Vaughn v. State, 880 So.2d 1178, 1194-96 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003). The mere fact that a statute contains a term that is not specifically defined in the statute or statutory scheme does not automatically render the statute void for vagueness. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 917 So.2d 159 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005) (holding that § 13A-12-200.11, Ala. Code 1975, that part of the Alabama Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act that prohibits the display of genitals, etc., for entertainment purposes, was not void for vagueness, even though the terms "business establishment," "for entertainment purposes," and "allow" were not specifically defined in the Criminal Code); State v. Randall, 669 So.2d 223, 226 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995) (holding that Alabama's stalking law, § 13A-6-90 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, was not void for vagueness, even though the terms "repeatedly" and "series" were not specifically defined in the statute); Musgrove v. State, 519 So.2d 565, 582-83 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 519 So.2d 586 (Ala. 1986) (holding that the kidnapping statute, § 13A-6-43, Ala. Code 1975, was not void for vagueness, even though the term "terrorize" was not specifically defined in the statute); and Farris v. State, 432 So.2d 538, 539-40 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983) (holding that § 13A-7-44, Ala. Code 1975, criminal possession of ex

"` "A voluntary guilty plea concludes the issue of guilt, dispenses with the need for judicial fact finding, is conclusive as to the defendant's guilt, and is an admission of all facts sufficiently charged in the indictment."'" Scott v. State, 917 So.2d 159, 166 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005) (quoting Whitman v. State, 903 So.2d 152, 155 (Ala.Crim.App. 2004), quoting in turn Morrow v. State, 426 So.2d 481, 484 (Ala.Crim. App. 1982)). "A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction.

In Alabama, a guilty plea "is an admission of all facts sufficiently charged in the indictment," not just an admission to the crime in the abstract. G.E.G. v. State , 54 So. 3d 949, 954 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Scott v. State , 917 So. 2d 159, 166 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) ). Of course, here Hunter pled guilty not to the crime charged in the indictment (attempted murder), but to the lesser-included offense of menacing.

See docs. 2 at 16-17; 3 at 4-7. In Alabama, "[a] voluntary guilty plea concludes the issue of guilt, dispenses with the need for judicial fact finding, is conclusive as to the defendant's guilt, and is an admission of all facts sufficiently charged in the indictment." G.E.G. v. State, 54 So. 3d 949, 954 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Scott v. State, 917 So. 2d 159, 166 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)). 1.

The fact that shoes, for example, are sold in only adult sizes cannot be used to bring Love Stuff within the `adult-only enterprise' definition any more than well-known and highly reputable clothing stores that cater to an adult clientele by offering only adult sizes. "The Court now turns to Scott v. State, 917 So.2d 159 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals examined at some length the void-for-vagueness doctrine involving claims against another section of the Alabama Obscenity Enforcement Act. The appellant there unsuccessfully argued that Ala. Code § 13A-12-200.il was void for vagueness because the terms `business establishment,' `for entertainment purposes,' and `allow' are not specifically defined in that statute, and the statute does not mention obscenity.2

The fact that shoes, for example, are sold in only adult sizes cannot be used to bring Love Stuff within the `adult-only enterprise' definition any more than well-known and highly reputable clothing stores that cater to an adult clientele by offering only adult sizes. "The Court now turns to Scott v. State, 917 So. 2d 159 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals examined at some length the void-for-vagueness doctrine involving claims against another section of the Alabama Obscenity Enforcement Act. The appellant there unsuccessfully argued that Ala. Code § 13A-12-200.11 was void for vagueness because the terms `business establishment,' `for entertainment purposes,' and `allow' are not specifically defined in that statute, and the statute does not mention obscenity.2

In Alabama, "'[a] voluntary guilty plea concludes the issue of guilt, dispenses with the need for judicial fact finding, is conclusive as to the defendant's guilt, and is an admission of all facts sufficiently charged in the indictment.'" G.E.G. v. State, 54 So.3d 949, 954 (Ala. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scott v. State, 917 So.2d 159, 166 (Ala.Crim.App.2005)). Notably, in discussing facts admitted to by a defendant, we have stated that,

"The mere fact that a statute contains a term that is not specifically defined in the statute or statutory scheme does not automatically render the statute void for vagueness. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 917 So. 2d 159 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that § 13A–12–200.11, Ala. Code 1975, that part of the Alabama Anti–Obscenity Enforcement Act that prohibits the display of genitals, etc., for entertainment purposes, was not void for vagueness, even though the terms ‘business establishment,’ ‘for entertainment purposes,’ and ‘allow’ were not specifically defined in the Criminal Code); State v. Randall, 669 So. 2d 223, 226 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that Alabama's stalking law, § 13A–6–90 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, was not void for vagueness, even though the terms ‘repeatedly’ and ‘series’ were not specifically defined in the statute); Musgrove v. State, 519 So. 2d 565, 582–83 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd, 519 So. 2d 586 (Ala. 1986) (holding that the kidnapping statute, § 13A–6–43, Ala. Code 1975, was not void for vagueness, even though the term ‘terrorize’ was not specifically defined in the statute); and Farris v. State, 432 So. 2d 538, 539–40 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that § 13A–7–44, Ala. Code 1975, criminal possess

The facts in this case are not in dispute, and the question before this Court on appeal—whether the circuit court erred when it granted Thomas's motion to dismiss—is purely a legal one. “ ‘ “ ‘[O]n appeal, the ruling on a question of law carries no presumption of correctness, and this Court's review is de novo. ’ Ex parte Graham, 702 So.2d 1215, 1221 (Ala.1997).” Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So.2d 869, 871 (Ala.1999).' ” Scott v. State, 917 So.2d 159, 169–70 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Girard v. State, 883 So.2d 717, 719 (Ala.2003) ).Discussion

However, that argument is without merit because “the absence of an express statement in [a statute] as to the requisite mental state does not render that statute unconstitutionally vague.” Scott v. State, 917 So.2d 159, 173 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (plurality opinion). Section 13A–2–4(b), Ala.Code 1975, provides: