Determinations of fact and credibility made by a trial court following a voluntariness hearing must be affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous. Screws v. State, 245 Ga. App. 664 (1) ( 538 SE2d 547) (2000). In this case, the trial court fully reviewed all of the evidence, including the videotape of Folsom's interrogation, and determined that Folsom was lucid and comprehended the questions asked of him, in spite of any medications he may have taken.

Moreover, there was never an attempt to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind. Screws v. State, 245 Ga. App. 664, 666(2) ( 538 S.E.2d 547) (2000). Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in admitting Morgan's custodial statement into evidence.

“If the evidence is sufficient to establish that the defendant's statement was the product of rational intellect and free will, it may be admitted even if the defendant was intoxicated when he made the statement.” Screws v. State, 245 Ga.App. 664, 665(1), 538 S.E.2d 547 (2000).The record in this case shows that after conducting an evidentiary hearing and reviewing the three video-recorded interviews, the trial court issued a seven-page order in which it concluded that McNear “was advised of each of his Miranda rights, he understood them, he voluntarily waived then, and he thereafter gave his statements freely and voluntarily without any hope of benefit or fear of injury.” With regard to McNear's intoxication, the trial court made the following finding:

(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Screws v. State, 245 Ga.App. 664, 665(2), 538 S.E.2d 547 (2000). Any assertion of the right to remain silent, however, must be clear and unequivocal.

(Footnotes omitted.) Screws v. State, 245 Ga. App. 664, 665 (1) ( 538 SE2d 547) (2000). See also Shelby v. State, 265 Ga. 118, 119 (2) ( 453 SE2d 21) (1995) (although defendant had a blood alcohol level of 0.24 percent, the evidence established that his custodial statement was knowingly and voluntarily given); Strickland v. State, 250 Ga. 624, 626 (2) ( 300 SE2d 156) (1983) (defendant's intoxication did not render him unable to make a voluntary statement since he did not appear to have been intoxicated); Forehand v. State, 271 Ga. App. 746, 747 ( 611 SE2d 78) (2005) (evidence that defendant was coherent and understood his rights was sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding that his statement was voluntary, notwithstanding his alleged intoxication).

" Powell v. State.Screws v. State, 245 Ga. App. 664, 665 (1) ( 538 SE2d 547) (2000).Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 340-341 (9) ( 282 SE2d 334) (1981).

Screws v. State. Thus, even if Brownlee were intoxicated, we must uphold the trial court's finding that Brownlee's statement was voluntarily and knowingly given since evidence supported that finding of fact. Screws v. State, 245 Ga. App. 664, 665 (1) ( 538 SE2d 547) (2000).Judgment affirmed.

Connerly v. State, 207 Ga. App. 498, 499 ( 428 SE2d 408) (1993). There was no evidence that Hickey had ingested any cocaine within the ten to eleven hours he had been in custody or that he exhibited any of the physical manifestations of cocaine intoxication, such as sweaty hands and dilated eyes. Screws v. State, 245 Ga. App. 664 (1) ( 538 SE2d 547) (2000). Even had there been these symptoms, that would not automatically make any statement given involuntary.

The trial court's determination is supported by evidence and is not clearly erroneous.Screws v. State, 245 Ga. App. 664, 665 (1) ( 538 S.E.2d 547) (2000). Id.