) stage] requires only a `short and plain statement' to show a right to relief, not a detailed recitation of the proof that will in the end establish such a right.") (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting the well-established standard that a complaint is deemed to have alleged sufficient facts if "it adequately puts the defendants on notice of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action"); Forbes v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 259 F.Supp.2d 227, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that the notice pleading standard expects "liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues to dispose of unmeritorious claims") (citations omitted). The Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint meets this standard.
If there is any authority suggesting the propriety of dismissing these types of claims at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Defendants have failed to cite it. In fact, the only two cases referenced in the Defendants' substantive analysis were decided at summary judgment, after the parties were given the benefit of discovery and the opportunity to fully develop the record. See Dici, 91 F.3d at 544 (noting the procedural posture of the case as an appeal from summary judgment); Saidu-Kamara v. Parkway Corp., 155 F.Supp.2d 436, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that the motion before the court was for partial summary judgment).
Nor does the undersigned find that the alleged discrepancies between the Second Amended Complaint and the Plaintiff's prior complaints "raise serious questions about the legitimacy of, and factual support for, th[e] allegations [in the Second Amended Complaint]." See Defs.' Br. at 2. It is well-settled that once a plaintiff amends his or her complaint, the "amended complaint supercedes the original version in providing the blueprint for the future course of a lawsuit." See, e.g., Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Know Fin. Group, L.L.C., 2004 WL 1179335, *6 n. 4 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2004) ("[I]t is axiomatic that an amended complaint that does not refer to or incorporate an original complaint supercedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect.") (citation omitted). As such, the "original pleading no longer performs any function in the case." See, e.g., Land v. Lichtenstader, 2003 WL 21262387, *1 (D. Del. May 30, 2003) (emphasis added; citation and internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, to the extent that there are discrepancies between the Second Amended Complaint and the prior complaints, they have no bearing on the court's analysis in ruling on the instant Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Accord id. (noting that the district court's review of Rule 12(b)(6) motion was limited to allegations contained in the plaintiff's amended complaint because "an amended complaint filed as a matter of course or after leave of court supercedes the original complaint") (citations omitted); see also Howard v. Snyder, 2002 WL 450082, * 2 (D. Del. March 11, 2002) (noting same).
In addition, the Defendants' reference to the possible lack of "factual support" for the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint further belies the Defendants' Motions. Moreover, in considering a motion to dismiss, a court must "accept as true all facts alleged in the [a]mended [c]omplaint and draw all reasonable inferences arising from those facts in plaintiff[']s favor." See, e.g., Bell v. Ostrow, 45 Fed.Appx. 152, 153 (3rd Cir. June 4, 2002) (citation omitted). Whether the Plaintiff will meet its evidentiary burden later in the proceeds has yet to be seen, but these types of arguments are premature at this early stage of the litigation. See cases cited supra.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that the District Court deny the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint as Against Various Defendants and to Strike Plaintiff's Demand for Punitive Damages (Doc. 8) and the Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 18).In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (B) and (C), and Rule 72.1.4 (B) of the Local Rules for Magistrates, objections to this Report and Recommendation are due by September 23, 2004. Response to objections are due by October 4, 2004.