Gibbins v. State, 229 Ga.App. 896, 901(7), 495 S.E.2d 46 (1997). See also Jackson v. State, 266 Ga. 308, 309(3), 467 S.E.2d 495 (1996); Scott v. State, 213 Ga.App. 84, 88(5), 444 S.E.2d 96 (1994). The trial court gave Appellant the opportunity to present evidence, introduce witnesses, and argue for mitigation of his sentence.
Evidence regarding the dangerous properties of the ingredients used in common in both manufacturing methods was clearly relevant in this case and appellant has not shown how the admission of the agent's testimony regarding the unused ingredients was so prejudicial as to require reversal of his conviction. See generally Scott v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84 (3) ( 444 S.E.2d 96) (1994). 4. Appellant was convicted of felony murder based on the underlying felony of criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine on December 22, 2000.
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1).Scott v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 88 (5), 444 S.E.2d 96(1994).
“OCGA § 17–10–2 provides that a trial judge must conduct a pre-sentence hearing to determine punishment, and the record shows that such a hearing was held.” Scott v. State, 213 Ga.App. 84, 88(5), 444 S.E.2d 96 (1994) (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court erred in failing to reschedule pre-sentence hearing to allow her an opportunity to possibly present witnesses to testify in mitigation of her punishment where record showed that pre-sentence hearing was held). During the hearing in this case, the trial court specifically asked Ellis's counsel if he had anything to present to assist the court in fixing punishment.
(Citation omitted.) Scott v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 86 (1) ( 444 SE2d 96) (1994). Accord Fuller v. State, 295 Ga. App. 439, 446 (7) (a) ( 672 SE2d 438) (2009).
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scott v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 86 (1) ( 444 SE2d 96) (1994). "If a search warrant, read as a whole, points out the premises, person or property to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to them, it meets the description requirement."
Further, that a scrivener's error described the duplex as the fourth instead of the third was not so material as to destroy the integrity of the affidavit or validity of the warrant. Scott v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 86 (1) ( 444 SE2d 96) (1994); Kelly v. State, 184 Ga. App. 337 ( 361 SE2d 659) (1987). Judgment reversed. Miller and Ellington, JJ., concur.
(Punctuation omitted.) Scott v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 88 (3) ( 444 SE2d 96) (1994). See id.; White v. State, 174 Ga. App. 699, 700 (1) ( 331 SE2d 72) (1985).
She observed the other child's bruised face, and Terry confessed to her that he hit the child in the face. This testimony was not inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court made no error in admitting it. Scottv. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 87(2) ( 444 S.E.2d 96) (1994); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 827, 828(2) ( 424 S.E.2d 6) (1992). Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P.J., and Adams, J., concur.
See, e.g., State v. Stephens, 167 Ga. App. 707 ( 307 S.E.2d 518) (1983).Scott v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 86 ( 444 S.E.2d 96) (1994). Notably, the result we reach herein is due to the specific facts of this case.