Opinion
Civil No. 09-5964 (RBK/JS).
July 28, 2011
OPINION
This is an employment discrimination case. Defendants removed this case from the Superior Court of New Jersey based on federal-question jurisdiction. In a February 17, 2011 opinion, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's federal claims, leaving only Plaintiff's state-law claims pending. Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand this matter to the Superior Court of New Jersey. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
II. STANDARD
28 U.S.C. 144728 U.S.C. § 1441See28 U.S.C. § 1447Abels v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co.770 F.2d 2629Pullman Co. v. Jenkins305 U.S. 534537See Abels770 F.2d at 29 See First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Straight Creek Processing Co. 756 F. Supp. 945 946 Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n657 F.2d 2936TM Marketing, Inc. v. Art Antiques Assoc.803 F. Supp. 994997Carney v. Dexter Shoe Co.701 F. Supp. 10931100
In her Motion, Plaintiff mistakenly states that she filed her original Complaint in Camden County. Defendants object that venue is improper in Camden County, as the underlying cause of action arose in Gloucester County, and Plaintiff filed her original Complaint in Gloucester County. However, Defendants do not argue that remand to Gloucester County is improper. Plaintiff admits that she erroneously stated Camden County is the proper venue, and that the Court should remand to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Gloucester County.
III. DISCUSSION
When a district court dismisses the federal claims that provided a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may maintain supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 245 (2007) ("Even if only state-law claims remained after resolution of the federal question, the District Court would have discretion, consistent with Article III, to retain jurisdiction."). However, "the district court[] may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). "A district court's decision whether to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary." Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1866 (2009).
However, "a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims." Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). "[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Id. at 350 n. 7; see also Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding exercise of supplemental jurisdiction not appropriate where federal claims had been dismissed because dismissal had occurred at early stage in litigation and no prejudice would result).
Here, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff's federal-question claims, leaving only Plaintiff's state-law claims. Therefore, it is within the discretion of the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. Because the case is early in the litigation process, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness do not balance in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction. Neither the Court nor the parties have invested substantial time and resources toward trial in federal court. Also, because only Plaintiff's state-law claims are pending, the Court should remand in the interest of comity. Plaintiff's state-law claims predominate, and the Court would not serve any federal interest by retaining jurisdiction. Thus, this case falls in the category of "the usual case" where all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, and the balance of factors point toward declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. See Carnegie, 484 U.S. at 350 n. 7.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is GRANTED. An appropriate Order shall enter.