[¶ 21.] “The authority of the trial court concerning sanctions is flexible and allows the court ‘broad discretion with regard to sanctions imposed thereunder for failure to comply with discovery orders.’ ” Schwartz v. Palachuk, 1999 S.D. 100, ¶ 23, 597 N.W.2d 442, 447 (quoting Chittenden & Eastman Co. v. Smith, 286 N.W.2d 314, 316 (S.D.1979)). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions.
Lowe v. Schwartz, 2006 SD 48, ¶ 8, 716 N.W.2d 777, 779 (quoting Walsh v. Larsen, 2005 SD 104, ¶ 6, 705 N.W.2d 638, 641). "An abuse of discretion consists of `a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.'" Schwartz v. Palachuk, 1999 SD 100, ¶ 16, 597 N.W.2d 442, 446 (quoting Hrachovec v. Kaarup, 516 N.W.2d 309, 311 (S.D. 1994)). The test for finding an abuse of discretion is "`whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached the conclusion.'"
[¶ 21.] We agree with the two trial courts in this case that court orders are not "invitations, requests or even demands; they are mandatory." Storm v. Durr 2003 SD 6, ¶ 17, 657 N.W.2d 34, 38 (quoting Schwartz v. Palachuk, 1999 SD 100, ¶ 23, 597 N.W.2d 442, 447). Mother has treated Grandparents' court-ordered visitation as a suggestion. She should not be heard to complain that the sanction for disregarding the order is too severe.
Those who totally ignore them . . . should not be heard to complain that a sanction was too severe." Storm v. Durr, 2003 SD 6, ¶ 17, 657 N.W.2d 34, 38 (quoting Schwartz v. Palachuk , 1999 SD 100, ¶ 23, 597 N.W.2d 442, 447). Jenco was expressly ordered to obtain new counsel and chose to disregard that order for thirty months. Plaintiff cannot be heard to complain now that the sanction was too harsh when compliance with the court's order was completely within Jenco's control. Jenco has not shown any reason for its failure to obtain substitute counsel nor has it shown that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice under SDCL 15-6-41(b) for failure to obey a court order.
Those who totally ignore them . . . should not be heard to complain that a sanction was too severe." Schwartz v. Palachuk, 1999 SD 100, ¶ 23, 597 N.W.2d 442, 447. [¶ 18.] To date, Storm has failed to show an absence of good cause to dismiss the action.
But for her defensive driving response, Mrs. Hansen's vehicle would have been drawn into the collision. Mrs. Hansen contemporaneously observed the collision causing serious injury to her brother. Nielson, 597 N.W.2d 442. Her allegation of emotional distress is based on her fear that her brother may suffer potentially serious injuries or death and was not caused by any "fear for . . . her own safety."
[¶ 25.] In attempting to establish a three-year requisite period of inactivity for dismissal under SDCL 15-6-41(b), Eischens attempt to distinguish Storm v. Durr, 2003 SD 6, 657 N.W.2d 34, Jenco, Inc., 2003 SD 79, 666 N.W.2d 763 and Schwartz v. Palachuk, 1999 SD 100, 597 N.W.2d 442, where the defendant's motions for dismissal was granted with shorter periods of delay. Eischens argue that the dismissals in these cases were granted because the plaintiff's disregarded or otherwise failed to follow a court order.