Opinion
No. 3:02-CV-0584-D
July 12, 2002
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an Order of the Court, Defendants' April 18, 2002 "Motion for More Definite Statement" and "Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-matter Jurisdiction, to Dismiss for Insufficiency of Process and Service Thereof, to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim for Which Relief May Be Granted, to Dismiss for Failure to Join Parties Needed for Just Adjudication and to Strike Scandalous Immaterial Matter" have been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for recommendation. The conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge follow:
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He claims that Defendants Dallas Central Appraisal District (misidentified in plaintiff's original complaint as "Dallas County Appraisal District"), Joe Jack Mills (misidentified as "Jo Jack Mills"), Sam Thompson, Hollis Brashear, Missy Vanderbilt, Ralph Poteet, and David Childs, violated his constitutional rights by assessing his property taxes by a procedure that violates the Texas Constitution. Defendants seek, inter alia, dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff has file two responses in opposition to Defendants' motions.
Plaintiff brought a similar complaint against various officials of the City of Richardson and the Richardson Independent School District, claiming the defendants conspired with the Dallas County Appraisal District to subject his property to an illegal tax assessment. See Scott v. Alicia Stephenson, et al., No. 3:02-CV-0762-M (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2002) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must prove that jurisdiction is proper. See Boudreau v. United States, 53 F.3d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1995); Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, A Division of Litton Systems, Inc., 723 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1984). In this case, the burden falls on Plaintiff. The allegations of his complaint must be taken as true and all inferences drawn in his favor. Saraw Partnership v. United States, 67 F.3d 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1995); Garcia v. United States, 776 F.2d 116, 117 (5th Cir. 1985). However, dismissal is warranted if those allegations together with any undisputed facts establish that the district court lacks jurisdiction. See Saraw, 67 F.3d at 569; Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1992).
DISCUSSION
Defendants challenge federal jurisdiction on various grounds, including the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341. This statute provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.28 U.S.C. § 1341. "The Act functions as a broad jurisdictional impediment to federal court interference with the administration of state tax systems." Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 277-28 (5th Cir. 2000), citing Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The statute also applies to taxes imposed by municipalities. Home Builders, 143 F.3d at 1010 n. 6; see also Alnoa G. Corp. v. City of Houston, 563 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1977).
Plaintiff does not seek to directly "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection" of his property taxes. Rather, he seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief for civil rights violations arising from an alleged unconstitutional tax assessment. While such a claim may not fall within the ambit of the Tax Injunction Act, it is precluded nonetheless. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that taxpayers may not challenge the validity of a state tax system in a federal civil rights action where state law provides an adequate remedy. In Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 115 (1981), the Court explained:
The recovery of damages under the Civil Rights Act first requires a "declaration" or determination of the unconstitutionality of a state tax scheme that would halt its operation. And damages actions, no less than actions for an injunction, would hale state officers into federal court every time a taxpayer alleged the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim. We consider such interference to be contrary to "[t]he scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts." (Citation omitted).
Therefore . . . we hold that taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such taxpayers must seek protection of their federal rights by state remedies, provided of course that those remedies are plain, adequate, and complete, and may ultimately seek review of the state decisions in this Court. (Citations omitted).
Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 115. See also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996) (noting that Fair Assessment limited the scope of a § 1983 cause of action by prohibiting suit for damages based on enforcement of a state tax scheme); National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 586 (1995) (holding that federal courts may not award damages in state tax cases when state law provides a clear and certain remedy); Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513 n. 16 (1982) (stating § 1983 does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear suits for tax refunds when state law provides an adequate remedy).
Plaintiff does not allege the absence of a "plain, speedy and efficient" state remedy for him to pursue his civil rights claim, and indeed, such an allegation would fail. Texas law provides procedural vehicles that afford taxpayers the opportunity to raise their serious federal constitutional questions. See, e.g. See Smith v. Travis County Education Dist., 968 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1992); McQueen v. Bullock, 907 F.2d 1544, 1549 (5th Cir. 1990); Hamilton v. Dallas Central Appraisal Dist., 1999 WL 261929 *2 (N.D.Tex. Apr. 23, 1999). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The resolution of this jurisdictional issue pretermits consideration of the other grounds raised by Defendants in their April 18, 2002 motions.