Scott v. State

27 Citing cases

  1. Carr v. State

    363 Ga. App. 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 7 times
    Concluding that child molestation counts did not merge, where the victim testified about different instances of sexual abuse that "lasted from when she was in sixth grade until she was a sophomore in high school"

    The Scott I Court explained that "[m]erger analysis often involves counts charging two different crimes," and made clear "that is the context in which Drinkard's[] ‘required evidence’ test is applied." 306 Ga. 507, 832 S.E.2d 426 (2019).Id. at 509 (2), 832 S.E.2d 426 ; accordDukes v. State , 311 Ga. 561, 571 (4), 858 S.E.2d 510 (2021) ; see U.S. Const. Amend. 5 ("No person ... shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...."); Ga. Const. Art. 1, § 1, XVIII ("No person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more than once for the same offense except when a new trial has been granted after conviction or in case of mistrial.").

  2. Scott v. State

    356 Ga. App. 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that three child-molestation convictions merged for sentencing purposes when the different sex acts occurred in the child's bedroom on the same day in a single course of conduct over a short period of time and noting that the victim did not testify has to how much time elapsed between touches

    The final count (Count 5) was based on the bathroom incident. Scott v. State , 306 Ga. 507, 508 (1), 832 S.E.2d 426 (2019). A Fulton County jury found Scott guilty of four counts of child molestation (Counts 2-5).

  3. McDaniel v. State

    360 Ga. App. 194 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 3 times

    " ‘Merger’ refers generally to situations in which a defendant is prosecuted for and determined by trial or plea to be guilty of multiple criminal charges but then, as a matter of substantive double jeopardy law, can be punished – convicted and sentenced – for only one of those crimes." Scott v. State , 306 Ga. 507, 509 (2), 832 S.E.2d 426 (2019) ; see State v. Marlowe , 277 Ga. 383, 383-384 (1), 589 S.E.2d 69 (2003). In cases involving two counts of the same offense, the merger analysis generally requires interpretation of the criminal statute at issue to identify the "unit of prosecution – the precise act or conduct that the legislature criminalized."

  4. State v. Shropshire

    896 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. 2023)   Cited 3 times

    Should a unit-of-prosecution analysis, as opposed to a required-evidence analysis, be applied to evaluate whether child molestation merges into aggravated child molestation? See generally Scott v. State, 306 Ga. 507, 832 S.E.2d 426 (2019); Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 636 S.E.2d 530 (2006).

  5. Shropshire v. State

    365 Ga. App. 653 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 2 times
    In Shropshire I, we also affirmed Shropshire's conviction for cruelty to children in’ the first degree but reversed his incest conviction, finding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to show that Shropshire committed incest as that crime was defined in 2001.

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Scott v. State , 306 Ga. 507, 509 (2), 832 S.E.2d 426 (2019) (" Scott I "). "Whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct offenses under the statute depends on ... legislative choice, [and] the text of the statute itself best reflects that legislative choice."

  6. Hogg v. State

    356 Ga. App. 11 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that two counts of the indictment merged when they both charged the defendant with touching the victim's genitals in some way and evidence showed that these touches occurred during a single incident

    (Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Scott v. State , 306 Ga. 507, 509 (2), 832 S.E.2d 426 (2019). See also Busby v. State , 332 Ga. App. 646, 650 (2) (b), 774 S.E.2d 717 (2015) ("Typically, the question is whether the same conduct may be punished under different criminal statutes.

  7. Shropshire v. State

    902 S.E.2d 677 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)

    Accordingly, a unit-of-prosecution analysis should be applied to determine if Shropshire’s two counts of child molestation merge. See Scott v. State, 306 Ga. 507, 509 (2), 832 S.E.2d 426 (2019) ("Scott I"); Cobb v. State, 356 Ga. App. 187, 191 (3) (b), 843 S.E.2d 912 (2020). Because child molestation and aggravated child molestation are different crimes, a required evidence analysis applies when considering whether those crimes merge.

  8. Jefferson v. State

    360 Ga. App. 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 3 times

    The doctrine of merger applies when a defendant is prosecuted for multiple criminal offenses, but as a matter of substantive double jeopardy, may be punished only once. See OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) ; Scott v. State , 306 Ga. 507, 509 (2), 832 S.E.2d 426 (2019). The "required evidence test" applies "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions" and the appropriate inquiry is "whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."

  9. Cobb v. State

    356 Ga. App. 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that two child-molestation convictions did not merge for sentencing purposes when the indictment alleged the offenses occurred over several months, and evidence supported a conclusion that the criminal acts occurred over 20 times

    Coates v. State , 304 Ga. 329, 331, 818 S.E.2d 622 (2018). In Scott v. State , 306 Ga. 507, 832 S.E.2d 426 (2019), however, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that an appellate court reviewing a conviction for multiple counts of child molestation should engage in a "unit of prosecution" analysis: [M]erger analysis requires careful interpretation of the criminal statute at issue to identify the unit of prosecution – the precise act or conduct that the legislature criminalized ....

  10. Johnson v. State

    313 Ga. 155 (Ga. 2022)   Cited 14 times
    Noting that actual-evidence test has been long-overruled

    " ‘Merger’ refers generally to situations in which a defendant is prosecuted for and determined by trial or plea to be guilty of multiple criminal charges but then, as a matter of substantive double jeopardy law, can be punished—convicted and sentenced—for only one of those crimes." Scott v. State , 306 Ga. 507, 509, 832 S.E.2d 426, 428 (2019). Substantive double jeopardy law protects a defendant from multiple punishments when his crimes arise from the same conduct.