Opinion
Case Number: 00-73209.
November 30, 2001.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Jennifer Scibilia, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Scott Correctional Facility in Plymouth, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition.
II. Facts
Petitioner's conviction arises out of the death of her three-year-old son, Matthew Bower, on July 17, 1996.
Gary Paul Beaudrie, an Ash Township volunteer fireman, testified that, between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. on July 17, 1996, he responded to a call regarding a child who was not breathing at Petitioner's house. He arrived on the scene within two to three minutes. Beaudrie testified that, when he entered the trailer, he found Matthew Bower lying face-up. He noticed that Matthew had marks on his face, that the area under his eyes was purple, and that his lips and nose looked flattened. He determined that Matthew was not breathing, and he and the boy's step-father began performing CPR, until the police arrived and took over.
Police Officer Williams Hines and his partner Officer Lloyd Beardsley arrived at the scene while Beaudrie was performing CPR. Officer Hines testified that when he looked at Matthew he thought the boy's nose appeared a bit compressed. Officer Hines further testified that Petitioner said, "God no, not again, not again."
Dr. Jeffrey Couturier testified that he was the emergency room physician on duty the night Matthew was taken to the hospital. He testified that Matthew was not breathing and had no pulse when he arrived at the hospital. In Dr. Couturier's opinion, Matthew had probably been dead for several hours by the time he was taken to the hospital.
William Garland testified that he previously dated Petitioner. He testified that he saw Petitioner slam Matthew on the couch on more than one occasion. She also used to throw Matthew into his car seat and he witnessed her throwing Matthew's bottle at him.
Pamela Terteling testified that she had known Petitioner since elementary school. She described Petitioner as being a bad mother who yelled at Matthew frequently. Terteling further testified that Petitioner "hit him a lot, picked him up by one arm, pushed him around. She hit him, but not just like on the butt. She — wherever she could hit him at." Finally, Terteling testified that Petitioner had told her that one day she would suffocate Matthew and kill him.
Ruth Broder, Petitioner's mother, testified that Petitioner was "rough" and "impatient" with Matthew, that she would expect "far too much from him for his age," and that she would "throw him into his bed or playpen." Broder testified that, on one occasion in the summer of 1995, Petitioner threw Matthew into a pool and made no attempt to save him when it appeared Matthew might drown.
Rebecca Luebke, Petitioner's sister, testified that Petitioner was neglectful of Matthew. She testified that Petitioner did not feed him enough and rarely changed his diaper.
Dr. Werner Spitz testified that he performed an autopsy on Matthew on July 17, 1996. He testified that he detected no injuries to the head, and that Matthew's eyes showed no hemorrhaging. Matthew's brain was discolored and fattened because of retention in the brain tissue of blood and fluids. Matthew's brain indications were consistent with oxygen deprivation. Dr. Spitz concluded that Matthew had died as a result of oxygen deprivation, consistent with suffocation, smothering, or strangulation.
Dr. Diane Scala-Barnett performed a second autopsy on Matthew. She testified that there were petechial hemorrhages on Matthew's face and the back of his neck, which were caused by venous congestion. She testified that venous congestion is caused when small capillaries are lacking in oxygen. Dr. Scala-Barnett testified that Matthew's brain was discolored, which is consistent with oxygen deprivation. She determined that Matthew died of asphyxia.
Petitioner testified in her own defense. She denied having been abusive toward Matthew. She testified that she had a contentious relationship with her mother and her sister and denied the veracity of their testimony. Petitioner testified that Matthew had a history of asthma and other breathing problems and attributed his death to these health problems. Petitioner denied killing her child.
III. Procedural History
Following a jury trial in Monroe County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder. On May 29, 1997, Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five to fifty years imprisonment.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, presenting the following claims:
I. Does the inaccurate medical testimony of Dr. Scala-Barnett require that a new trial be ordered either because information was withheld from trial counsel, ineffective assistance of counsel, that there has been a miscarriage of justice or because the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence?
II. Is there sufficient evidence to support the verdict as there is not evidence that connects Ms. Scibilia to child's death as this case is based on statements and alleged incidents that occurred years earlier, none of them showing a present act to murder that night?
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction. People v. Scibilia, No. 203997 (Mich.Ct.App. Dec. 18, 1998).
Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting the same claims presented on direct review to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Scibilia, No. 113920 (Mich. July 27, 1999).
On July 19, 2000, petitioner filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus, presenting the following claims:
I. Conviction obtained in violation of Petitioner's right to due process because material, exculpatory information was not disclosed by the prosecutor pursuant to a discovery order.
II. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of trial counsel where trial counsel failed to investigate and cross-examine on matters which would have case doubt on the suspect medical conclusions of Dr. Scala-Barnett.
III. The verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.IV. Analysis A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA") altered the standard of review federal courts must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the act, April 24, 1996. Because petitioner's application was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review that a federal court must utilize when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ; see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous").
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. . . .
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519-20 (2000).
With respect to the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 1521. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. . . .
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.Id. at 1521-22.
With this standard in mind, the Court proceeds to the merits of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
B. Brady Violation Claim
Petitioner claims that she is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence favorable to the defense. Petitioner fails to identify the specific nature of this allegedly undisclosed exculpatory evidence. She instead states that, based upon alleged inconsistencies between the two autopsy reports, information must have existed which should have been turned over to the defense.
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Supreme Court established that a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense constitutes a denial of due process "where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Included within the universe of evidence that must be disclosed is that which might be used to impeach prosecution witnesses. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). Favorable evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682.
The last state court to issue a reasoned opinion regarding Petitioner's claim of a Brady violation, the Michigan Court of Appeals, stated, in pertinent part:
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly denied her motion for a new trial on the ground that the prosecution withheld evidence from defense counsel. Specifically, defendant argues that a second autopsy performed on the victim was "likely ordered because there were problems with obtaining a conviction based on the first autopsy" and, therefore, "it is more than likely that the problems [with the first autopsy] were told to someone in the investigation." Defendant's argument that the prosecution failed to provide the defense with all exculpatory information or evidence is based on mere conjecture. Both pathologists reached the conclusion that the victim died as the result of a deliberate act that caused him to asphyxiate, consistent with either suffocation, smothering, or strangulation. Hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a new trial.People v. Scibilia, slip op. at 1.
Petitioner has failed to show that the state court's determination was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. She fails to identify with any specificity the evidence which the prosecution allegedly failed to turn over to the defense. Accordingly, she is not entitled to habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Petitioner next claims that she is entitled to habeas corpus relief because she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, Petitioner claims that her trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the basis for Dr. Scala-Barnett's medical testimony and failed to adequately cross-examine Dr. Scala-Barnett.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for determining whether a habeas petitioner has received ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a petitioner must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. This "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Second, a petitioner must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced petitioner. A petitioner may establish prejudice by "showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Id.
The Supreme Court emphasized that, when considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing court should afford counsel a great deal of deference:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.Id. at 689 (internal citations omitted).
The Court further explained that, to establish deficient performance, a petitioner must identify acts that were "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. The Sixth Circuit, applying the Strickland standard, has held that a reviewing court therefore must focus on whether counsel's alleged errors "have undermined the reliability of and confidence in the result." McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1311 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1257 (1997).
The Michigan Court of Appeals, the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion addressing the merits of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, held, in pertinent part:
Defendant next argues that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel by defense counsel's failure to extensively cross-examine the pathologists. However, the record reveals that both pathologists were thoroughly questioned regarding whether the victim's other identifiable breathing conditions could have been responsible for his death. Although there were some differences in the pathologists' conclusions regarding the external examination and the amount of bruising and petechial hemorrhages that the victim had, both doctors arrived at the conclusion that the cause of the victim's death was deliberate and denied that the victim could have died from asthma or pneumonia. Defendant has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failure to more extensively cross-examine the pathologists regarding the differences they found in the external examination of the victim, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Thus, defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that she received effective assistance of counsel.People v. Scibilia, slip op. at 1-2.
Although the Michigan Court of Appeals did not specifically cite the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Strickland, it clearly applied the standard articulated therein. Petitioner has failed to show that the state court's application of that standard was unreasonable. After reviewing the trial transcript, the Court concludes that the trial court's cross-examination of each of the pathologists was comprehensive and thoughtful. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus with respect to this claim.
D. Claim that Verdict is Against the Great Weight of the Evidence
Finally, Petitioner claims that she is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. A federal court lacks power to grant habeas corpus relief on the ground that a state conviction is against the great weight of the evidence.Thomas v. McLemore, 2001 WL 561216, *5 (E.D. Mich. March 30, 2001), citing Young v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1097, 1105 (11th Cir. 1985). The appropriate inquiry on federal habeas corpus review is not whether the verdict went against the great weight of the evidence, but whether sufficient evidence was presented to support the conviction. Id. Thus, this Court will treat Petitioner's final claim for habeas corpus relief to be asserting that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to support her conviction for second-degree murder.
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Supreme Court established that the standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge must focus on whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."Id. at 319 (emphasis in original). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), this Court must determine whether the state court's application of theJackson standard was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. In making this determination, this Court must afford the state court's findings of fact a presumption of correctness unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the factual determination in the state court was erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); West v. Seabold, 73 F.3d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2569 (1996).
The last state court to issue a reasoned opinion regarding these claims, the Michigan Court of Appeals, held, in pertinent part:
Lastly, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We disagree. To support a verdict of second-degree murder, the prosecution must present sufficient evidence that there was (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse. People v. Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 463-64 (1998). Malice is defined as "the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm." Id. at 464.
Here, eight witnesses testified that defendant was verbally and physically abusive to the victim. Two witnesses testified that defendant had threatened to kill the victim. While defendant was in jail one of her cell mates called defendant a baby-killer and defendant replied, "[y]ou killed one, too." One witness testified that on the night the victim died, the victim's nose and lips were flattened. A second witness also noticed that a little bit of the victim's nose was compressed on the night he died. A pathologist testified that the victim had died as a result of oxygen deprivation, consistent with either suffocation, smothering, or strangulation, and that the death was deliberate. Another pathologist testified that the victim's cause of death was asphyxia as the result of homicide. Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of second-degree murder.People v. Scibilia, slip op. at 2.
Petitioner does not claim that the state court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating her insufficiency of the evidence claim. Thus, this Court considers whether the state court decision was an unreasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia. In addressing Petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals considered the following facts: numerous witnesses testified that Petitioner had been verbally and physically abusive to her son; two witnesses testified that Petitioner had threatened to kill her son; two pathologists testified that the death was deliberate; and two witnesses testified that the victim's nose and mouth appeared to be compressed. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that, based upon the foregoing facts, a rational trier of fact could have found that Petitioner did not act in self defense.
Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the state court's findings of fact were erroneous. Therefore, according the state court's findings of fact a presumption of correctness, this Court concludes that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision did not "result in a decision that . . . involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied and the matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.