Scoggan v. State

15 Citing cases

  1. Reeves v. State

    969 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. App. 1998)   Cited 71 times
    Holding evidence legally and factually sufficient despite absence of evidence indicating cause, time, or location of victim's death

    Because searches for "mere evidence" were impermissible in 1965, Chapter is did not contemplate such a search. Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). Six years after the Supreme Court's Haydendecision, Chapter 18 was amended.

  2. Rankin v. State

    953 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)   Cited 71 times
    In Rankin, police found a rock of crack cocaine under the seat in a patrol car where the defendant had been sitting, and the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) weighing less than 28 grams.

    It is axiomatic that an appellate court must always address challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, even though a reversal may be required on other grounds. Garza v. State, 715 S.W.2d 642, 642 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986); Jefcoat v. State, 644 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Horne v. State, 607 S.W.2d 556, 562 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Rains v. State, 604 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Watson v. State, 605 S.W.2d 877, 880-881 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Winn v. State, 871 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1993); Birl v. State, 763 S.W.2d 860, 860 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1988); Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987); Scott v. State, 701 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1986); Forte v. State, 686 S.W.2d 744, 754 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1985); Troncosa v. State, 670 S.W.2d 671, 679 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1984); Daniel v. State, 648 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1983); and, Madden v. State, 630 S.W.2d 380, 387 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1982). This is because a successful challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence bars retrial and requires the entry of a judgment of acquittal.

  3. Carmen v. State

    358 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. App. 2012)   Cited 38 times

    Some courts of appeals have held that, during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under article 18.02(10), the police may seize only those items specifically described in the search warrant even if they discover additional items that would otherwise fall within the plain-view exception. Young, 8 S.W.3d at 699; Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 243–45 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); see Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(d) (“Only the specifically described property or items set forth in a search warrant issued under Subdivision (10) of Article 18.02 of this code or property, items or contraband enumerated in Subdivisions (1) through (9) or in Subdivision (12) of Article 18.02 of this code may be seized.”). But see Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 906 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), overruled on other grounds, Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

  4. Carmen v. State

    No. 01-10-00124-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 30, 2011)

    Some courts of appeals have held that, during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under article 18.02(10), the police may seize only those items specifically described in the search warrant even if they discover additional items that would otherwise fall within the plain-view exception. Young, 8 S.W.3d at 699; Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 243-45 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 18.01(d) ("Only the specifically described property or items set forth in a search warrant issued under Subdivision (10) of Article 18.02 of this code or property, items or contraband enumerated in Subdivisions (1) through (9) or in Subdivision (12) of Article 18.02 of this code may be seized."). But see Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds, Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

  5. Johnson v. State

    933 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 4 times
    Stating that the decision about whether evidence of prior sexual conduct is admissible is one of relevance

    The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals has defined promiscuity as the "indiscriminate grant of physical favors to persons of the opposite sex without any requirement of love." Connally v. State, 838 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.); Ramos v. State, 819 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd); Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Ormand v. State, 697 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1985, no pet.). This definition can be traced to an entry in Corpus Juris Secundum: "The word 'promiscuity' does not signify an isolated incident of sexual relations with one particular person, but denotes an indiscriminate grant of physical favors to persons of the opposite sex without any requirement of love."

  6. Ramos v. State

    819 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App. 1992)   Cited 11 times

    It is a defense to sexual assault if the child was, at the time of the offense, fourteen years or older and had engaged promiscuously in sexual activity before the time of the offense. Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991). "Promiscuity" is not a defense to aggravated sexual assault.

  7. Hernandez v. State

    754 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App. 1988)   Cited 4 times

    In addition, a number of our sister courts have decided the promiscuity issue without even mentioning the issue of consent as a prerequisite. E.g., Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (stating the promiscuity defense without mentioning consent); Walker v. State, 727 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1987, no pet.) (excluded evidence of four acts of sexual intercourse by complainant entitled defendant to promiscuity defense under Boutwell); Wimer v. State, 717 S.W.2d 468 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1986, no pet.) (defendant admitted rapes, but his earlier consensual sexual relations with his daughter did not constitute promiscuity); Jasso v. State, 699 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1985, no pet.) (no consideration of consent before denying that acts in evidence constituted promiscuity); Wicker v. State, 696 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1985) (appellant asserted ability to consent based on promiscuity, but court did not mention whether consent was material in analyzing promiscuity), aff'd en banc, No. 1175-85 (Tex.Crim.App., Oct. 21, 1987) (not yet reported) (affirming upon challenge to voluntariness of confession); Chreene v. State, 691 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Te

  8. Joseph v. State

    807 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)   Cited 72 times
    Relying on Nicholas in support of its conclusion that officer had no probable cause to search contents of letter where search warrant authorized seizure of marijuana

    01(d), V.A.C.C.P., prohibits seizure of anything not specifically described in an Art. 18.02(10) warrant. See Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi, pet. ref'd) (case distinguished under Art. 18.02(10) warrant). In answer to this contention, we note that it is well settled that general exploratory searches are illegal. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965).

  9. Scoggan v. State

    799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)   Cited 88 times
    Holding defendant could not be convicted of sexual assault on the uncorroborated testimony of victim who was older than age fourteen at the time of the offense where the evidence failed to demonstrate outcry to third person within six months of the offense

    On direct appeal, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi reversed appellant's conviction and remanded the case to the trial court. Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987). We declined to review the search and seizure grounds relied on for the reversal; the only question before us now is whether appellant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence.

  10. Zarychta v. State

    44 S.W.3d 155 (Tex. App. 2001)   Cited 52 times
    Holding array of six men with varying degrees of dark hair and dark complexions was not impermissibly suggestive, even though defendant was the only Caucasian pictured

    Thus, it might be reasonably concluded that the "plain view" exception is not available to police when executing an "evidentiary" search warrant under Article 18.02(10). See Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 799 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). But see Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 906 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) (upholding seizure of evidence not specifically listed in a evidentiary warrant issued under Article 18.02(10)).