Scott v. Scott

4 Citing cases

  1. Henderson v. Mogren

    149 So. 3d 629 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014)   Cited 3 times
    Upholding attorney-fee award when appellant limited his argument to the merits of the contempt finding that was determined to be without error

    Id. at 810โ€“11 (emphasis added).In Scott v. Scott, 38 So.3d 79, 86 (Ala.Civ.App.2009), this court considered a situation similar to the situation in the case at hand and came to the following conclusion:โ€œWe conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion in holding the former husband in contempt because there was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that the former husband โ€˜willfully and intentionally failed and refused to ... pay [periodic] alimony as ordered.โ€™

  2. Rose v. Rose

    No. 2081182 (Ala. Civ. App. Nov. 19, 2010)

    The former husband was held in contempt because he acted in defiance of the divorce judgment, which directed him, until it was modified or vacated, to pay a specified portion of his military-retirement benefits to the former wife. As we have noted, it is unwise "`for a paying spouse to simply stop paying periodic alimony based on his or her suspicion of the other spouse's cohabitation,'" because doing so "`could lead to a holding of contempt.'"Scott v. Scott, 38 So. 3d 79, 85 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (quoting Sanders v. Burgard, 715 So. 2d 808, 811 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998)). Even though the former husband has correctly contended that the former wife's award of a share of his military-retirement benefits was subject to modification, he was not entitled to terminate the payments unilaterally, and the trial court could properly have determined, as it did, that contacting the Defense Finance and Accounting Service was not the appropriate recourse.

  3. Rose v. Rose

    70 So. 3d 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)   Cited 17 times
    In Rose, this court merely found that it was permissible for the trial court to treat the former husband's benefits as "a source of income for payment of a periodic-alimony award" because "payments [we]re currently being issued from the former husband's retirement account."

    Even though the former husband has correctly contended that the former wife's award of a share of his benefits was statutorily subject to modification or termination, the trial court could have nevertheless determined, as it did, that the former husband's conduct in contacting the DFAS and terminating the payments unilaterally was not the appropriate means of effectuating ยง 30-2-55. See Scott v. Scott, 38 So.3d 79, 86-87 (Ala.Civ.App. 2009) (discussing alternatives to unilaterally terminating periodic-alimony payments that should be utilized when a payor spouse believes he or she should no longer be obligated to make such payments). We further note that determinations of contempt are "`committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and, absent an abuse of that discretion or unless the judgment of the trial court is unsupported by the evidence so as to be plainly and palpably wrong, this court will affirm.'"

  4. Swindle v. Swindle

    55 So. 3d 1234 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)   Cited 7 times

    "Scott v. Scott, 38 So.3d 79, 84 (Ala.Civ.App. 2009). The former husband presented credible evidence indicating that the former wife was engaged in a sexual relationship with the paramour and that their relationship was of a permanent nature.