Id. at 935 (emphasis in original). In Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F. Supp. 37 (D.Kan. 1978), a district court upheld against a First Amendment challenge to the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to an inmate who had an extensive history of hostile and destructive behavior and had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. Noting that prison officials have the responsibility to provide proper care for ill inmates as well as the responsibility to protect neighboring inmates, the court concluded that "the forced administration by prison physicians of tranquilizing drugs to an inmate with a medical history such as plaintiff's is not a violation of federal rights."
The Court found that plaintiff failed to state a constitutional violation. Id. (citing Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F. Supp. 37 (D. Kan. 1978) (Officials charged with responsibility to provide for medical treatment of prison inmates have a constitutional duty to provide necessary medical treatment regardless of consent); Davis v. Agosto, 89 F. App'x 523 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (It was well within the authority of prison medical officials to determine that closing a wound was necessary to the health and safety of an inmate; and had they opted in the face of the inmate's objection not to provide this treatment, they could have subjected themselves to a deliberate indifference claim.). The Court also found that plaintiff's claims failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference.
his will based on a misdiagnosis did not state a constitutional claim for relief); People ex rel. Ill. Dep't of Corr. v. Millard , 335 Ill.App.3d 1066, 270 Ill.Dec. 407, 782 N.E.2d 966 (2003) (holding Illinois DOC does not violate an inmate's constitutional rights in seeking a court order to force feed an inmate on a hunger strike); McCormick v. Stalder , 105 F.3d 1059, 1062 (5th Cir.1997) (due process does not prevent prison officials from forcing a prisoner to undergo treatment for tuberculosis ); Martinez v. Turner , 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir.1992) (rejecting constitutional challenge to decision by prison officials to force-feed a detainee to preserve his health after a hunger strike); State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel , 537 N.W.2d 358, 364 (N.D.1995) (future medical cost of allowing diabetic prisoner to refuse treatment justified forced injections of insulin ); Commissioner of Corr. v. Myers , 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452, 454 (1979) (permitting dialysis over inmate's objection); Sconiers v. Jarvis , 458 F.Supp. 37, 40 (D.Kan.1978) ( “[D]efendants had an affirmative constitutional duty to provide necessary medical treatment regardless of consent because intentional denial of medical treatment ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.”).Most of those cases contain important factual and legal distinctions.
tuberculosis medication against his will based on a misdiagnosis did not state a constitutional claim for relief); People ex rel. Ill. Dep't of Corr. v. Millard, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1066 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding Illinois DOC does not violate an inmate's constitutional rights in seeking a court order to force feed an inmate on a hunger strike); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1062 (5th Cir. 1997) (due process does not prevent prison officials from forcing a prisoner to undergo treatment for tuberculosis); Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting constitutional challenge to decision by prison officials to force-feed a detainee to preserve his health after a hunger strike); State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358, 364 (N.D. 1995) (future medical cost of allowing diabetic prisoner to refuse treatment justified forced injections of insulin); Commissioner of Corr. v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Mass.1979) (permitting dialysis over inmate's objection); Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D. Kan. 1978) ("[D]efendants had an affirmative constitutional duty to provide necessary medical treatment regardless of consent because intentional denial of medical treatment ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."). Docket No. 21, p. 4-5.
Nor has he established that any constitutional right was violated by defendant Jackson's attempt to follow medical protocol with this test. See Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F.Supp. 37, (D.Kan. 1978)(Officials charged with responsibility to provide for medical treatment of prison inmates have a constitutional duty to provide necessary medical treatment regardless of consent); Davis v. Agosto, 89 Fed.Appx. 523 (6th Cir. 2004)(unpublished)(It was well within the authority of prison medical officials to determine that closing a wound was necessary to the health and safety of an inmate; and had they opted in the face of the inmate's objection not to provide this treatment, they could have subjected themselves to a deliberate indifference claim.). Unpublished opinions cited herein are not cited as binding precedent but for persuasive value only in accord with Fed.R.App.P. 32.1 and 10th Cir.R. 32.1).
Indeed, if Kofoed had failed to perform other needed procedures on Lyons' left shoulder after Kofoed had already opened up Lyon's shoulder and Lyons was under anaesthesia, Kofoed could have subjected himself to another deliberate indifference claim. See, e.g., Scioners v. Jarvis, 458 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D. Kansas 1978) ("[D]efendants had an affirmative constitutional duty to provide necessary medical treatment regardless of consent because intentional denial of medical treatment or deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."). Moreover, the present case does not present a situation where a prisoner completely withholds consent and medical officials nonetheless force him to undergo treatment despite the prisoner's objections.
In addition, Mr. Mattox does not allege sufficient facts indicating that the prison physician's order to administer psychotropic drugs to him over his objection amounted to a violation of his federal constitutional rights. See Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F.Supp. 37, (D.Kan. 1978). Exhibits provided by plaintiff with his complaint indicate he has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, that he was exhibiting psychotic behavior, and that a hearing was conducted and the results of the hearing were affirmed in connection with the decision to administer drugs involuntarily to plaintiff.
arper, federal and state courts have balanced these interests comparably. See, e.g., Davis v. Agosto, 89 Fed. Appx. 523, 528 (6th Cir. 2004) (forced suturing of an open wound against inmate's will did not violate inmate's due process or Eighth Amendment rights); Parks v. McCoy, 35 Fed. Appx. 239, 241 (7th Cir. 2002) (inmate forced to take tuberculosis medication against his will based on a misdiagnosis did not state a constitutional claim for relief);McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1062 (5th Cir. 1997) (due process does not prevent prison officials from forcing a prisoner to undergo treatment for tuberculosis); Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting constitutional challenge to decision by prison officials to force-feed an inmate to preserve his health after a hunger strike); State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358, 364 (N.D. 1995) (future medical cost of allowing diabetic prisoner to refuse treatment justified forced injections of insulin); c.f. Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D.Kan. 1978) ("[D]efendants had an affirmative constitutional duty to provide necessary medical treatment regardless of consent because intentional denial of medical treatment . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."). This Court recognizes that Harper mandates that a prisoner receiving a course psychtropic drug treatment receive certain process before the state is permitted to administer the treatment involuntarily.
The issue presented is whether Mr. Garrett is competent at this time to make decisions regarding his personal care. If he is judged to be competent (in the sense described in Section 3914), and he thereafter decides to end his life through starvation, then — given the fact that his custody is given over to the Department of Correction — an issue will arise whether the State has a right in the circumstances to compel him to take nourishment despite the usual recognition (or unfocused-upon assumption) of a right of all adult persons to control what food is taken by them. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1971); Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F.Supp. 37 (D.Kan. 1978). The last introductory comment I make is a disclaimer.
To characterize a person's self-destructive acts as entitled to that constitutional protection would be ludicrous. On the contrary, the State has a duty to protect the health and welfare of those persons in its custody ( Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103) and may be cast in civil damages for its failure to observe such duty (see, e.g., Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117; Sconiers v Jarvis, 458 F. Supp. 37; Polkovitz v. State of New York, 87 A.D.2d 984; Wilson v. Sponable, 81 A.D.2d 1, app dsmd 54 N.Y.2d 834; Gioia v. State of New York, 16 A.D.2d 354). The fact that the State has a legitimate and compelling interest in preventing suicide is demonstrated by several statutes.