Opinion
3:22-cv-05851-LK-TLF
06-12-2023
DEVON J. SCOLLARD, Plaintiff, v. STAFFORD CREEK CORRECTIONS CENTER, et al., Defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING IN PART REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Lauren King, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke. Dkt. No. 5. As set forth below, the Court adopts in part the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) and dismisses Defendants Stafford Creek Corrections Center (“SCCC”) and the Teamsters Union. This Order does not address the claims against the other Defendants.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Scollard, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has been convicted and is confined at the Washington Corrections Center. Dkt. No. 5 at 1. He names as Defendants in this action SCCC, the Teamsters Union, Department of Corrections Secretary Cheryl Strange, SCCC Disciplinary Hearings Officer Barry Dehaven, SCCC Superintendent Ron Haynes, SCCC Associate Superintendent Gina Penrose, SCCC CPM Rob Schreiber, Resolution Specialist D. Brewer, and Corrections Officers Villanobos, Ivey, and Johnson (with no first names identified). Dkt. No. 4 at 3-4. Mr. Scollard brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that when he was housed at SCCC, Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights during disciplinary hearings, retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment, and imposed conditions of confinement that violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 8, 12-19.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standards for Reviewing a Report and Recommendation
This Court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which” a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (same). The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). However, the Federal Magistrates Act “does not on its face require any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); see Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121 (“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”).
B. Legal Standards
The Court must dismiss the complaint of a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis “at any time if the [C]ourt determines” that the action: (i) “is frivolous or malicious;” (ii) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (iii) “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b). A complaint is frivolous when it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs. Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). At this stage, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 885 (9th Cir. 2021), rev'd on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 143 S.Ct. 1191 (2023) (per curiam).
C. The Report and Recommendation and Objections
Judge Fricke recommended dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Scollard's claims against SCCC and the Teamsters Union because they are not proper Defendants. She explained that SCCC “is an arm of the State of Washington; the State is not a ‘person' and therefore is not a proper defendant.” Dkt. No. 5 at 4. She also explained that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state or an agency acting under state control absent a clear and equivocal waiver, which did not exist here. Id.
Judge Fricke further noted that Mr. Scollard did not allege that the Teamsters Union is a state actor or a government entity or was otherwise acting under color of state law as required to state a Section 1983 claim. Id. at 5. Thus, even assuming the truth of Mr. Scollard's allegation that the Teamsters Union “hires/employs” SCCC staff, the Teamsters Union could not be held vicariously liable for those employees' actions under Section 1983. Id. at 5-6; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (“Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”). Accordingly, Judge Fricke recommended dismissal of SCCC and the Teamsters Union without leave to amend. Dkt. No. 5 at 5-6.
Mr. Scollard filed timely objections in which he contends that SCCC and the Teamsters Union were the supervisors of the SCCC and Department of Corrections employees he accuses of wrongdoing. Dkt. No. 9 at 2.
To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Mr. Scollard must show that (1) he suffered a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
Mr. Scollard argues that SCCC and the Teamsters Union “meet[] the standards [for] supervisor liability per [Castillo v. Skwarski, No. C08-5683-BHS, 2009 WL 4844801 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 2009)]” because they “allow[ed] Their subordinates to inflict The Constitutional harm against [him]” and “reasonably should have known of the acts occurring That caused The irreparable Constitutional injury.” Dkt. No. 9 at 2. He also asserts that both SCCC and the Teamsters Union are “arms of the state” and that “it was There [sic] Duties [sic] to ensure There [sic] subordinates [were] properly trained.” Id.
There are several problems with Mr. Scollard's arguments. First, the allegations he raises in his objections are nowhere to be found in his complaint. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 4 at 4 (stating only that the Teamsters Union “hires/employ[s] All Staff in Suit”); see generally Dkt. No. 4 (failing to set forth any basis for SCCC's liability). Second, even if he amended his complaint to include these allegations, he would still fail to state a claim against SCCC and the Teamsters Union. As the R&R explains, SCCC is not a “person” for purposes of a Section 1983 claim. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[s]tate agencies . . . are not ‘persons' within the meaning of § 1983” so plaintiff had no cause of action against the state agency under that statute); Warren v. Washington, No. C11-5686-BHS/KLS, 2012 WL 6963906, at *15 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 2012) (explaining that SCCC is not a “‘person[]' for purposes of liability” under Section 1983), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 364791 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2013). This is further underscored by Mr. Scollard's assertion in his objections that both SCCC and the Teamsters Union are “arms of the state,” Dkt. No. 9 at 2, because the Ninth Circuit has squarely held that “[s]tates or governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes are not ‘persons' under § 1983.” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab'y, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997)). In addition, SCCC is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Dkt. No. 5 at 4; Warren, 2012 WL 6963906, at *15. Mr. Scollard does not argue that Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable or waived here. See generally Dkt. No. 9. And finally, Mr. Scollard fails to explain how the Teamsters Union constitutes a state actor other than his unadorned assertion that both it and SCCC served as supervisors who were responsible for training the individual Defendants and should have known of the harm the individual Defendants inflicted upon him. This does not suffice to establish private entity liability under Section 1983. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138-40 (9th Cir. 2012); O'Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145, 1155-60 (9th Cir. 2023).
Because SCCC is not a proper defendant for a Section 1983 claim and that deficiency cannot be cured by any amendment, dismissal with prejudice is warranted. Because it is not clear that the deficiencies in Mr. Scollard's claims against the Teamsters Union could not be cured by amendment, the Court dismisses those claims without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS IN PART the Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 5, dismisses Mr. Scollard's claims against SCCC with prejudice, and dismisses his claims against the Teamsters Union without prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to send this Order to Judge Fricke, all counsel of record, and Mr. Scollard.