Scipio v. Upsell

8 Citing cases

  1. McNeill v. Town of Islip

    112 A.D.3d 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)   Cited 4 times

    Cheryl McNeill was not a party to the action, her records were subject to the physician-patient privilege, and she expressly declined to waive that privilege ( seeCPLR 4504 [a]; Roman v. Turner Colours, 255 A.D.2d 571, 572, 681 N.Y.S.2d 69; Muniz v. Preferred Assoc., 189 A.D.2d 738, 738, 592 N.Y.S.2d 734; Wepy v. Shen, 175 A.D.2d 124, 124–125, 571 N.Y.S.2d 817; Baldwin v. Franklin Gen. Hosp., 151 A.D.2d 532, 533, 542 N.Y.S.2d 667; Dalley v. LaGuardia Hosp., 130 A.D.2d 543, 544, 515 N.Y.S.2d 276; cf. Scipio v. Upsell, 1 A.D.3d 500, 500, 767 N.Y.S.2d 254).

  2. Wideman v. N.Y

    52 A.D.3d 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)

    The plaintiffs moved pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order after the defendant sought authorizations to obtain the mother's Medicaid and pharmacy records for the period during which the infant was in utero. Since the infant placed her physical and cognitive condition in issue, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for a protective order with respect to the mother's Medicaid and pharmacy records while the infant was in utero, "during which time there could be no severance of the infant's prenatal history from [her] mother's medical history" ( Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 102 AD2d 886, 888; see Scipio v Upsell, 1 AD3d 500, 501; Herbst v Bruhn, 106 AD2d 546).

  3. Elmore v. 2720 Concourse

    50 A.D.3d 493 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)

    Before: Lippman, P.J., Saxe, Gonzalez and Moskowitz, JJ. While this Court may exercise its own discretion regarding the supervision of discovery, deference is generally afforded to the trial court's determinations in this regard ( Don Buchwald Assoc. v Marber-Rich, 305 AD2d 338). Given defendants' failure to offer proper expert evidence establishing a particularized need for inquiry into matters not directly at issue in this action, the denial of their discovery request was proper ( Mendez v Equities By Marcy, 24 AD3d 138; Mayi v 1551 St. Nicholas, 6 AD3d 219). Defendants' expert affidavits are conclusory and fail to substantiate the assertion that the mother's records are necessary or relevant ( Scipio v Upsell, 1 AD3d 500, 501).

  4. Napoli v. Crovello

    49 A.D.3d 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 10 times

    The mere fact that the plaintiff commenced this action did not result in an automatic waiver of the physician-patient privilege ( see Scalone v Phelps Mem. Hosp. Ctr., 184 AD2d at 71) and there is no evidence that the plaintiff affirmatively placed her psychiatric condition in issue so as to effect a waiver of the privilege and permit disclosure ( see CPLR 3121 [a]; Dillenbeck v Hess, 73 NY2d 278, 287). Accordingly, the plaintiffs psychiatric treatment records are not subject to disclosure ( see Scipio v Upsell, 1 AD3d 500; Goldberg v Fenig, 300 AD2d 439, 440; Cottrell v Weinstein, 270 AD2d 449, 449-450). The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

  5. Lamy v. Pierre

    31 A.D.3d 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 7 times
    In Lamy, a minor child sued to recover damages for cognitive and behavioral defects allegedly caused by the child's ingestion of lead-based paint while residing in a building owned by the defendants.

    "We reverse the order insofar as appealed from. While the mother did not waive the physician-patient privilege with respect to her own medical history by commencing this action in a representative capacity on behalf of the infant and derivatively on her own behalf, she is not entitled to assert that privilege with respect to medical records "pertaining to the period when the infant plaintiff was in utero, during which time there could be no severance of the infant's prenatal history from his mother's medical history" ( Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 102 AD2d 886, 888; see Scipio v Upsell, 1 AD3d 500, 500-501; Herbst v Bruhn, 106 AD2d 546, 548). Since the affidavit of the defendants' medical expert established that the mother's medical records relating to the infant's gestation and birth were material and necessary to the defense of this action ( see CPLR 3101 [a]), the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the motion which was for a protective order with respect to those records, and should have granted that branch of the cross motion which was to compel the production of authorizations for the release of those records.

  6. Beer v. Goldfarb

    2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 30805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014)   Cited 3 times

    The branch of Dr. Goldfarb's motion for an order compelling plaintiffs to provide HIPAA-complaint authorizations for the psychological/psychiatric medical records of Beth Starkand's son is denied. The son is not a party to the action and disclosure of such records will invade his privacy in violation of the physician-patient privilege (see CPLR 4504(a); McNeill v Town of Islip, 112 AD3d 587, 977 NYS2d 892 [2d Dept 2013]; Scipio v Upsetl, 1 AD3d 500, 767 NYS2d 254 [2d Dept 2003]; Muniz v Preferred Assocs, 189 AD2d 738, 592 NYS2d 734 [1st Dept 1983]; see also CPLR 3101). Moreover, the fact Beth Starkand alleges in her amended and supplemental bill of particulars that her relationship with her son was strained due to her illness does not place her son's mental or psychological condition in issue (see Lamy v Pierre, 31 AD3d 613, 818 NYS2d 610 [2d Dept 2006]), nor has her minor son placed in issue his mental or psychiatric condition "either by way of counterclaim or to excuse the conduct complained of by the plaintiff in the pending matter" (Fox v Marshall, 91 AD3d 710, 710, 936 NYS2d 307 [2d Dept 2012]).

  7. Hunter v. Richmond Univ. Med. Ctr.

    101945/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2011)

    Roman v. Turner Colours, Inc., 255 AD2d 571, 572 [2d Dept 1998]. Scipio v. Upsell, 1 AD3d 500 [2d Dept 2003].

  8. Hunter v. Richmond Univ. Ctr.

    2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 51485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)

    Roman v. Turner Colours, Inc., 255 AD2d 571, 572 [2d Dept 1998].Scipio v. Upsell , 1 AD3d 500 [2d Dept 2003].