A store owner is generally not liable for injuries caused by a third person acting independently of that store owner. See Scott v. Allied Stores of Ohio, 96 Ohio App. 532, 537, 122 N.E.2d 665, 668 (1953). However, a store owner is liable for injuries caused by a third person if those injuries were produced by dangerous conditions of which the store owner knew of or should have known about and failed to reasonably remedy.
And such a proprietor would not be liable for dangerous conditions existing in its park unless it created them or had actual knowledge thereof and failed to take proper action to eliminate the same, or unless they were created by others and the proprietor had constructive knowledge of the existence of same on its premises by being in existence on said premises for such a period of time that a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary care would have discovered and eliminated the same. Champlin Hardware Co. v. Clevinger, 158 Okla. 10, 12 P.2d 683; City of Sapulpa v. Young, supra, 296 P. at page 438; Scott v. Allied Stores of Ohio, 96 Ohio App. 532, 122 N.E.2d 665; 20 A.L.R.2d 8, at page 24. Whether or not a dangerous condition has existed for such a length of time that an ordinarily prudent person would have discovered and eliminated the same is a question of fact under the circumstances of a given case.
However, a storekeeper is liable for injuries inflicted on its customers by third parties if they were produced by dangerous conditions of which the storekeeper had actual or constructive notice. 20 A.L.R.2d 8; Scott v. Allied Stores of Ohio, 96 Ohio App. 532, 122 N.E.2d 665. It is a question of fact for the jury (or here the court) as to whether the dangerous condition existed long enough so that in the exercise of ordinary care a reasonable person exercising reasonable care would have discovered and remedied the same. And this may be established by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence.
Insofar as the conduct of third persons is concerned, it is generally held that the inviter is liable if he has not taken reasonable and appropriate measures to restrict the conduct of third parties of which he should have been aware and should have realized was dangerous. Viands v. Safeway Stores (D.C.Mun.App. 1954), 107 A.2d 118; Ellington v. Walgreen Louisiana Co. Inc. (La.App. 1949), 38 So.2d 177; Scott v. Allied Stores of Ohio, 96 Ohio App. 532, 122 N.E.2d 665; Eyerly v. Baker, 168 Md. 599, 178 A. 691; Mathis v. Atlantic Aircraft Distributors, Inc., 216 Md. 262, 140 A.2d 156, 74 A.L.R.2d 647; Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed., § 78; Whalen v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., supra; Farrier v. Levin (1959), 176 Cal.App.2d 791, 1 Cal.Rptr. 742, rehearing denied 1960; Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 348. Generally speaking, what constitutes due care in the maintenance of a floor or stairway is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.
Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Barragate, 125 Ohio St. 190; Youngstown Suburban Ry. Co. v. Faulk, 114 Ohio St. 572; Farrell v. Loew's Ohio Theatres, 25 Ohio Law Abs. 679. Another case concerned a plaintiff who was injured in a store by being struck when another customer in the defendant's store threw a "block" on a "shoplifter" who had escaped from the custody of two of the store's employees. Scott v. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., 96 Ohio App. 532. The above cited proposition of law is not applicable here.