Opinion
No. 08-CA-249.
October 28, 2008.
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 563-683, DIVISION "I" HONORABLE JO ELLEN V. GRANT, JUDGE PRESIDING.
LEBLANC BUTLER LAW FIRM, PATRICIA S. LEBLANC, MICHAEL L. FANTACI, Attorneys at Law, 3421 N. Causeway Boulevard, Suite 301, Metairie, LA 70002, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE.
McCRANIE, SISTRUNK, ANZELMO, HARDY, MAXWELL McDANIEL, THOMAS P. ANZELMO, SR., LYNDA A. TAFARO ANDRE J. LAGARDE, Attorneys at Law, 3445 N. Causeway Boulevard, Suite 800, Metairie, LA 70002, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Clarence E. McManus, and Greg G. Guidry.
Defendant, East Jefferson Levee District (Levee District), appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, Kenner Acquisition, LLC (Kenner Acquisition), granting Kenner Acquisition's motion in limine and excluding the introduction of evidence regarding the Levee District's claim of ownership of the property by acquisitive prescription. For the reasons that follow, we convert this appeal into an application for supervisory writ of review and grant the writ, reversing the judgment, and remanding the matter to the District Court for further proceedings.
On February 14, 2001, plaintiff Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc. filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment, or in the alternative, for Damages. Named as defendants were the East Jefferson Levee District and Georgia Pacific Corporation.
In its petition, Schwegmann alleged that it was the owner of immovable property located in Jefferson Parish, and that the Levee District was in possession of its property and had refused to vacate same. It further alleged that it was entitled to be declared owner of the property, or in the alternative, it was entitled to damages from its ancestor in title for the fair market value of the property lost. It asserted that it Georgia Pacific acquired the property after its purchase and liquidation of Edenborn, Inc. in January of 1968, and that Georgia Pacific sold the property to John Schwegmann, Jr. in May of 1969. In October of 1979, Mr. Schwegmann sold the property to Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets.
In its answer, the Levee District asserted that its predecessor in interest, the Pontchartrain Levee District, appropriated property in Jefferson and St. Charles Parishes (and the property at issue was encompassed in that appropriation) in 1948 and 1949, for the purpose of constructing a levee. The property owner, Edenborn, filed suit seeking compensation for the appropriated property in the 23rd Judicial District Court and on May 31, 1960, Edenborn was granted a money judgment for the property appropriated, which was paid by the Pontchartrain Levee District. Commencing in 1949, the Levee District constructed a highly visible levee, which included parts of the appropriated property. Since that time, the Levee District has continuously been in corporeal possession of the property, and this possession had never been disturbed and opposed prior to the filing of the instant suit. The Levee District admitted that it did not record its acquisition of the property until November of 1996. The Levee District also pled the affirmative defenses and filed a reconventional demand against Schwegmann, asserting acquisitive prescription of ten years' good faith possession, and acquisitive prescription of a servitude. In addition, the Levee District filed a third party demand against Georgia-Pacific.
On August 3, 2004, Schwegmann sold the property and assigned the claim and instant litigation to Kenner Acquisition pursuant to an order of the Bankruptcy Court. Kenner was then substituted as plaintiff and currently pursues this suit. Thereafter, Kenner Acquisition filed a motion for partial declaratory relief, seeking to be declared owner of the property. The Levee District filed a cross motion for partial declaratory relief, likewise seeking to be declared owner of the property.
Prior to the hearing on the motion for partial declaratory relief, Kenner Acquisition filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude from introduction any evidence regarding the Levee District's possession of the property at issue. Kenner Acquisition contended that the Levee District's status as a political subdivision prevents it from acquiring ownership of the property via acquisitive prescription, and therefore any evidence regarding possession was irrelevant.
On February 8, 2008, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Kenner Acquisition, granting its motion in limine and excluding the introduction of evidence regarding the Levee District's claim of ownership of the property by acquisitive prescription. The court in its judgment expressly stated that it "foreclose[d] East Jefferson Levee District's argument that it became the owner of the disputed property through ten year, good faith acquisitive prescription." The court thereafter stated that it certified the judgment as final for purposes of immediate appeal.
Our initial inquiry is whether the trial court's judgment is a final partial judgment that can be certified as immediately appealable. It is the duty of a court to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the issue is not raised by the litigants. Boudreaux v. State, Depart. of Transp. Development, 01-1329 (La. 2/26/02), 815 So.2d 7.
A final judgment is one which determines the merits of a controversy in whole or in part. By contrast, an interlocutory judgment is one that does not determine the merits, but only preliminary matters in the course of the action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1841. The judgment in this case grants a motion in limine and limits the introduction of evidence. It is therefore an interlocutory, and not a final, judgment. An appeal will lie from a final judgment, or an interlocutory judgment only when expressly provided by law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083; Wooley v. Amcare Health Plans of Louisiana, Inc., 05-2025 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/25/06), 944 So.2d 668. There is no express provision in the law to allow an appeal from the granting of a motion in limine.
The trial court stated that it was certifying the judgment as final for purposes of immediate appeal pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915B. However, C.C.P. art. 1915 governs partial judgments that determine merits issues, and allows certification of these partial judgments as final for the purpose of immediately appeal, after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. Art. 1915 does not allow a trial court to certify as final an interlocutory ruling.
The ruling of the trial court, which limits the introduction of evidence, is a non-appealable, interlocutory judgment, and the trial court erred in certifying the judgment as final. Nevertheless, the ruling is subject to review under our supervisory jurisdiction. A court of appeal has plenary power to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over trial courts, and may do so at any time, pursuant to its own discretion. See C.C.P. art. 2201; Campbell v. Markel American Ins. Co., 00-1448 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/12/01), 822 So.2d 617.
Applying our supervisory jurisdiction to the matter before us, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in granting a motion in limine, excluding evidence which was alleged to be not relevant by one party, and effectively denying the opposing party the opportunity to present one or more of its claims.
"`Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." LSA-C.E. art. 401. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Louisiana, this Code of Evidence, or other legislation. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." LSA-C.E. art. 402.
In this case, the Levee District offers several distinct theories as to why it should be considered owner/possessor of the land at issue. The Levee District contends that it acquired the property by appropriation, and paid for the property via a judgment rendered against it in a prior proceeding. It then contends that, if the judgment is not translative of title, it nevertheless was in possession in good faith of the property in excess of ten years, and therefore it acquired the property via acquisitive prescription. The Levee District finally contends that even if its possessive was not sufficient to allow it to acquire the property, it was sufficient to allow the acquisition of a servitude on the property.
Kenner Acquisitions contends that it is the record owner of the property, that the judgment of the prior court did not translate title to the property, and that the Levee District as a political subdivision cannot acquire ownership of the property by acquisitive prescription. These are the issues pending in the motion for partial declaratory judgment, currently pending in the district court.
We find that evidence of the Levee District's possession of the property at issue is relevant to a determination of one or more of these issues, and therefore the trial court erred in granting the motion in limine.
In granting the motion in limine, the trial court indicated that it found the case of Parish of Jefferson v. Bonnabel Properties, 620 So.2d 1168 (La. 1993), to be applicable. In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 did not allow a political subdivision to acquire ownership of property through 30 year bad faith acquisitive prescription. The Levee District argues that ten year good faith acquisitive prescription would have vested title prior to 1974, and that the Bonnabel opinion does not hold that a political subdivision could not acquire property through prescription under the 1921 Constitution.
In this case, determination of the legal issues depends initially on a determination of the facts of the case, which have not yet been fully developed in this matter. While we recognize the arguments made by the parties, we do not determine at this time whether the trial court was correct in its legal conclusions. Allowing all relevant evidence to be produced, and utilizing that evidence to assist in determining not only what the legal issues are but how they apply to the facts as adduced, enables the court to fully consider the issues presented to it and promotes the judicial policy of avoiding piecemeal litigation.
Finding that the trial court did err, we reverse its ruling granting the motion in limine, and remand this case for further proceedings.
THIS APPEAL IS CONVERTED TO A WRIT. WRIT GRANTED; CASE REMANDED