We reject the contention of respondent and the Law Guardian that the court improperly altered its original decision prior to an order having been submitted or entered on that decision. "`Until then, the court had inherent power, sua sponte or at the behest of one of the parties, to reconsider . . . its earlier decision'" ( Saccone v. Elm Hill Plaza, 5 A.D.3d 1028 [Mar. 19, 2004], quoting Levinger v. General Motors Corp., 122 A.D.2d 419, 420; see Scritchfield v. Perry, 245 A.D.2d 1054). We conclude that the court properly exercised that power in altering its original decision and fixing a more definite visitation schedule.
Thus, the Railroad defendants established that they did not lose or destroy the Pulse Data cartridge from the Amtrak train, and the court properly reconsidered its prior decision and allowed the Railroad defendants to use the readable data from that cartridge at trial. "A court has the inherent power, sua sponte or on motion of a party, to reconsider and vacate its prior decision before issuing an order thereon" ( Scritchfield v. Perry, 245 A.D.2d 1054, 1054; see Burns v. Haines Equip., 284 A.D.2d 922). Because an order was not yet issued, the requirements of CPLR 2221 with respect to motions affecting a prior order are not applicable ( see Vinciguerra v. Jameson, 153 A.D.2d 452, 454; Levinger v. General Motors Corp., 122 A.D.2d 419, 420).
Contrary to the contention of plaintiff, the court had jurisdiction to amend its prior decision before an order was entered. "A court has the inherent power, sua sponte or on motion of a party, to reconsider and vacate its prior decision before issuing an order thereon" ( Scritchfield v. Perry, 245 A.D.2d 1054; see, Vinciguerra v. Jameson, 153 A.D.2d 452, 454). Contrary to the further contention of plaintiff, the court properly denied that part of her cross motion seeking to amend the complaint. Plaintiff contends on appeal that she sought to plead more specifically a negligence cause of action based on improper maintenance of the loading machine that caused her injury. Despite her failure to allege that theory in her cross motion, "where she has alleged facts which may make out a viable cause of action, she may be permitted to amend, even on appeal, provided there is no prejudice to the defendant" ( Stephan v. Shulman, 130 A.D.2d 484, 485 , citing Murray v. City of New York, 43 N.Y.2d 400, rearg dismissed 45 N.Y.2d 966).
"A motion for leave to reargue: 1.) shall be identified specifically as such; 2.) shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offered on the prior motion; and 3.) shall be made within thirty days after service of a copy of the order determining the prior motion and written notice of its entry..." A court has the inherent power, sua sponte or on motion of a party, to reconsider and vacate its prior decision before issuing an order thereon (see Scritchfield v. Perry, 245 A.D.2d 1054, 667 N.Y.S.2d 584 [App. Div. 4th Dept. 1997] citing, American Re-Ins. Co. v. SGB Universal Bldrs.Supply, 160 A.D.2d 586 [App. Div. 1st Dept 1990]; Vinciguerra v Jameson, 153 A.D.2d 452 [App. Div. 3rd Dept 1990; Levinger v. General Motors Corp., 122 A.D.2d 419 [App. Div. 3rd Dept 1986]). While the determination to grant leave to reargue a motion lies within the sound discretion of the court, a motion for leave to reargue "is not designed to provide an unsuccessful party with successive opportunities to reargue issues previously decided, or to present arguments different from those originally presented" (internal citation omitted) (See Matter of Carter v. Carter, 81 A.D.3d 819, 916 N.Y.S.2d 821 [2nd Dept. 2011]).
Nonetheless, it is well-settled that the Court has the inherent power, sua sponte or at the behest of one of the parties, to reconsider and amend an earlier decision before issuing an order thereon. Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 229 A.D. 2d 197 [1st Dept 1997]; Hulett v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 1 A.D. 3d 999 [4th Dept 2003]; Scrithfield v. Perry, 245 A.D. 2d 1054 [4th Dept 1997]; Rostant v. Swersky, 79 A.D. 3d 456 [1st Dept 2010]. Under such circumstances, where an order has not yet been issued, the strict requirements of CPLR ยง2221 with respect to motions affecting a prior order are not applicable.