2. "Where the requirements of law are otherwise met a trover action will lie, although the property has been disposed of by the defendant prior to the date of demand and the filing of the suit." Scoggins v. General Finance c. Corp., 80 Ga. App. 847 (3) ( 57 S.E.2d 686). 3. "[A] restrictive indorsement puts subsequent parties on notice that the indorser retains ownership of the instrument . . . Kirstein Leather Co. v. Deitrick (C.C.A. Mass. 1936) 86 Fed 2d 793; and Nordin v. Eagle Rock State Bank (1934) 139 Cal.App. 584, 34 P.2d 490."
1. An action in trover will lie on the part of the true owner of personal property against one who has converted such property to his own use, although the defendant in good faith and without notice of the owner's title purchased it from an agent or bailee of such true owner who, however, had no authority to dispose of it, and although the defendant had also parted with possession of the property before suit was brought, but after notice of plaintiff's claim. Miller v. Wilson, 98 Ga. 567 ( 25 S.E. 578, 58 Am. St. R. 319); Clarke Bros. v. McNatt, 132 Ga. 610, 617 ( 64 S.E. 795, 26 L.R.A. (NS) 585); Scoggins v. General Finance Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 847 (3) ( 57 S.E.2d 686); Rogers v. Citizens Bank of Greensboro, 92 Ga. App. 399, 406 ( 88 S.E.2d 548); Berger v. Noble, 81 Ga. App. 34, 42 ( 57 S.E.2d 844); Sappington v. Rimes, 21 Ga. App. 810 (1) ( 95 S.E. 316). The act of the defendant, when informed by the plaintiff that the automobile belonged to him, in replying that if the wanted to he could get a bail trover, and in immediately thereafter and before service of the trover action reselling the automobile to the dealer from whom he had purchased it, was a conversion of the property, provided the title and right of possession thereof was in the plaintiff. Whelchel v. Roark, 31 Ga. App. 75, 78 ( 119 S.E. 451); Liptrot v. Holmes, 1 Ga. 381 (3), 391.
We have considered the record carefully and we do not agree with this contention. In this connection, we call attention to Scoggins v. General Finance Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 847 (1 a) ( 57 S.E.2d 686), wherein this court held: "Under Code § 67-1403, when conditional bills of sale have been recorded in the county of the residence of the conditional vendee within thirty days from the date of their execution, such registration serves as constructive notice to the world of the existence of such instruments from the date of their execution." See McIntyre v. Burns, 81 Ga. App. 239 ( 58 S.E.2d 442).
DeVaughn v. Byrom, 110 Ga. 904 ( 36 S.E. 267). The intervenor bank here failed to make such equitable showing, and there is accordingly no ground for applying equitable principles to this case. 3. General Finance Thrift Corporation's bill of sale, signed by John E. Price on July 8, 1954, and recorded on July 13, 1954, was a prior lien to the bank's bill of sale dated June 26, 1954, and recorded July 15, 1954, as is obvious from Scoggins v. General Finance Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 847 ( 57 S.E.2d 686): "Under Code §§ 67-1305 and 29-401 when bills of sale to secure debt have been recorded in the county of residence of the maker thereof, such registration serves as constructive notice from the date the same are filed for record." Judgment reversed. Gardner, P. J., Townsend, Carlisle and Nichols, JJ., concur.