Scoggan v. State

15 Citing cases

  1. Hernandez v. State

    754 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App. 1988)   Cited 4 times

    In addition, a number of our sister courts have decided the promiscuity issue without even mentioning the issue of consent as a prerequisite. E.g., Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (stating the promiscuity defense without mentioning consent); Walker v. State, 727 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1987, no pet.) (excluded evidence of four acts of sexual intercourse by complainant entitled defendant to promiscuity defense under Boutwell); Wimer v. State, 717 S.W.2d 468 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1986, no pet.) (defendant admitted rapes, but his earlier consensual sexual relations with his daughter did not constitute promiscuity); Jasso v. State, 699 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1985, no pet.) (no consideration of consent before denying that acts in evidence constituted promiscuity); Wicker v. State, 696 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1985) (appellant asserted ability to consent based on promiscuity, but court did not mention whether consent was material in analyzing promiscuity), aff'd en banc, No. 1175-85 (Tex.Crim.App., Oct. 21, 1987) (not yet reported) (affirming upon challenge to voluntariness of confession); Chreene v. State, 691 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Te

  2. Joseph v. State

    759 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App. 1988)   Cited 1 times

    The appellant's only argument on appeal is that the letter was not described in the search warrant and was seized by virtue of an illegal general exploratory search conducted by the officers, citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86, 85 S.Ct. 506, 511-12, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). He also cites Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987, pet. ref'd, pet. granted) for authority that "mere evidence" cannot be seized under a search warrant that does not particularly describe the items in the body of the warrant. Scoggan correctly sets out the general rule that evidence not described in a search warrant but seized pursuant to the warrant is admissible if found in plain view by officers who have a right to be where they are, is inadvertently discovered, and is immediately apparent to the officers that they have evidence before them.

  3. Jones v. State

    789 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App. 1990)   Cited 7 times
    Holding conviction could not be supported on the uncorroborated testimony of fourteen year old victim whose outcry was made seven months after the offense

    Id. at 2 n. 4. The most recent case addressing the corroboration requirements under art. 38.07 where there is no timely outcry and where the complainant is fourteen through sixteen years of age is Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987, pet. granted). The Scoggan court first determined that the 1983 amendment to art. 38.07 (excepting complainants under fourteen years of age from the outcry requirement) merely codified the holding in Hernandez and did not require corroboration where none had been required in the past, such as when the victim is legally incapable of consenting.

  4. Ivatury v. State

    792 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App. 1990)   Cited 22 times
    Falling asleep is a race-neutral justification

    In his sixth point of error, Ivatury contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the Stealth Bomber computer tape. Ivatury argues that since the search warrant and affidavit for the safety deposit box failed to specifically describe the computer tape and only authorized the seizure of a photograph of Agent Fahey pursuant to articles 18.01 and 18.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the police seized the tape in violation of these provisions. Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987, pet. granted); see TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. arts. 18.01(d) 18.02(10). Ivatury misplaces his reliance on Scoggan.

  5. Scoggan v. State

    799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)   Cited 88 times
    Holding defendant could not be convicted of sexual assault on the uncorroborated testimony of victim who was older than age fourteen at the time of the offense where the evidence failed to demonstrate outcry to third person within six months of the offense

    On direct appeal, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi reversed appellant's conviction and remanded the case to the trial court. Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987). We declined to review the search and seizure grounds relied on for the reversal; the only question before us now is whether appellant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence.

  6. Joseph v. State

    807 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)   Cited 72 times
    Relying on Nicholas in support of its conclusion that officer had no probable cause to search contents of letter where search warrant authorized seizure of marijuana

    01(d), V.A.C.C.P., prohibits seizure of anything not specifically described in an Art. 18.02(10) warrant. See Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi, pet. ref'd) (case distinguished under Art. 18.02(10) warrant). In answer to this contention, we note that it is well settled that general exploratory searches are illegal. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965).

  7. Ramos v. State

    819 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App. 1992)   Cited 11 times

    It is a defense to sexual assault if the child was, at the time of the offense, fourteen years or older and had engaged promiscuously in sexual activity before the time of the offense. Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991). "Promiscuity" is not a defense to aggravated sexual assault.

  8. Connally v. State

    838 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App. 1992)   Cited 3 times

    Single acts of sexual conduct do not constitute promiscuity. Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Wicker v. State, 696 S.W.2d 680, 682-83 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1985), aff'd, 740 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 938, 108 S.Ct. 1117, 99 L.Ed.2d 278 (1988). Sexual contact is defined as "any touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person."

  9. Johnson v. State

    933 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 4 times
    Stating that the decision about whether evidence of prior sexual conduct is admissible is one of relevance

    The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals has defined promiscuity as the "indiscriminate grant of physical favors to persons of the opposite sex without any requirement of love." Connally v. State, 838 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.); Ramos v. State, 819 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd); Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Ormand v. State, 697 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1985, no pet.). This definition can be traced to an entry in Corpus Juris Secundum: "The word 'promiscuity' does not signify an isolated incident of sexual relations with one particular person, but denotes an indiscriminate grant of physical favors to persons of the opposite sex without any requirement of love."

  10. Rankin v. State

    953 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)   Cited 71 times
    In Rankin, police found a rock of crack cocaine under the seat in a patrol car where the defendant had been sitting, and the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) weighing less than 28 grams.

    It is axiomatic that an appellate court must always address challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, even though a reversal may be required on other grounds. Garza v. State, 715 S.W.2d 642, 642 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986); Jefcoat v. State, 644 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Horne v. State, 607 S.W.2d 556, 562 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Rains v. State, 604 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Watson v. State, 605 S.W.2d 877, 880-881 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Winn v. State, 871 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1993); Birl v. State, 763 S.W.2d 860, 860 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1988); Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987); Scott v. State, 701 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1986); Forte v. State, 686 S.W.2d 744, 754 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1985); Troncosa v. State, 670 S.W.2d 671, 679 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1984); Daniel v. State, 648 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1983); and, Madden v. State, 630 S.W.2d 380, 387 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1982). This is because a successful challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence bars retrial and requires the entry of a judgment of acquittal.