321; 49 Tex. Cr. 204, 91 S.W. 585; 27 Utah 1, 73 P. 886; 86 Ark. 481, 111 S.W. 470; 98 S.E.2d 716; 201 Fed. 489, 119 C.C.A. 581; 111 Ark. 399, 163 S.W. 1177, L.R.A. 1915C 302, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 933; 69 Ark. 545, 64 S.W. 268; 163 Iowa 123, 142 N.W. 948; 91 Kan. 653, 138 P. 410, 51 L.R.A.N. S. 286; 32 S. 915; 177 S.W. 371; 218 N.Y. 1161, 112 N.E. 733, L.R.A. 1916F; 6 Okla. Cr. 398, 119 P. 139; 26 Philippine 503; 44 Tex. 642; 75 Tex. Cr. 110, 170 S.W. 739; 57 Tex. Cr. 605, 124 S.W. 661; 51 Wn. 372, 98 P. 741; 37 Tex. Cr. 339, 39 S.W. 935; 103 Indiana 142, 2 N.E. 349; 121 Mo. 604, 26 S.W. 364; 201 Fed. 489, 119 C.C.A. 581; 51 Wn. 372, 989 P. 741; 17 F.2d 973; 48 S.Ct. 20, 275 U.S. 527, 72 L.Ed. 408; 61 F. Supp. 919; 36 So.2d 897, 251 Ala. 314; 336 P.2d 169, 51 C.2d 751; 90 So.2d 704; 185 So. 625, 135 Fla. 548, 120 A.L.R. 742; 247 S.W. 376, 197 Ky. 416; 342 P.2d 1052, 135 Mont. 580; 112 N.E. 733, 218 N.Y. 161, L.R.A. 1916F, 1044; 113 N.E. 1064, 218 N.Y. 702; 71 N.Y.S.2d 830, 189 Misc. 602; 149 S.W.2d 96, 141 Tex. Cr. 456; 54 S.W.2d 515, 122 Tex. Cr. 171; 244 S.W. 1014, 92 Tex. Cir. 523; 200 S.W. 842, 82 Tex. Cer. 634; 98 S.E.2d 817, 199 Va. 184; 70 S.E.2d 293, 193 Va. 612; 73 S.Ct. 177, 344 U.S. 880, 97 L.Ed. 681; 73 S.Ct. 278, 344 U.S. 900, 97 L.Ed. 696; 107 P.2d 927, 6 Wn.2d 393; 351 P.2d 209, 67 N.M. 31; 247 S.W. 376, 197 Ky. 416; 69 Ark. 545, 64 S.W. 268; 12 Ga. A. 702, 78 S.E. 268; 193 Ill. A. 291; 218 N.Y. 161, 112 N.E. 733, L.R.A. 1916F, 1044; 42 Tex. Cr. 176, 58 S.W. 131; 131 Fed. 378; 193 Ill. A. 291; 42 Tex. Cr. 176, 58 S.W. 131; 24 F.2d 82; 82 S.Ct. 643; 177 S.E. 318, 174 S.C. 344; 194 S.E. 11, 185 S.C. 274; 22 S.E.2d 417, 201 S.C. 170; 145 S.E.2d 15, 246 S.C. 575; 22 S.E. 274. As to the Court's erring in failingto ascertain the facts constituting the acts for which thepleas were taken: 247 S.C. 475, 151 S.E.2d 221; 89 S.Ct. 1709. Philip Wingard, Esq., Sol. of Greenville, for Respondent. July 8, 1971.
R., 54 S.W.2d 515; Schwartz v. State (1941), 141 Tex.Crim. R., 149 S.W.2d 96; Powell v. Commonwealth (1922), 133 Va. 741, 112 S.E. 657, 33 A.L.R. 541; Hodnett v. City of Danville (1929), 152 Va. 955, 146 S.E. 281; State v. Elliott (1940), 6 Wn.2d 393, 107 P.2d 927. The proviso contained in § 9-2105, Burns' 1942 Replacement, that "every pleading, motion in writing, report, deposition or other paper, filed or offered to be filed, in any cause or proceeding, whether received by the court, refused or stricken out, shall be a part of the record from the time of such filing or offer to file" (italics supplied), is certainly broad enough to include affidavits filed as a part of and in support of a motion for new trial.
The general rule is that a new trial should be granted where a witness has testified to material inculpatory facts against the accused and after the verdict, but before the motion for new trial has been acted upon, makes an affidavit that he testified falsely. Williams v.State, 375 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.Crim.App. 1964); Schwartz v. State, 141 Tex.Crim. 456, 149 S.W.2d 96, 97 (App. 1941). Autry v. State, 718 S.W.2d 898, 902-903 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1986, pet. ref'd).
This new evidence, if believed by the jury, would have injected reasonable doubt into the case. Jones v. State, 711 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); see Schwartz v. State, 141 Tex.Crim. R., 149 S.W.2d 96 (1941). We hold that the new evidence, in the form of J_____D_____'s affidavit, was such as might cause a different verdict on another trial. Under the circumstances we conclude that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial.