Opinion
8:22-cv-02031-MGL-JDA
06-30-2023
Kenneth Gene Scott, Plaintiff, v. Richland County, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss. [Doc. 31.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, through counsel, filed this action on June 27, 2022. [Doc. 1.] On December 21, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [Doc. 31.] Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion on January 4, 2023. [Doc. 34.] Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from the Complaint. [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff, who is a disabled individual with schizophrenia, was formerly incarcerated at the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center (“ASGDC”) from June 28, 2020, through December 15, 2021, while waiting for the disposition of criminal charges against him. [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 9, 10, 12, 16-17.] Defendant “is responsible for the ownership, management, operation, staffing, and oversight of ASGDC.” [Id. ¶ 8.]
Plaintiff alleges that ASGDC's administration knew about his status as a mental health inmate. [Id. ¶ 19.] He further alleges that, while he was at ASGDC, he was treated as follows:
• he was placed in isolation in a Special Housing Unit (“SHU”), which is approximately 10 feet by 13 feet, for 24 hours per day without access to recreation, commissary, or other activity to provide a break from solitary confinement;
• he was periodically assaulted by staff;
• his glasses were broken during an assault by staff, and he could not see clearly while he was incarcerated;
• he did not have access to paper, pencils, magazines, or any items to pass the time;
• he was not given toilet paper, towels, a toothbrush, toothpaste, a wash cloth, soap, or anything to maintain hygiene;
• he was not allowed to shower for months at a time and took only approximately 20 showers during his incarceration;
• when he was allowed to shower, he was locked in a three-feet-by-four-feet shower stall with a barred door for over 24 hours with nowhere to sit or lie to rest, no way to stretch his limbs, and no place to use the restroom;
• his sink and toilet in SHU did not have water;
• when he did have access to running water, it was cloudy, smelly, and unsanitary and it was rarely hot water, even in the shower;
• his toilet backed up with sewage regularly, and the overflowing sewage was allowed to remain for long periods of time;
• he was forced to wear the same unwashed clothes for months;
• he was given no clothes, shoes, or socks for periods of time;
• he was not given a haircut or shave;
• he had no means of communicating with anyone outside of ASGDC;
• he and others were occasionally strapped in a restraint chair for periods of time up to and exceeding 24 hours without being allowed to stretch or use the restroom, resulting in Plaintiff urinating or defecating in the chair;
• his air vents were molded and unclean;
• he was sometimes moved from one SHU to another, where he would find fecal matter, urine, blood, and/or polluted water from a stopped up sink and toilet on the walls and the floor;
• his SHUs were infested with rats, bed bugs, fleas, ants, and mosquitoes;
• he was forced to eat meals that had been soiled by human secretions while in the restraint chair and shower stall;
• his SHUs were inadequately heated and cooled;
• he was denied medical care, dental care, mental health assistance, and legal assistance;
• he was not given medication he had been taking before incarceration for schizophrenia;
• when he was sporadically visited by mental health workers, they tried to make Plaintiff take pills without telling him what they were;
• he was allowed to meet with his public defender only once during his incarceration;
• he was not allowed access to anyone with authority to register his complaints about the conditions of his confinement; and
• he was retaliated against by prison officials based on his behavior that was exacerbated by the lack of mental health treatment.[Id. ¶ 19a-u.] The treatment Plaintiff received and conditions of his confinement “were commonplace for all inmates with mental health diagnoses, and such treatment was ASGDC's unwritten policy, custom, and practices.” [Id. ¶ 19v.]
Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of confinement at ASGDC “have been a concern by detainees, their agents, [Defendant's] agents, administrators, and staff for years with no improvement.” [Id. ¶ 21.] ¶ 2014, Pulitzer/Bogard & Associates, LLC conducted a management and operations study (the “Study”), which identified issues at ASGDC. [Id. ¶¶ 22-25.] Specifically, the Study expressed concerns about housing detainees with serious mental illness in SHU, about a cool-down sanction being used that placed detainees in SHU in an individual cell or shower stall for up to 12 continuous hours as punishment, and about confinement in SHU depriving inmates of opportunities to engage in programs, services, rights, and privileges at ASGDC. [Id.] ¶ 2020, the Richland County Council Detention Center Ad Hoc Committee (the “Ad Hoc Committee”) met about “concerns that mentally ill detainees were not getting proper treatment due to the fact that the only place to house severely mentally ill detainees is a single cell in SHU; discussed the manner in which housing for mentally ill detainees should be provided; and[ noted] that there were 109 security staff vacancies at the time of the meeting.” [Id. ¶ 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).] Further, in September 2021, the South Carolina Department of Corrections conducted a site inspection at ASGDC and reported 172 security staff vacancies, which resulted in “insufficient personnel to provide [24-hour] supervision and processing of detainees and[, therefore,] the SHU's were not being sufficiently monitored.” [Id. ¶ 27.]
The Complaint asserts the following causes of action: (1) a claim for violation of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights [id. ¶¶ 30-36]; (2) a claim for violation of Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights [id. ¶¶ 37-41]; (3) a claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) [id. ¶¶ 42-45]; (4) a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [id. ¶¶ 46-48];(5) a claim for gross negligence [id. ¶¶ 49-54]; (6) a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) [id. ¶¶ 55-58]; (7) a claim for assault and battery [id. ¶¶ 59-62]; and (8) a claim for attorneys' and experts' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 [id. ¶¶ 63-64]. Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages, fees, and any other relief the Court deems just and proper. [Id. at 14-15.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)-the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”'” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
Challenge to Pleading Standard
Rather than address Defendant's arguments related to the distinct claims in this case, Plaintiff's two-page response to the motion to dismiss primarily argues that Iqbal and Twombly are inapplicable to this case and that Defendant “fails to cite more recent cases concerning pleading requirements issued by the United States Supreme Court.” [Doc. 34 at 1-2.] However, Plaintiff is mistaken.
As outlined above, the Supreme Court in Twombly explained the interplay between Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in Iqbal further explained the plausibility standard described in Twombly. These cases have continued to be the preeminent cases relied on by federal courts to explain how to apply Rule 8(a)'s pleading requirements in the context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and they are not limited to the specific facts or causes of action in those cases. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (“Th[e] argument [that Twombly should be limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute] is not supported by Twombly and is incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts. Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 124, 125-26 (4th Cir. 2023) (applying Iqbal and Twombly to a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against prison officials). Accordingly, as outlined above, Iqbal and Twombly provide the proper framework for determining whether Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim for relief.
Moreover, Plaintiff's reliance on Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014), for the proposition that it changes the pleading requirements outlined in Iqbal and Twombly is misplaced. In Johnson, the Court held that “no heightened pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional rights to invoke § 1983 expressly in order to state a claim.” Id. at 11. In so holding, the Court noted that Iqbal and Twombly were not relevant to the question in Johnson because “they concern the factual allegations a complaint must contain to survive a motion to dismiss” rather than the legal theory supporting the claim. Id. at 12. Because Defendant has not moved to dismiss based on Plaintiff's failure “to invoke § 1983 expressly,” id. at 11, or otherwise to allege a legal theory, Johnson is inapposite to this case.
Abandoned Claims
In its motion to dismiss, Defendant argues that it cannot be sued based on the doctrine of respondeat superior as a matter of law and Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead his § 1983 claims based on municipal liability; that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; that the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fourth and Eighth Amendments governs Plaintiff's § 1983 claims; that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead his ADA claim; that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead his state law claims for gross negligence, IIED, and assault and battery; that Defendant cannot be held liable on Plaintiff's IIED claim; and that § 1988 does not set forth its own cause of action and instead complements other civil rights laws. [Doc. 31-1.] As stated, in his response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff primarily challenges the pleading standard Defendant relies on for its arguments that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled his claims. [Doc. 34 at 1-2.] Plaintiff's failure to provide a meaningful response to Defendant's arguments that the Fourth and Eighth Amendments do not govern Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, that Defendant cannot be held liable on Plaintiff's IIED claim, and that § 1988 does not set forth its own cause of action justifies dismissal of these claims. See Waiters v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., No. 2:17-3227-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 5874132, at **8, 10 (D.S.C. May 10, 2019) (concluding that a plaintiff abandoned claims by failing to address in his opposition to a motion to dismiss an argument raised in the motion to dismiss), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 4462810 (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2019); Jones v. Family Health Ctr., Inc., 323 F.Supp.2d 681, 690 (D.S.C. 2003) (noting that a claim not addressed in the plaintiff's opposition memorandum had been abandoned). Additionally, with respect to whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled his claims, Plaintiff's only argument is that he “has alleged 22 specific actions of [Defendant] under its policies, customs and practices constituting inhumane, barbaric and tortuous treatment in violation of law [and that these] policies, practices, acts, omissions and customs were continued despite these policies, procedures, customs and practices being brought specifically to the attention of [Defendant's] county council, supervisors and administrators.” [Doc. 34 at 1.] The Court assumes that Plaintiff refers to paragraph 19 of the Complaint, which outlines his alleged treatment while at ASGDC, and to paragraphs 21 through 27, which describe the Study and its results, the Ad Hoc Committee's 2020 concerns, and the 2021 site inspection. [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 19, 21-27.] However, nothing in Plaintiff's response meaningfully addresses Defendant's arguments regarding Plaintiff's failure to plead a factual or legal basis for his ADA claim or failure to sufficiently plead the elements of a gross negligence claim; accordingly, Plaintiff's failure to meaningfully address his ADA and gross negligence claims justifies dismissal of those claims as well. See Waiters, 2019 WL 5874132, at **8, 10; Jones, 323 F.Supp.2d at 690. Indeed, nothing in Plaintiff's response identifies what specific claim(s) Plaintiff contends have been sufficiently pled. [See Doc. 34 at 1 (contending that “Plaintiff has alleged 22 specific actions . . . constituting inhumane, barbaric and tortuous treatment in violation of law,” but failing to specify what law(s) those actions purportedly violated).] Giving a very generous interpretation to Plaintiff's response in opposition, however, the Court notes that Plaintiff has provided at least some response to Defendant's arguments regarding his claims under § 1983 that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated and for assault and battery. Thus, the Court addresses those claims.
Even if Plaintiff had responded to these arguments, these claims would be subject to dismissal for the reasons Defendant argues. With respect to allegations that Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, Defendant correctly contends “Plaintiff does not appear to allege any unconstitutional search within the prison facility, . . . there are no factual allegations in the Complaint that would give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim[, and], to the extent [Plaintiff] is intending to allege the use of excessive force, that claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment.” [Doc. 31-1 at 4-5.] The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures governs claims of excessive force when they arise in the context of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of an individual. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). “[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . applies to the initial decision to detain an accused, not to the conditions of confinement after that decision has been made.” Robles v. Prince George's Cnty., 302 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2002) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Once the single act of detaining an individual has been accomplished, the [Fourth] Amendment ceases to apply” and, instead, the Fourteenth Amendment applies. Id. at 268-69. Because Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated at ASGDC, subsequent to his arrest, any claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated should be dismissed. With respect to allegations that Defendant violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights, Defendant correctly argues that “Plaintiff has not properly pled any claim for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights because he was a pre-trial detainee and not a convicted prisoner.” [Doc. 31-1 at 5.] The Eighth Amendment is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Although a convicted prisoner is entitled to protection only against “cruel and unusual” punishment, a pretrial detainee who has not yet been found guilty of any crime may not be subjected to punishment of any description. Id.; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 & n.16 (1979). Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee when he was incarcerated at ASGDC and had not been convicted of a crime, any claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated should be dismissed. With respect to Plaintiff's IIED claim, Defendant correctly argues that it cannot be held liable on this claim because it “is governed by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act [(“SCTCA”)], and the definition of ‘loss' contained in the [SCTCA] specifically excludes ‘the intentional infliction of emotional harm.'” [Doc. 31-1 at 7 (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-30(f)).] Cases in this district have repeatedly held that the SCTCA does not allow a plaintiff to recover for IIED against government entities or government actors in their official capacities. Hedgepath v. E. Richland Cnty. Pub. Serv. Dist., No. 3:21-cv-1705-JMC, 2022 WL 673741, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2022) (dismissing an IIED claim against a county and individual defendants in their official capacities); Land v. Barlow, No. 2:21-cv-1883-RMG-MHC, 2021 WL 6495298, at *10 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2021) (holding that a sheriff's office, a town, and individual defendants in their official capacities were entitled to dismissal of an IIED claim), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 5997984 (D.S.C. Dec. 20, 2021); Ward v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 457 F.Supp.2d 625, 632, 647 (D.S.C. 2006) (granting summary judgment on an outrage claim against a city). Accordingly, Plaintiff's IIED claim should be dismissed. Finally, with respect to Plaintiff's § 1988 claim, Defendant correctly argues that § 1988 does not create a separate cause of action. [Doc. 31-1 at 8]; Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F.2d 471, 474 (4th Cir. 1978) (“Section 1988 in itself does not create any cause of action, but it instructs federal courts as to what law to apply in causes of action arising under federal civil rights acts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hepburn ex rel. Hepburn v. Athelas Inst., Inc., 324 F.Supp.2d 752, 757 (D. Md. 2004) (“Section 1988 does not create any additional causes of action; it merely provides the applicable law in actions that are already proper under civil rights statutes like § 1983.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1988 claim should be dismissed.
Even if Plaintiff had responded to Defendant's arguments regarding the ADA and gross negligence claims, they would be subject to dismissal for the reasons Defendant argues. Defendant correctly asserts that Plaintiff's ADA claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not pled any factual or legal basis for this claim, including that Plaintiff failed to plead the title of the ADA that he bases his claim on and that, assuming it is brought under Title II of the ADA, he failed to plead facts to support any element of such claim. [Doc. 31-1 at 5.] Defendant further argues that Plaintiff has not pled facts showing discrimination against him based on an alleged disability. [Id. at 5-6.] The Court agrees that Plaintiff's ADA claim is not entirely clear. To the extent he brings his ADA claim based on purportedly inadequate medical treatment [Doc. 1 ¶ 44 (alleging that ASGDC “failed to provide [Plaintiff] with treatment, supervision, adequate medications, or psychotherapy”)], the claim fails because the ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability, Goodman v. Johnson, 524 Fed.Appx. 887, 890 (4th Cir. 2013); see Jenkins v. Beeman, No. PX-21-2364, 2023 WL 2599544, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 22, 2023) (dismissing a claim under the ADA where the complaint focused on an inmate's denial of adequate medical care for an ankle injury). Moreover, if, as Defendant assumes, Plaintiff intends to bring his ADA claim under Title II of the ADA, the Complaint fails to state a claim. Title II, which applies to state prisons, provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yesky, 524 U.S. 206, 210-13 (1998). To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff “must allege that (1) []he has a disability, (2) []he is otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public service, program, or activity, and (3) []he was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of such service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis of h[is] disability.” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005). Here, the Complaint's allegations regarding a purported violation of the ADA are vague and conclusory and insufficient to put Defendant on notice of the grounds for the claim. For example, the Complaint fails to allege what service, program, or activity Plaintiff was excluded from or denied the benefit of. Further, it fails to allege that Plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of his disability. Instead, the vague and conclusory allegations focus on Defendant's failure to provide mental health treatment to Plaintiff [Doc. 31-1 ¶¶ 43-45], which is insufficient to state an ADA claim, see Miller v. Hinton, 288 Fed.Appx. 901, 903 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting “that the ADA is not violated by a prison's simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners” absent discrimination (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's ADA claim should be dismissed. Similarly, with respect to the gross negligence claim, Defendant correctly argues that “Plaintiff fails to plead any standard of care nor the breach thereof.” [Doc. 31-1 at 6.] Generally, to state a claim for gross negligence a plaintiff must plead the same elements as a claim for negligence, that is that (1) the defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached the duty; (3) that the defendant's breach was an actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered an injury or damages. See Cockrell v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, No. 3:11-cv-2042-CMC, 2011 WL 5554811, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2011). However, “[n]egligence is the failure to exercise due care, while gross negligence is the failure to exercise slight care.” Clyburn v. Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist. # 17, 451 S.E.2d 885, 887 (S.C. 1994) (“Gross negligence is the intentional, conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do.”). Here, the Complaint fails to allege what duty Defendant owed to Plaintiff and how Defendant breached that duty. Instead, under the gross negligence cause of action, the Complaint alleges that “[t]he actions of [Defendant] were such that reasonable people could have foreseen the damages such acts and omissions would cause”; “Defendant's acts and omissions were a direct cause of the injuries suffered by [Plaintiff]”; “[t]he damages caused to [Plaintiff] were irreparable and serious”; “Defendant's acts and omissions amounted to negligence, and due to the nature of its negligence, [Defendant] should be found to have been grossly and recklessly negligent”; and “Plaintiff supposes himself entitled to actual and punitive damages from [Defendant] for their gross negligence.” [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 50-54.] These allegations are insufficient to put Defendant on notice of the grounds for the gross negligence claim because they do not clarify which acts or omissions allegedly breached what duty Defendant owed to Plaintiff.
Section 1983 Claim
Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. However, § 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying ‘the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Municipal Liability
Defendant first argues the Complaint should be dismissed because Defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior and Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient factual information to support a Monell claim. [Doc. 31-1 at 3-4.] Although Defendant is correct that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 claims, the Court concludes that the Complaint's allegations are sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory and, instead, is liable only for its own acts. Id. (“[W]e conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”). Therefore, “a municipality is liable under § 1983 if it follows a custom, policy, or practice by which local officials violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights. Only if a municipality subscribes to a custom, policy, or practice can it be said to have committed an independent act.” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized four ways municipal liability may arise based on a policy or custom:
(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that manifests deliberate
indifference to the rights of citizens; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, although the Complaint alleges that it is filed “under the doctrine of respondeat superior” and that Plaintiff seeks damages “[p]ursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior” [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 3, 29], it also alleges that ASGDC violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to a municipal custom, policy, or practice. Specifically, it alleges that the treatment Plaintiff received was based on “ASGDC's unwritten policy, custom, and practices”; that “the policies, customs, and practices of Defendant” caused Plaintiff's injuries; that “ASGDC's customs, policies, practices, acts and omissions subjected [Plaintiff] to and caused [him] substantial serious harm”; that Defendant's “policies, customs, [and] practices exposed [Plaintiff] to intolerable conditions and formed the basis for the violation of the Eighth Amendment”; and that “Defendant's customs, policies, practices, acts, and omissions . . . have deprived [Plaintiff] of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” [Id. ¶¶ 19v, 20, 39, 40, 47.] It further alleges that in 2014, the Study reported that “it was common practice to place detainees in SHU in an individual cell or shower stall for up to 12 continuous hours” as punishment and “recommended that ASGDC should conduct an independent review of the legality, liabilities, and appropriateness” of this common practice. [Id. ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).] It also alleges that based on the Study and “the custom and practice of using shower stalls and restraint chairs for many years, . . . Defendant is aware of and deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm” to Plaintiff. [Id. ¶ 23.] The Complaint asserts that the Ad Hoc Committee expressed concerns about housing and treatment for mentally ill detainees in 2020 and that a site inspection in 2021 found that the ASGDC had insufficient personnel to provide proper supervision and that the SHUs were not being sufficiently monitored. [Id. ¶¶ 26, 27.] Finally, it alleges that “Defendant's policies, practices, acts, and omissions . . . constitute the impermissible punishment of pretrial detainees for which no legitimate governmental purpose exists.” [Id. ¶ 33.] Based on these allegations, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim against Defendant under a theory of custom or usage by condonation by alleging a practice that is persistent and widespread that Defendant knew about and did nothing to correct. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1389, 1390-91 (4th Cir. 1987) (recognizing municipal liability based on custom or usage by condonation and holding that municipal fault under this theory “requires (1) actual or constructive knowledge of [the custom or usage's] existence by responsible policymakers, and (2) their failure, as a matter of specific intent or deliberate indifference, thereafter to correct or stop the practices”); see also Washington v. Housing Auth. of the City of Columbia, 58 F.4th 170, 182-84 (4th Cir. 2023) (concluding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled municipal liability by alleging that the housing authority applied a policy requiring immediate installation of carbon monoxide detectors only to privately owned apartments, understaffed inspectors and personnel, operated a non-uniform repair system, adopted a custom of willful neglect to obtain federal grants, and failed to train and supervise its employees because the allegations included “specific deficiencies in . . . procedures, practices, and training programs[ that] go further than allegations of past generalized bad [municipal] behavior” and the allegations sufficiently asserted that the constitutional injury would have been avoided absent these deficiencies) (last alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Owens, 767 F.3d at 402-03 (noting that, “[a]lthough prevailing on the merits of a Monell claim is difficult, simply alleging such a claim is . . . easier,” and concluding the plaintiff had sufficiently pled that the police department had a policy or custom of withholding exculpatory evidence from criminal defendants by alleging that reported and unreported cases from before and during the events at issue in the case, as well as successful motions in other criminal cases, showed similar conduct by officers and that the department ignored this conduct). Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to dismissal on this basis, and the Court turns to Defendant's arguments regarding Plaintiff's allegations that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.
The Court notes that Plaintiff continues to maintain that “Defendant [is] liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” [Doc. 34 at 1-2.] However, that appears to be a misunderstanding of Monell, which specifically held that “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” 436 U.S. at 691 (first emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Complaint and Plaintiff's response in opposition to the motion to dismiss both assert that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated because Defendant subscribes to a custom or practice as required by Monell.
Because the undersigned has already recommended that any claims that Plaintiff's Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights were violated be dismissed, the only remaining § 1983 claim to address is Plaintiff's allegations that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.
Fourteenth Amendment
With respect to allegations that Defendant violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff alleges a myriad of conditions of confinement in Paragraph 19 of his Complaint, without providing any supporting factual background for any of those conclusory allegations.” [Doc. 31-1 at 4.] Defendant further contends that “for any alleged assault by detention officers or . . . use of the restraint chair or . . . denial of needed medical or mental health care, [Plaintiff] fails to include any factual information to support those claims, such as a description of who, what, why, or how those incidents occurred and the factual circumstances underlying those allegations.” [Id.]
Unlike convicted inmates, pretrial detainees have not been adjudicated guilty of a crime and may not be subjected to any form of “punishment.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). To establish that a condition or restriction of confinement is constitutionally impermissible punishment, a “pretrial detainee must show either that it was (1) imposed with an expressed intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, in which case an intent to punish may be inferred.” Id. Courts may infer that a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, and is therefore punishment, if the restriction is arbitrary or purposeless. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). However, even though the purpose of pretrial confinement is to ensure the detainee's presence at trial, the detention center may impose restraints on the detainee that are reasonably related to the detention center's interest in maintaining the facility's security, even if the restraints “are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial.” Id. at 539-40.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that the standard for determining whether detention center officials have violated a pretrial detainee's right to due process is deliberate indifference. See Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992). Although these claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, case law interpreting the standard of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment is instructive. Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting that courts “traditionally apply Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference precedents to” Fourteenth Amendment claims).
The deliberate indifference standard applies whether the prisoner complains of “inhumane conditions of confinement, failure to attend to his medical needs, or a combination of both.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To state a claim based on alleged deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege that, (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or risk thereof was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which is that of deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34 (1993). The objective inquiry “requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 36. Stated differently, the standard requires the prisoner to “show that the risk . . . is not one that today's society chooses to tolerate.” Id. As to the subjective inquiry, deliberate indifference exists when prison officials know of an excessive risk to a prisoner's health or safety and consciously disregard that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37.
Here, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that the conditions Plaintiff was housed in at ASGDC-including but not limited to being placed in isolation in a SHU for 24 hours per day without access to recreation, commissary, or other activities to provide a break from solitary confinement; being locked in a shower stall for over 24 hours at a time; being strapped to a restraint chair for over 24 hours at a time; and being denied medical care, dental care, and mental health care-posed an objective risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. See Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 355-61 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that spending between 23 and 24 hours per day alone in a small cell without access to congregate religious, educational, or social programming posed a substantial risk of serious psychological and emotional harm to the plaintiffs and citing cases and studies); Baxley v. Jividen, 508 F.Supp.3d 28, 56 (S.D. W.Va. 2020) (finding that the evidence supported a viable claim of systemic deficiencies in mental and medical health care where the plaintiffs had serious medical and/or mental health diagnoses that they reported when they arrived at regional jails but claimed that they were not provided necessary medical treatment, including medication, in a timely manner). Additionally, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant knew of the serious risk to Plaintiff's health and safety and consciously disregarded that risk because it alleges that in 2014, the Study expressed concerns about housing detainees with serious mental illness in SHU and about a cool-down sanction of placing detainees in SHU in an individual cell or shower stall for up to 12 continuous hours as punishment; in 2020, the Ad Hoc Committee had concerns that mentally ill detainees were not getting proper treatment and about staffing shortages; and in 2021, the ASGDC had insufficient personnel to properly supervise, process, and monitor the jail. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43 (holding a trier of fact could find that a defendant had actual knowledge of a risk where it was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The allegations in the Complaint are more than labels and conclusions, plausibly plead a Fourteenth Amendment claim, and are sufficient under Iqbal and Twombly to give Defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds on which Plaintiff rests his claim. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied as to the allegations that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.
However, as previously noted, “[§] 1983 . . . is not an independent source of substantive rights, but simply a vehicle for vindicating preexisting constitutional and statutory rights.” Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2017). Therefore, Plaintiff need not assert separate causes of action for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and § 1983.
Assault and Battery Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's assault and battery claim “fails to provide facts of any specific event that serves the basis for th[e] claim.” [Doc. 31-1 at 7-8.] However, the Court disagrees.
“Under South Carolina law, an assault occurs when a person has been placed in reasonable fear of bodily harm by the conduct of the defendant, and a battery is the actual infliction of any unlawful, unauthorized violence on the person of another, irrespective of degree.” Roberts v. City of Forest Acres, 902 F.Supp. 662, 671 (D.S.C. 1995). Plaintiff's assault and battery claim alleges that during his incarceration, “ASGDC guards would assault and commit battery on [Plaintiff] by attacking him and holding him down or forcing him into a ‘restraint chair' as punishment for his behavior.” [Doc. 1 ¶ 60.] The Court concludes that these allegations are sufficient to give Defendant notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and plausibly state an assault and battery claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Francis, 588 F.3d at 193. Although Defendant argues that “Plaintiff provides no supporting facts” for this claim, the Court disagrees. Defendant is correct that Plaintiff has not named specific officers or dates, but Plaintiff's allegations of being attacked by officers and forced into a restraint chair plausibly state a claim for assault and battery. Cf. Pendergrass v. Hodge, 53 F.Supp.2d 838, 845-46 (E.D. Va. 1999) (declining to dismiss a § 1983 claim where the plaintiff had failed to name the correct defendants and instead substituting John Doe for the named defendants and allowing the plaintiff to engage in discovery to explore the claim, including the identity of the appropriate defendant); Arnold v. Moore, 980 F.Supp. 28, 37 (D.D.C. 1997) (“The plaintiff has had no discovery in this case. Therefore, it is not surprising that he would not know the names of the corrections officer who allegedly beat him. The plaintiff's complaint, however, is sufficiently detailed, and should not be found deficient simply because the plaintiff has not learned the names of his alleged assailants.”) Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied with respect to this claim.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that the motion to dismiss [Doc. 31] be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion should be denied as to Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and for assault and battery but otherwise granted.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.