Scott v. Lloyd

3 Citing cases

  1. Snyder v. Fiedler

    139 U.S. 478 (1891)   Cited 1 times

    Upon the acceptance of Mrs. Liebsch's resignation as administratrix, and when the order was made allowing her successor, the administrator de bonis non, to prosecute the suit in her place, the action ceased to be one in which she was concerned as a "party," either within the meaning of the present statute, or within the rule, in force prior to its adoption, which excluded as a witness, without reference to his interest in the issue, one who was a party to the record. De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 367, 384; Scott v. Lloyd, 12 Pet. 145; Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209; Bridges v. Armour, 5 How. 91, 94. It is of no consequence that she stood upon the record as the original plaintiff who sought judgment against the personal representatives of Snyder. As she ceased before the final trial to be administratrix, and as no judgment could have been rendered in her favor, as administratrix, against the administrators of Snyder, she was competent, under the statute, to testify to any transaction with or statement by him relating to the matters in dispute. Her credibility, in view of all the circumstances, was for the jury.

  2. Embrey v. Jemison

    131 U.S. 336 (1889)   Cited 44 times
    In Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U.S. 336, 348, the defendant, who was sued upon promissory notes given in execution of a previous verbal contract that was illegal, this court said that he could not "be permitted to withdraw attention from this feature of the transaction by the device of obtaining notes for the amount claimed under the illegal agreement; for they are not founded on any new or independent consideration, but are only written promises to pay that which the obligor had verbally agreed to pay.

    oof of fraud or mistake, or of an express understanding that certain matters were left open for settlement. Oil Co. v. Van Etten, 107 U.S. 325; Perkins v. Hart, 11 Wheat. 237; Hager v. Thomson, 1 Black, 80; Bull v. Harris, 31 Ill. 487; Lee v. Reed, 4 Dana, 109; Hodges v. Hosford, 17 Vt. 615; Martin v. Beckwith, 4 Wis. 219; Gibson v. Hanna, 12 Mo. 162; Cogswell v. Whittlesey, 1 Root, 384; Sergeant v. Ewing, 36 Penn. St. 156; Nicholson v. Pelanne, 14 La. Ann. 508. And when such an account is settled, the presumption is that all the previous dealings between the parties relating to the subject matter of the account are adjusted. Bourke v. James, 4 Mich. 336; Mills v. Geron, 22 Ala. 669. It is a well-settled principle in the Federal courts that a party to a negotiable instrument is not a competent witness to prove any fact existing at the time of his accrediting the paper, tending to invalidate it. Bank of the United States v. Dunn, 6 Pet. 51; Bank of the Metropolis v. Jones, 8 Pet. 12; Scott v. Lloyd, 12 Pet. 145; Henderson v. Anderson, 3 How. 73; Smyth v. Strader, 4 How. 404; Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 13 How. 229; Sweeney v. Easter, 1 Wall. 166; Davis v. Brown, 94 U.S. 423. It has also been settled in this court that a continued recognition of a debtor's liability and his agreement to discharge it, after he has full knowledge of all the facts in relation to the matter, estop him from pleading a want of consideration or setting up fraud as a defence to an action on the promise.

  3. Blen v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co.

    20 Cal. 602 (Cal. 1862)   Cited 14 times

    His competency was not restored by receiving money, and a bond as indemnity against his liability for costs and damage as a stockholder at the time the action was commenced. (Scott v. Loyd, 12 Pet. 145; Campbell v. Galbreath, 5 Watts, 424; Clement v. Bixlen , 3 Id. 248; Hook v. Hoaks , 5 Id. 80; Kentucky Rep. 1 & 2 A. K. Marsh, 839; Ashly v. Patton, 3 Levy & Rawle, 300; Gebbert v. Schmidle , 15 Id. 235; Benjamin v. Smith, 12 Wendell, 404; 14 Cal. [above cited] 265; Brown v. Lynch, 1 Paige's Ch. Rep. 156; Pond v. Hartwell, 17 Pick. 272; 1 Greenleaf's Ev., sec. 420.)