Opinion
Civil Action Number 01-1714 Section "L" (4)
September 17, 2001
ORDER REASONS
Pending before the Court is the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Defendant opposes the motion and seeks dismissal of this action with prejudice, or, in the alternative, dismissal without prejudice subject to several court-imposed conditions. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice is GRANTED, conditioned upon a stipulation that the Plaintiff's claims are limited to $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest, and are restricted to the claims asserted by the class in the class action pending in the 29th Judicial Court for the Parish of St. Charles. Additionally, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay Defendant costs and attorneys' fees in the amount of $200.00
I. BACKGROUND
On May 4, 2001, Plaintiff, Mark Scioneaux, filed suit in the 29th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Charles, alleging damages stemming from the release of acetic acid from Defendant Monsanto's plant in Luling, Louisiana. Almost one year prior, on July 31, 2000, a class action, entitled Keith Matherne v. Monsanto Company, No. 53,311, was filed in 29th Judicial District Court, alleging damages arising from the same incident. Unlike the members of the class, Scioneaux asserted claims against both Monsanto and Ron Cooley, the manager of the Luling plant and did not limit his claims to $75,000. On June 6, 2001, Defendant removed the action to federal court, and shortly thereafter filed both an answer and a motion to dismiss Cooley under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). The parties participated in a discovery conference on July 11, 2001, and Defendant's submitted initial disclosures, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), on July 24, 2001. Plaintiff did not complete initial disclosures, but instead filed the pending motion to dismiss without prejudice on August 3, 2001, indicating his intent to "join the class of people in the State Court suit and have his claim adjudicated therein."
In opposition, the Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice. Defendant asserts that although Plaintiff's counsel was an early and active participant in the class action pending in state court, the Plaintiff nevertheless elected to proceed individually, alleging damages distinct from those asserted by the class and not limiting his claims to $75,000. Defendant further contends that since filing suit, Plaintiff has made no effort to prosecute this claim, and ultimately allowed the action to "linger in federal court." According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff should have sought a dismissal without prejudice long before the Defendant "exerted significant time and effort" in defense of this suit, and because of this delay, a motion to dismiss with prejudice is now appropriate.
II. DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) governs voluntary dismissals. This rule provides that "an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." See Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 41 (a)(2). Rule 41 further provides that "[u]nless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal . . . is without prejudice." Id. A plaintiff's right to voluntary dismissal, however, "is not absolute." LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976). Dismissal under Rule 41(a) is within the discretion of the court, and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Diamond v. United States, 267 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1959). Generally, a voluntary dismissal should be granted unless the defendant will suffer prejudice or other legal harm. See Holiday Queen Land Corp. v. Baker, 489 F.2d 1031, 1032 (5th Cir. 1974).
To alleviate any potential harm or prejudice to defendants, courts commonly impose conditions on voluntary dismissals. LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 604. Such conditions vary according to the stage in the proceeding at which the motion is made. See Hartford Accident Indem. Corp. v. Costa Lines Cargo Servs., Inc., 903 F.2d 352, 360 (5th Cir. 1990). If a plaintiff seeks a dismissal at a late stage, after the defendant has invested substantial time and effort, a court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss without prejudice, or may impose special conditions on the dismissal. See id. Typically, a court will assess reasonable costs and attorneys' fees on the plaintiff as a condition of dismissal, although other conditions may also be imposed to allay harm to the defendant in a particular case. See Ritchey v. LeDoux, 164 F.R.D. 186, 189 (E.D. La. 1995) (conditioning motion to dismiss upon plaintiff's payment of attorneys' fees and costs and a stipulation that any discovery produced would be available for use in any future state court suit).
In this case, the Defendant has undoubtedly expended some time and effort complying with discovery rules and filing other pleadings. However, the circumstances in this case are not so severe as to warrant dismissal with prejudice. The Plaintiff's suit was filed in state court on May 4, 2001. Three months later, on August 3, 2001, the present motion to dismiss was filed. Other than Defendant Cooley's motion to dismiss, no substantive motions have been filed and the trial date has not yet been scheduled. Compare Davis v. Huskipower Outdoor Equip. Corp., 936 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 1991) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to dismiss where plaintiffs moved to dismiss more than one year after removal, and after months of pleadings, conferences, and memoranda); Hartford, 903 F.2d at 361 (no abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss where action was removed to federal court ten months prior, parties had conducted significant discovery and attended several hearings, and one defendant had been granted summary judgment). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice.
The Court recognizes that the Defendant has exerted some resources in the defense of this case. To that end, the Court orders that the Plaintiff shall pay Defendant costs and attorneys fees in the amount of $200.00. Furthermore, this dismissal is conditioned upon Plaintiff's stipulation that his claims, if asserted in the state class action, do not exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and are confined to the allegations of the class.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice. The dismissal is conditioned upon the payment of Defendant's costs and attorneys' fees in the amount of $200.00 and stipulation that the Plaintiff's claims, if asserted in the state court class action, do not exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and are limited to the claims asserted by the class.